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Abstract:  
 This thesis outlines research that was conducted on the relationship between governance, 
public policy and the impacts of disasters.  Here, the vulnerability approach to disaster 
management is viewed through a political economy perspective, and I contend that political 
ideologies and economic structures influence vulnerability to disaster.  This perspective is taken 
in order to determine how vulnerability reduction fits into a political agenda that combines a 
strong central state with a liberal economy.  Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don were the most 
severely impacted of Thailand’s coastal communities in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.  These 
two communities are used as primary case studies for the research.  The population groups that 
were most vulnerable to the December 26, 2004 Asian tsunami are identified, and the social, 
environmental, political and economic factors that contributed to their vulnerability are analyzed.  
The methods of data collection for this project included interviews with key informants and with 
residents of Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don.  The conclusions drawn from the research fed into a 
series of recommendations designed to assist in ongoing disaster vulnerability reduction efforts 
in Thai and other developing country communities.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 Over the past century, the frequency of recorded disasters has increased dramatically 
(EM-DAT, 2005).  In 2004, disasters1 affected over 135 million and killed over 329 thousand 
people (EM-DAT, 2005).  However, many have argued that although disaster agents are rising 
vulnerability to hazards is increasing at a much faster pace and accounts for most of the increase 
in disaster events (Haque, 2003; David A. McEntire, 1999; Susman, O'Keefe, & Wisner, 1983; 
Varley, 1994).  Although the 1990s were declared the United Nations International Decade for 
Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR), the number of disasters increased during this decade (See 
                                                 
1 EM-DAT defines a hazard event as a disaster if one of the following criteria is met: 10 or more 
people are either confirmed as dead or have been missing and presume dead; 100 people are 
reported as affected; there is a declaration of a state of emergency; or if there is a call for 
international assistance. 
Figure I: Frequency of Disasters 
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Figure I) (Twigg, 1998).  At the 1994 IDNDR conference in Japan, representatives of the 
international community agreed that disaster management requires greater attention to 
community-based disaster mitigation which encourages participation in disaster mitigation and 
community planning (Newport & Jawahar, 2003; Twigg, 1998).  However, follow-up initiatives 
have been infrequent and have not been backed by adequate resources (Yodmani, 2001).  Unless 
social, political, economic, and environmental vulnerability is addressed pre-disaster, an 
increased frequency of disasters seems inevitable.   
 At 7:58 a.m. local time on December 26th 2004, the pressure between the Eurasian and 
Indian tectonic plates was suddenly relieved and the largest earthquake in over 50 years, an 
estimated magnitude of 9.3 on the Richter scale, resulted (RMS, 2006).  On Koh Phi Phi Don, 
the earthquake was neither felt nor learned of until much later that morning.  It was a quiet 
Sunday morning until one woman said to another “Oh, go see, your boat is on the sand” 
(Interview 2m, 2005).  “We ran together and were surprised that the big ferry was on the beach, 
there was no water.  Then, it started to come back very fast and every long tail boat was washed 
up on the land.  The water came to me and I said ‘Oh my God, where is my baby,’ but nobody 
talked because they were all running” (Interview 2m, 2005).    
 The Indian plate has been subducting beneath the Burma plate at an annual rate of 5 cm/ 
year, creating enormous unrelieved pressure.  Once this pressure was relieved through the 
earthquake, the Burma plate was displaced 4-5 meters upwards, along 1,200 kilometers of 
faultline, with a rupture width of over 300 kilometers (CCOP & DMR, 2006): the massive 
volume of water that was displaced almost instantaneously caused a devastating tsunami.   
 The affects of the Indian Ocean tsunami, including over 281,000 lives lost (ADPC, 2005) 
and roughly 1.5 million displaced, are not comparable to any disaster within modern history.  
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Although the western coast of Sumatra has a history of tsunamis, there has not been one with 
such a large magnitude since 1861 (RMS, 2006).  In the wake of such a large-scale disaster, 
disaster relief agencies, humanitarian organizations and academics have been challenged to 
adjust and reinvent disaster management strategies. The Andaman-Sumatra earthquake and the 
resultant tsunami caused overwhelming impacts in Thailand, Indonesia, India and Sri Lanka and 
has stimulated the search for more effective disaster management and preparedness strategies in 
order to decrease future vulnerability to tsunamis and other disasters in South-East Asia. 
1.1  Structure of Thesis 
 In the first chapter of this thesis, I identify my research problem, goals, questions and 
research rationale.  In the second and third chapters, I outline the context of my research within 
two main bodies of literature: vulnerabilities literature, in which I define vulnerability and situate 
the “vulnerability approach” within the broader field of disaster management; and literature on 
the neoliberal economic model and state-led development, in which I trace the benefits and 
limitations of each system on disaster vulnerability.  The fourth chapter offers a breakdown of 
my research methods, details the phases of my research in the field, and provides background 
information for my case study site.  Following the methodology, the fifth chapter of this thesis 
provides information on the geophysical processes that occur in a tsunami, and specifically 
discusses the events of the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004.  The sixth chapter describes and 
summarizes the research results.  A critical analysis and discussion of the research findings is 
provided in the seventh chapter, while the research limitations, broader implications of the 
findings and considerations for future disaster management strategies are outlined in the 
concluding eighth chapter of the thesis. 
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1.2 Research Problem 
 Vulnerability, in the context of disaster management, has been widely explored in 
disaster management literature; however the link between vulnerability and governance, 
particularly governance in coastal zones, has been under-studied.  This thesis investigates the 
relationship between political ideology, public policy, national governance and vulnerability to 
disaster using two case studies: Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don, Thailand.  In Thailand, Khao 
Lak and Koh Phi Phi experienced the greatest devastation by the tsunami and I hypothesized that 
vulnerability in these places was considerably influenced by political structures and authorities.  
Here I focus on the causes of human vulnerability pre-tsunami and seek to reveal the underlying 
political, environmental, economic and social factors that influenced vulnerability for residents 
and tourists of Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don.  It is my hypothesis that both global and national 
political structures influenced the socio-economic landscape in Thailand and therefore shaped 
disaster vulnerability.  
1.3 Research Rationale 
 The paradigmatic shift in disaster management, my confidence in the vulnerability 
approach to disasters, and the devastating impacts of the December 26th tsunami for residents of 
Kao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don, have all influenced and steered this thesis.  Pre-1970s, the 
prevailing ‘dominant’ approach to disaster management considered that disasters were singular 
and natural ‘acts of God’.  However, this perspective encouraged only a reaction to disasters 
rather than preparedness for disaster.  As a result, disasters were far more destructive than 
necessary.  Gilbert F. White (1961), Robert W. Kates (1962) and Ian Burton et al., (1968) were 
the first to challenge the dominant approach and to recognize that disasters are usually, in part, 
human-invoked.  This assertion was the starting point of a paradigm shift towards the ‘alternative 
approach’ to disasters.  This alternative approach is based on the notion that disasters are 
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resultant of human behaviors and problems with development.  However, in the past decade, 
some disaster management theorists have combined these approaches to establish a ‘holistic’ 
approach, which understands disasters as products of both physical and human invoked causes.  
Here, I understand disasters from the holistic perspective: the combination of a natural ‘trigger 
event’ with human-invoked vulnerability.  More specifically, I adopt the vulnerability approach 
to disaster management which has roots in the alternative perspective and is valuable because it 
seeks to understand: why a disaster happened; what its impact has been; why it affected a certain 
population; and how to estimate future risk (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989).   
 There are various lenses through which the vulnerability approach has been observed.  
For some authors, vulnerability to disasters has been conceptualized as the susceptibility of a 
community to a hazard (Hewitt 1997). For others, vulnerability is influenced by industrial 
development and technological processes (McEntire 2001).  Wisner and Luce (1993) take the 
approach that vulnerabilities are revealed by analyzing daily behaviors, actions and patterns, 
while others take an ecological approach in which vulnerability is rooted in environmental 
fragility (Bryant & Bailey, 1997).  Political economic approaches to vulnerability have been used 
in a number of disciplines, and essentially understand vulnerability as a phenomenon related to 
economic class.  The ‘Political Economy Approach’ was derived from the theory or 
marginalization (Susman et al., 1983) and is focused on the affects of economic and political 
powers on vulnerability (Greenberg & Thomas, 1994).  However, the political economy 
approach was criticized for not giving adequate attention to environmental influences on 
vulnerability. Thus the Political Ecology perspective originated out of a need to integrate human 
ecology, political economy and development studies perspectives (P. Blaikie & Brookfield, 
1987; Wisner, 2005a).  In this research, I take both a political economy and political ecology 
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approach.  The political economy approach enables investigation into the influences of 
capitalism on disaster vulnerability, while the political ecology approach is geared towards 
understanding the linkages between human agency, policy and environment. There are a number 
of advantages to the political ecology approach: it aims for research to integrate social, 
environmental and political factors; it focuses on understanding local to global dynamics; and it 
seeks to understand the different vulnerabilities human groups face depending on their class, 
gender, age, and geography (Stonich, 1993).  The political ecology perspective also enables the 
investigation of the influence of political ideology on disaster vulnerability.  Although one of my 
objectives is to demonstrate whether capitalist motivations can increase vulnerability, I do not 
presume that vulnerability to disaster would be less extreme under a socialist state.  In contrast I 
recognize that, for developed countries, capitalism has increased economic security and has 
therefore dramatically reduced hazard vulnerability.  Western economic and political systems 
have significantly reduced vulnerability through national emergency preparedness and 
management programs, improved disaster tracking technology and warning systems, education 
programs on hazard awareness and response, and increased community participation in disaster 
relief and response initiatives.  The disaster reduction that has occurred as a result of capitalistic 
development should not be overlooked.  However, disaster theorists have a responsibility to 
remember that in some places “the skewed distribution of resources associated with capitalism 
increases liabilities and reduces capacities” (David A. McEntire, 2001, 192).  Diasporas of 
wealth often limit the opportunity for people to reduce vulnerabilities. 
 I traveled to Koh Phi Phi Don in October of 2002 on a four day backpacking trip.  As a 
small-town southern Ontarian, my trip to Koh Phi Phi offered a tropical paradise experience in 
which I experienced enchanting differences in environment, climate and people.  The December 
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26th, 2004 tsunami triggered personal sympathy for the Koh Phi Phi Don community, and it was 
the connection that I felt to the island that motivated this thesis.  The enormity of this disaster 
and its impacts, specifically for those economically and socially marginalized, moved me to 
review and evaluate disaster management approaches and to study the influence of local 
governance on vulnerability.   
1.4 Research Goals and Objectives 
 The broad aim of my research was to determine how Thailand’s political environment 
influenced the way in which Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi residents were impacted by the 
December 26th tsunami.  As such, I seek to: 
a) Identify how national and local public policy influenced the vulnerability on Khao 
Lak and Koh Phi Phi; 
b) Determine the degree to which economic inequalities, socio-political 
marginalization, and the environmental landscape influenced vulnerability to the 
Asian tsunami for Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don residents; and  
c) Influence re-development through recommendations on how to reduce future 
disaster vulnerability. 
 In order that these goals are reached it was necessary that my research address a number 
of questions:  
a) Is the political ideology of Thailand compatible with vulnerability reduction? 
b) Is vulnerability reduction (with goals of equity) possible through state-led 
development? 
c) Are free-market capitalism and vulnerability reduction ideologically compatible? 
















Focus on Response and 
Recovery 
2 THE VULNERABILITY APPROACH TO DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT 
 The vulnerability approach is a key framework in disaster management and “governs the 
art of disaster mitigation” (Winchester, 1992, ix).   My objective here is to situate the 
vulnerability approach within the broader context of disaster mitigation. In order to do this, in 
this chapter I define disaster mitigation and examine its benefits and limits; define the 
vulnerability approach and document its theoretical evolution; review current vulnerabilities 
perspectives; and compare vulnerabilities approaches to evaluate their significance.  I also 
explore the ‘holistic’ approach to disaster management and demonstrate how it merges the 
‘alternative’ and ‘dominant’ perspectives.  I also identify the unique components of the holistic 
approach and reveal those characteristics which have been named by some authors as ‘original’ 
but which I contend are only marginally different from previous perspectives.   
2.1 Defining Disaster Mitigation  
 Disaster management encompasses a broad range of disaster relief and management 
strategies.  Figure II names the 
disaster strategies referred to in 
this paper and illustrates how 
these are situated within the 
broader realm of disaster 
management.  As shown in 
Figure II, disaster mitigation is 
situated with two other pre-
disaster planning techniques: disaster prevention and disaster preparedness.  Although disaster 
Figure II: Disaster Management Approaches 
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mitigation has not traditionally been a priority for development organizations, there has recent 
been a call for integration between disaster relief and development initiatives (Yodmani 2001; 
(Moench, 2005).  Disaster mitigation: focuses on capacity building and reducing vulnerability; 
recognizes the importance of managing rather than preventing hazards and; seeks to combine 
disaster relief and redevelopment.  It is the third premise which is particularly significant and 
will be further explored here.   
2.2 Understanding Disasters and Disaster Management 
 In order to understand vulnerability to disasters, it is important to identify the meaning of 
disaster in the context of the vulnerability approach.  From a vulnerability standpoint, disasters 
are seen as the combination of a trigger agent (or hazard) and human vulnerability, which often 
results from problems with development (i.e. development on unsafe land, poor enforcement of 
building codes or land use policies) (David A. McEntire, 2001; O'Keefe, Westgate, & Wisner, 
1994; Yodmani, 2001).  For this thesis, I adopt Randolph Kent’s (1987) definition: “a disaster 
occurs when a disaster agent exposes the vulnerability of a group or groups in such a way that 
their lives are directly threatened or sufficient harm has been done to economic and social 
structures, inevitably undermining their ability to survive” (Kent, 1987, 4).  More simply, 
disaster is “the interface between an extreme physical event and a vulnerable human population” 
(Susman et al., 1983, 264)2. 
                                                 
2 DISASTER= Hazard + Vulnerable Population. 
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2.3 Shifts in the Disaster Management Paradigm 
 Understandings of disaster have changed significantly over time.  During the early and 
mid 1900s, the ‘dominant perspective’ understood disasters as ‘acts of God,’3 while, in the 
1970s, anthropologists and social geographers conceptualized a new ‘alternative’ view of 
disasters which discredited the dominant approach (David A. McEntire, 2001; Varley, 1994; 
Weichselgartner, 2001).  Although preceded by Burton et al. (1978), Kenneth Hewitt (1983) was 
among the first to contest what he called the ‘dominant view’ of disaster management and 
became a leading vulnerabilities theorist.  Hewitt (1983) contended that the dominant approach 
to disasters missed “the main sources of social influence over hazards” by focusing only on how 
disasters are attributed to nature (Hewitt, 1983, 7).  The ‘dominant perspective’ to disaster 
management, he argued, views disasters as singular and normal ‘natural’ or physical events in 
the path of development, and fails to address human behaviors as contributors to disaster (Twigg, 
1998).  In practice, this perspective is inadequate as it facilitates ‘reaction to disaster’ instead of 
allowing for disaster preparedness and mitigation pre-disaster.  The ‘alternative perspective’ 
more appropriately views both disaster preparedness and mitigation as important and recognizes 
that, in addition to the characteristics of physical/natural hazard phenomena, human behavior and 
patterns of development also influence the severity of disaster.  While the dominant perspective 
views geophysical processes as the centre of disasters, the alternative perspective more fittingly 
accounts for human interaction with and on the environment.  Thus, the major difference 
between the alternative and dominant approaches to disasters is that the alternative perspective 
links disasters to societal development.  For example, McEntire (1999) and Haque (2003) 
theorize that the increase in the number of disasters is related to the increase in numbers of 
                                                 
3 Acts of God are defined as a fatalistic “syndrome whereby individuals feel no personal 
responsibility for hazard response and wish to avoid expenditure on risk reduction” Smith, K. 
(1996 p. 70).  
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vulnerable people.  That is, as societies adopt ill-advised development agendas, the number of 
vulnerable people increases.  Consequently, in disaster situations, a greater number of people are 
affected.   
 The recently developed 
‘holistic approach’4 combines the 
alternative and dominant 
approaches and is valuable because 
it recognizes the importance of 
both natural and human-made 
forces in affecting vulnerability.  
This approach suggests that the 
‘alternative’ approach (and its 
focus on socio-economic and 
political causes of disaster) should 
be combined with the ‘dominant’ 
understanding of environmental agents (Alexander, 1993; Cardona, 2003; David A. McEntire, 
2001).  McEntire (2001) argues that the dominant perspective needs to expand its explanation of 
disasters beyond natural causes, while the ‘alternative perspective’ should expand its point of 
view beyond the social, economic and political realms (David A. McEntire, 2001).  Although the 
‘holistic approach’ is considered ‘new’ for integrating natural and human-influenced 
vulnerability, the ‘alternative approach’ did not completely ignore natural hazards as influential 
                                                 
4 The holistic perspective to disasters, “takes into account multiple sources, catalytic processes, 
and the compound interaction of physical, built, technological and social systems” (McEntire 
2001, p.190). 
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to disaster, rather its focus was on social processes.  In fact Hewitt (1983) asserted that “it would 
be wrong to suggest that events associated with flood or earthquake in no way reflect the nature 
of…geophysical processes” (Hewitt, 1983, 25). Still, the holistic approach has merit because it 
focuses more evenly on the natural and human invoked causes of disaster.  Pelling and Uitto 
(2001) also call for a holistic approach to disaster management and believe that disaster theorists 
should extend their focus in order to understand the influence of broader political and economic 
structures and patterns on disaster vulnerability (Pelling & Uitto, 2001).  This argument 
complements a shift in development discourse which has involved critique of ‘alternative 
development’ and grassroots initiatives.  Still, theorists should strive to understand local-level 
vulnerabilities in the context of broader socio-political structures, rather than framing 
vulnerabilities solely as resultant of either local patterns or larger political structures.  The 
‘holistic perspective of disaster,’ geared towards development and economic progress to address 
vulnerability was the starting point for McEntire’s (2000) concept of ‘invulnerable 
development.’5 Invulnerable development was established as a development plan aimed at 
identifying the capacities of an area and reducing both physical and social vulnerabilities (D. A. 
McEntire, 2000).  One advantage of invulnerable development is its emphasis on identifying the 
different actors (i.e. government bodies, civil society and NGOs) that influence vulnerability.  In 
this way, the invulnerable development approach has the potential to understand local 
vulnerabilities in the context of broader political agendas. 
 There are a number of lenses through which the alternative perspective has been viewed.  
Some of these include: the influence of industrial development and technology on vulnerability 
(David A. McEntire, 2001); urban vulnerability; disasters and gender (Anderson & Woodrow, 
                                                 
5 Weichselgartner defines invulnerable development as “development pursued in such a manner 
as to address vulnerabilities” (Weichselgartner, 2002 p. 151).  
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1989; Cutter, 1995); disasters in daily life; and the political economy and political ecology 
perspectives (Pulwarty & Riebsame, 1997).  Each of these is valuable, but the political economy 
and political ecology perspectives are best suited to analyzing disaster vulnerability as it relates 
to issues of governance.  The political ecology approach though is appropriate to this study as it 
“applies methods of political economy in ecological contexts” (Wilson, 1996, 76) and is 
primarily concerned with the ways that economic and political actors influence the human-
environmental relationship and the impacts of these relationships on the environment.  Thus, the 
political ecology approach is useful for analyzing the affects of economic and political agents on 
the environment.  However, I am not only concerned with the influence of political and 
economic actors on environmental change, but am also interested in investigating the influence 
of these actors on human vulnerability.  The political economy perspective fulfills this area of the 
study as it is concerned with the ways that vulnerability is influenced by capitalistic styles of 
development (Cannon, 2000; Maskrey, 1989; Yodmani, 2001).  The political economy approach 
to disasters is particularly relevant to this study because it asserts that financial security is 
increasingly dependent on the ability of a person to integrate, at the very least, into his local 
economy, but more likely on his/her ability to participate in the global economy (Wisner, 2003).  
It also maintains that it is the most poor who are often forced to locate and develop livelihoods in 
environmentally insecure areas.     
 The political economy perspective to disasters has grown in the past decade and has been 
paralleled by a tendency to view disasters as at least partially a result of human-invoked causes.  
For example, McEntire (2001) states that “the skewed distribution of resources associated with 
capitalism increases liabilities and reduces capacities” and “capitalism must be altered if not 
carefully held in check” (David A. McEntire, 2001, 192).  Although this plea may be legitimate, 
   
 14 
it is idealistic and improbable to hope that the global economic system will change.  Until then, 
political economists should strive for an approach that could sufficiently decrease vulnerability 
to natural hazards and maintain economic security for those previously vulnerable.  Disaster 
strategists should also acknowledge, however, the global spread of Western style capitalism, and 
that people are dependent and attached to the capitalistic economic system.  Although a number 
of vulnerability reduction approaches exist, none seek to integrate critiques of capitalism and 
vulnerability reduction, and this is an approach that should be investigated.   
2.4 Combining Disaster Relief and Development 
 Disaster mitigation is a pre-disaster scheme that is situated among disaster prevention and 
disaster preparedness.  These approaches are underlined by the argument that there has been too 
much focus on relief from disasters and there needs to be emphasis on the planning for and 
management of disasters (Alley, 1993).  Cuny (1983) argues that disaster prevention is expensive 
and suggests that because disasters are important and often positive events for the environment, 
they should not be ‘prevented’, but should be prepared for and managed (Cuny, 1983).  Disaster 
preparedness involves reducing vulnerability and building local capacity (including the ability to 
respond and recover from disaster).  However, it is disaster mitigation which focuses on 
combining disaster management and development.  This combination has been widely advocated 
within the past decade: (McAllister, 1993; David A. McEntire, 2001, 2004; Mileti, 1999).  
Disaster mitigation has four key objectives: to minimize destruction of a hazard; to reduce 
physical vulnerability; to reduce economic vulnerability; and to strengthen community social 
structures.  
 Ideally, combining development and disaster relief organizations would reduce 
vulnerability; however, there are two main barriers to effective disaster mitigation.  First, disaster 
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mitigation requires a certain level of development (Cuny, 1983).  The aim to reduce physical, 
economic and environmental vulnerability assumes that political and social systems exist that 
will enable economic restructuring.  This restructuring would be more plausible in a nation has a 
stable political and economic system, but it is more often countries that lack solid political and 
economic institutions which experience the greatest impacts of disaster.  The second problem is 
with the practical implementation of disaster mitigation.  Theoretically, a combined development 
and disaster relief approach is ideal, but the integration of these is difficult: combining 
development and disaster relief initiatives requires larger time and financial commitments by aid 
agencies, greater assistance from international donors (for developing country disasters), and can 
produce host-country clearance difficulties for aid agencies when disaster relief efforts extend 
into development projects. For example, the December 26, 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean 
devastated the Aceh province in Indonesia.  However, as a result of political turmoil and fights 
for independence the government initially refused external relief for the province (Keys, 
Masterman-Smith, & Cottle, 2004).   
 Despite these problems, pre-disaster planning has a number of important benefits.  
Disaster mitigation reduces vulnerability; decreases the potential for human suffering; builds on 
local capacity; focuses on managing rather than preventing hazards; provides a framework for 
relief organizations; and integrates development and disaster relief (O'Keefe et al., 1994).  
O’Keefe, Westgate et al. (1994) indicate that pre-disaster planning is appropriate because it aims 
to “consider and alleviate the causes and not merely the symptoms of disaster” (O'Keefe et al., 
1994, 96).  From this perspective, development after relief is particularly important.  Since 
disaster relief often returns disaster victims to their pre-disaster social and economic positions, it 
is less effective at decreasing vulnerability to future disasters (Baird, O'Keefe, Westgate, & 
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Wisner, 1975).  Disaster mitigation, on the other hand, aims to increase the standard of living for 
people instead of returning populations to their pre-disaster status (O'Keefe et al., 1994).   
 The term ‘resiliency’ has been an important concept in the paradigm of disaster 
management.  Disaster resilience is described as a characteristic of households or communities 
enabling recovery after a disaster (Pelling & Uitto, 2001).  Resilient communities are built when 
the worlds of relief and development integrate local, national and global institutions and 
organizations in meaningful ways: “disaster resilient communities means that disaster reduction 
is everyone’s responsibility” (Briceño, 2004, 235).  Disaster resilience can involve community 
and household preparedness, including obvious preparation measures such as: community 
evacuation plans, financial contingency plans, and escape routes.  However, resilience also 
extends to social capital and community cohesiveness.  Communities become more resilient to 
disaster situations when they seek to build on existing social capital.  Both formal and informal 
connections between people can enhance community cohesion and can unite community 
members.  Social capital can increase a community’s ability to adapt and respond during a 
disaster (Pelling, 2003). One restriction is that social capital is often linked to household 
members’ livelihoods and economic resources: even basic interaction with neighbors may be 
restricted if a household has little means to reciprocate something as minor as dinner invitations.  
Thus, resilience is often “enhanced by stimulating local economic development” (Pelling & 
Uitto, 2001, 55) at the household or community levels. 
 Two of the most well-known disaster relief organizations that have combined disaster 
relief and development are The Red Cross and Red Crescent societies.  These have shifted focus 
from relief to development, are now concerned with disaster preparedness and disaster mitigation 
contending that ‘Band-aid assistance is inadequate’ (McAllister, 1993).  However, to date, few 
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other development-focused agencies have attempted to integrate disaster management into their 
mission (Yodmani, 2001). Nevertheless, most vulnerabilities theorists continue to argue for the 
integration of disaster relief activities and development initiatives (David A. McEntire, 2001; 
O'Keefe et al., 1994).  In order to adequately reduce vulnerabilities, “precautionary planning 
needs to be totally integrated into planning for real development,” but this would take 
considerable integration and cooperation between governmental, bilateral, and non-governmental 
organizations (David A. McEntire, 2001; O'Keefe et al., 1994,96 ).  
2.5 The Vulnerabilities Approach to Disaster Management 
 Vulnerability is one lens through which disaster mitigation can be viewed.  The initial 
establishment of the concept of ‘vulnerability’ had roots in the social sciences (Cannon, 2000) 
and the approach “serves as a focal point to enable understanding of the unique and complicated 
relationship between development and disasters” (David A. McEntire, 2004, 197).  The term 
vulnerability has been used in a number of disciplines and its meaning varies depending on the 
context in which it is used (Vatsa, 2004).  In the past decade, vulnerability has been used in the 
disciplines of risk, hazard and disaster mitigation (Weichselgartner, 2001).  In this thesis, I use 
vulnerability in the context of disaster management, and in this context, it has been widely 
agreed that vulnerability is defined as the degree at which people are susceptible to hazard (Baird 
et al., 1975; Piers Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, & Wisner, 1994; Hewitt, 1997; Lewis, 1999; Maskrey, 
1989; Winchester, 1992).   
 The vulnerability approach to disaster management was introduced in the 1970s and 
stemmed from the ‘alternative perspective’.  One of the tenets of the alternative approach is that 
human behavior determines the level of vulnerability in the event of a disaster (M. R. Bhatt, 
1998; Piers Blaikie et al., 1994; Hewitt, 1983; David A. McEntire, 2001; Winchester, 1992).  
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The vulnerability approach, not surprisingly, takes vulnerability as the starting point for 
understanding why a disaster happened who it impacted, why it impacted a particular group, and 
how to estimated future vulnerability (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989).  This approach is important 
because it aims to reduce future vulnerabilities.  The emphasis of the vulnerability approach is on 
“how communities are exposed to dangers or become unsafe,” but the focus is on those who are 
affected (Hewitt, 1997, 141).   
 Vulnerabilities are dynamic and are always in a state of flux, (Alcántara-Ayala, 2002; 
Downing & Bakker, 1999; Lewis, 1999; David A. McEntire, 2001; Vatsa, 2004). They exist 
before a disaster occurs, they contribute to the severity of the disaster, they restrict appropriate 
responses to the disaster; and continue after the disaster has subsided (Anderson & Woodrow, 
1989).  Hewitt (1997) believes that the vulnerability approach sees risk as originating in 
vulnerability: vulnerability refers to the inability of people to influence the societal processes 
which determine security.  This perspective effectively demonstrates the difficulty of changing 
larger political and social structures; however it makes assumptions about the desire of 
individuals to change them.  Although people are often restricted from ‘societal processes which 
determine security’ many are also unwilling to participate.  Hewitt’s (1997) statement suggests 
that those vulnerable to disaster have a desire to influence and participate in broader political 
structures, but are ‘unable’ to do so because of restrictions beyond their control.  However, this is 
not necessarily the case.  In some cases, individuals perpetuate their own vulnerability because 
they are not interested in participating in political processes or community meetings, or decide 
not to participate in risk reduction activities such as household disaster preparedness.   
 Blaikie et al. (1994) situate vulnerability in an equation for risk: Risk= Vulnerability+ 
Hazard and this equation has been adopted by many theorists (Piers Blaikie et al., 1994; 
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Maskrey, 1989; Twigg, 1998; Vatsa, 2004).  This equation is somewhat problematic because it 
views vulnerability as static.  However with a slight adjustment, Lewis (1999) formulated a more 
appropriate equation: Risk=Vulnerability x Hazard.  This equation is more accurate because it 
considers that there are always multiple factors of vulnerability (poverty, gender, ethnicity, age 
etc.) and suggests that a greater number of vulnerable characteristics (ie. poverty, gender, and 
ethnicity) can cause disaster vulnerability to increase exponentially.  In addition this equation 
suggests that more extreme hazard events multiply existing vulnerabilities and magnify risk even 
more than Blaikie et al.’s (1994) equation would suggest. 
 While Hewitt (1997) and Blaikie et al. (1994) focus on risk, Anderson and Woodrow 
(1989) and Warmington (1995) perceive that vulnerabilities result from long-term factors that 
affect a community’s ability to withstand disasters or respond to and recover from them 
effectively.  Vulnerabilities exist before disasters, and continuing inattention to problems with 
development or inequities in society will result in the perpetuation of vulnerability to disaster.  
Despite some conceptual variations regarding vulnerability, vulnerability theorists take 
vulnerability reduction as the starting point for disaster management.   
2.5.1 Goals of the Vulnerability Approach 
 Advocates of the vulnerability approach suggest two broad goals: 1) to reduce physical, 
social and economic vulnerability, and; 2) to increase capacity to cope with hazards.  However, 
there are also more specific goals which vary between vulnerability researchers.   
 For Hewitt (1997) the aim of the vulnerability approach is to “examine the ways in which 
people are actually at risk: their frailties, lack of protection and limited survival capacities” 
(Hewitt, 1997, 143).  McEntire (2001) suggests that changes in industrial development, 
environmental management and technological processes are needed in order to reduce 
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vulnerability to hazards, however his approach does not give adequate attention to the influence 
of social, political and economic processes on vulnerability.  Wisner and Luce (1993) take a 
much more ‘local’ approach to vulnerability reduction, arguing that the vulnerability approach 
should be focused on analyzing ‘vulnerabilities in daily life’ (Wisner & Luce, 1993).  Although 
this approach would be useful for reducing individual vulnerability, it would be difficult to apply 
such a scheme on a regional or national scale.  Similarly, Alcántara-Ayala (2002) and 
(Winchester, 1992) believe that the key to understanding vulnerability is understanding the 
concept at a household level.  This claim has merit in that it considers how household decisions 
impact broader socioeconomic and political systems, but Alley (1993) noted that pre-disaster 
planning is more appropriately focused at the community- rather than household-level.  
 Community-level disaster management focuses on involving the entire community in 
disaster mitigation plans and strategies.  In fact, “a critical element of sustainable disaster 
management is communities’ participation” (Pandey & Okazaki, 2005, 2).  Community disaster 
management integrates local authorities, civil society and aid agencies (in that order), but places 
communities at the forefront.  Community-based disaster management stemmed from 
recognition that those who are vulnerable are the best at describing their needs and capacities 
(Pandey & Okazaki, 2005).  Involving an entire community in disaster management increases 
disaster resilience since those who would be affected by the disaster are also those who were 
responsible for preparing disaster plans and implementing them.  In addition, community-based 
initiatives have the potential to influence household decision making and maintain access to 
regional officials and decision makers.  
 A broad array of vulnerability approaches exists, but selection of an appropriate disaster 
management method is dependent on a number of factors, including the type of disaster and the 
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geographical position of those at risk.  Thus, before choosing a vulnerability approach, it is 
important to identify the vulnerable area and define the specific factors influencing 
vulnerabilities in that location. 
2.6 Indicators of Vulnerability 
 Both the alternative and vulnerability approaches focus on the concept that vulnerability 
is, at least partially, socially produced through human behavior and mismanaged development.  
Most often, political, social and economic structures are highlighted as key factors that 
contribute to vulnerability (Alcántara-Ayala, 2002; Cardona, 2003; Maskrey, 1989).  However, 
some scholars perceive different factors that influence vulnerability.  For example, Wisner 
(2005) focuses specifically on livelihood security, McEntire (2001) stresses physical and 
technological variables, and both Mileti (1999) and McEntire (2001) mention cultural attitudes 
(i.e. feelings of apathy towards disasters, breakdown of traditional coping measures and fatalistic 
attitudes towards disasters)  as major causes of increased vulnerability to disasters.  Aside from 
the economic, political and social processes that are theorized to influence vulnerability, Pelling 
and Uitto (2002) suggest that environmental and geographical processes are also key 
considerations.  Cannon (2000) frames these indicators differently, and argues that vulnerability 
originates in: physical fragility; socio-economic fragility; and lack of resilience.  Despite the 
semantic differences between the factors identified by each of these theorists, there is little 
difference in how they understand vulnerability more broadly.  The factors most consistently 
perceived to influence vulnerability include the: political, economic, cultural, environmental and 
social.  Each of these will be addressed in more detail here (See Figure IV). 
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 Political structures significantly impact vulnerability to disasters.  Vulnerabilities, as 
Hewitt (1997) suggests, “are embedded in, and more or less fully subject to, actions and 
developments at all levels of governments” (Hewitt, 1997, 164).    
 Canada Corp and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) define 
governance as “the set of rules, traditions and the practices that define who the decision-makers 
are, how they get to be decision-makers in the first place, the kinds of decisions they can make, 
the purpose they’re supposed to be serving, to whom they have to listen when they make 
decisions, where their money comes from, and to whom they’re accountable for their actions” 
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(CIDA, 2005).  The concept of ‘good governance’6 originated in the neoliberal development 
paradigm, specifically in a 1989 World Bank report on Sub-Saharan Africa, and reflected the 
World Bank’s concern for state involvement in economics (Santiso, 2001).  However, since then 
the term ‘good governance’ has been conceived more broadly and assumes that “a transparent, 
accountable, participatory, and effective state will reduce corruption, increase growth and 
promote democracy” (Orlandini, 2003, p.18).  The attributes of good governance include: 
upholding the rule of law; promoting human rights; making sound economic choices; and 
ensuring transparent, participatory and accountable decision-making processes (UN, 2005).  In 
contrast, bad governance is defined to include “failures by governments to provide good and 
efficient public services; failures to manage the fiscal and the budget problems of the country; 
and failures to prevent bureaucratic and political corruption” (Phongpaichit, 2001, p.1). 
 Governance influences disaster vulnerability by shaping public policy, guiding 
development processes and outcomes, and organizing decision makers.  In societies with high 
numbers of vulnerable people, it is likely that the political environment is corrupt and that 
governance is illegitimate but powerful (Hewitt, 1997).  Political structures extend from national 
politicians to local government officials.  If managed inadequately, policies implemented by 
these structures reinforce inequities and further vulnerability (Sarewitz, Roger Pielke, & 
Keykhah, 2003).  Economic processes are often integrated within political structures and also 
contribute to disaster vulnerability (Piers Blaikie et al., 1994).  Often, deficiencies in economic 
well-being lead people to face environmental factors which contribute to vulnerability (Comfort 
                                                 
6 According to UNESCAP, good governance is “participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, 
transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of 
law.  It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and 
that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making.  It is also 
responsive to the present and future needs of society” (UNESCAP, 2005)  
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et al., 1999{Twigg, 1998 #32).  For example, exposed coasts are often inhabited by people 
whose livelihoods are dependent on fishing and tourist vending.  Thus, in many cases, the poor 
must risk environmental insecurity in order to survive economically.  Lack of economic security 
“force many of the poor to settle in cheap but dangerous locations” (Twigg, 1998, 2) thereby 
increasing vulnerability to disaster and restricting recovery post-disaster.  Socio-cultural 
organization can also impede or enhance the ability of a population to cope with disaster.  For 
instance, social marginalization may restrict individual access to community resources, social 
networks and support systems.  By contrast, strong social roots are beneficial during times of 
disaster: resources can be pooled and strong support systems can motivate and empower 
recovery.   
2.6.1 Defining Vulnerable Areas 
 Vulnerability is not consistent across space, in fact, levels of risk and factors of 
vulnerability vary significantly across the globe and even within communities (Hewitt, 1997).  
Although local vulnerability can be defined in the event of a disaster, there are broader global 
trends that make it possible to identify vulnerable areas and to make assumptions about future 
populations at risk.  Most disaster management theorists agree that developing countries 
experience the greatest loss of life per disaster, and that vulnerabilities in the global South are 
increasing (Alcántara-Ayala, 2002; O'Keefe et al., 1994; Wijkman & Timberlake, 1984).  
However, some take a more hazard-based approach to vulnerability and argue that those most 
vulnerable to disasters are “those living in the most precarious physical environments” 
(Liverman, 1994; McAllister, 1993; O'Brien, Eriksen, Schjolden, & Nygaard, 2004, 3).  If 
disaster management was conceptualized as a continuum between those who viewed 
vulnerability as a result of natural/environmental causes (dominant approach) and those who 
   
 25 
viewed vulnerability as resultant of human behaviors (alternative approach), researchers such 
as Liverman (1994) would be situated nearer the dominant side.  This is because she observes 
that people “living in areas likely to experience sea level rise, increasing storminess, drier 
conditions, or heavier flooding” are more vulnerable to disaster (Liverman, 1994, 329).  
Despite the importance of human-influenced factors that contribute to vulnerability, physical 
location and vulnerability are certainly related.   
 
2.6.2 Social Vulnerability: Defining Vulnerable People 
 The impacts of a disaster are not consistent across populations (Anderson & Woodrow, 
1989), however, theorists have identified characteristics that are consistent among vulnerable 
groups and have argued that certain groups are especially vulnerable.  Members of lower 
economic and cultural classes, minority groups, women, the disabled, youth, and the elderly are 
all typically more prone to disaster than their counterpart populations (Fordham, 2003; Wisner, 
1999, 2005a; Yodmani, 2001).  If people hold one or more of these characteristics it will increase 
the likelihood that they will experience greater vulnerability to disaster.   
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It is also important to mention that these factors of vulnerability are relational and can 
magnify the effects of other factors (Wisner, 2005a).  For example, a woman may experience 
economic insecurity because of her gender.  As a result of economic insecurity she might have 
limited access to resources leading to poverty and being labeled as ‘lower class.’  This low social 
position might limit her ability to make important social contacts that could enable her to 
establish a better livelihood.  Thus, characteristics of vulnerable people act on one another and 
are resultant of one another (Wisner, 2005a).   
Socio-economic characteristics can also restrict access to risk reduction techniques 
(Comfort et al., 1999).  For example, a person’s class may inhibit his/her ability to obtain 
insurance, social marginalization as a result of ethnicity or physical ability may decrease access 
to community assistance programs or neighborhood help, and gender could influence access to 
community decision makers and relief programs.  Human behaviors and characteristics can 
influence ability to tap into risk reduction techniques and can impede a whole community’s 
potential to bounce back from disaster (Comfort et al., 1999).  The combined characteristics of 
any individual influence his/her connectedness to their community and influence his/her ability 
to respond to a disaster (Morrow, 1999).  Although demographic characteristics are relational, 
each trait influences vulnerability for different reasons and it is therefore important to investigate 
how each of the five characteristics (class, ethnicity, gender, physical ability, and age) influence 
disaster vulnerability. 
2.6.2.1 Economic Class 
 An individual’s class in society has been used as a key measure of vulnerability (Hewitt, 
1997; Vatsa, 2004; Wijkman & Timberlake, 1984; Wisner & Luce, 1993).  Vasta (2004) believes 
that those with “fewer assets, almost no insurance, and less diversified sources of income” are 
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more prone to disaster (Vatsa, 2004, 2).  Wijkman and Timberlake (1984) agree that in a disaster 
situation it is the poor who suffer the most.  In fact, countries with low human development 
indices experience on average 1052 deaths per disaster, while countries with high human 
development indices suffer approximately 23 deaths per disaster (IFRC, 2001).  This is often 
because the poor are forced to accept livelihoods which make them more vulnerable.   
2.6.2.2 Ethnicity 
 Ethnicity is another determinant of vulnerability. Minority groups often have limited 
access to social and natural resources and experience lower average incomes than dominant 
ethnic groups (Wisner & Luce, 1993).  Financial insecurity for ethnic minorities influences 
decisions to reside in disaster prone areas and accept employment that is tied up in more 
dangerous locations7.  In addition vulnerabilities that ethnic minorities experience are often tied 
up in language abilities.  If ethnic minorities lack fluency in the dominant language they can 
experience difficulties in seeking information, filling in application forms, and tapping into 
service programs (Morrow, 1999).  
2.6.2.3 Gender 
 Many have argued that women and men are unevenly affected by disasters (E. R. Bhatt, 
1998; Fordham, 2003; Hewitt, 1997; Vatsa, 2004).  Wisner and Luce (1993) suggest that 
“women generally have less access to resources” (Dankelman & Davidson, 1988) and less 
representation in decision making at all levels” (Pietila & Vickers, 1990) and are therefore more 
vulnerable than their male counterparts (Wisner & Luce, 1993, 19).  In addition, women are 
physically less able to evacuate in disaster settings and child care responsibilities often increase 
the difficulties of disaster response.  Bhatt (1998) draws information from rural and urban 
                                                 
7 Dangerous locations can include residence on “unsafe land and in unsafe shelters or low-cost 
dwelling, because there is no other land available at reasonable cost” (UNISDR et al., 2002, 5) 
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women of Gujarat, India when she suggests that rural women are more often the victims of 
droughts and floods because they are left behind while men look for work (E. R. Bhatt, 1998).   
2.6.2.4 Physical Ability 
 The physically or sensory disabled are also believed more vulnerable in disaster 
situations (Phillips & Morrow, 2005).  Disabled individuals often lack socio-economic security 
pre-disaster and lack the physical ability to respond in a disaster situation.  Pain et al. (2001) 
indicate that the disabled are more likely to be unemployed, more often hold inferior positions, 
have poorer housing, have more limited access to education and transportation, and are 
marginalized more frequently than their able-bodied counterparts.  As a result of being socially 
and economically marginalized before a disaster, the disabled are generally more vulnerable to 
the impacts of disaster.   
2.6.2.5 Age 
 Youth and the elderly are more disaster-prone than adult populations.  In part, the 
physical restrictions which sometimes accompany these populations make it more difficult to 
respond in disaster situations.  However, there are broader socio-economic processes of which 
youth and elderly are sometimes restricted, which increase their vulnerability.   In fact, “older 
people and children are often constructed as ‘problematic’ groups who are outsiders to the spaces 
of mainstream social life” (Pain et al., 2001, 141).  The youth and elderly are often marginalized 
before a disaster and in many societies “people are segregated on the basis of age” (Pain et al., 
2001, 152).  For women, the lower-class, minority groups, youth, and the elderly, social and 
economic marginalization often influences vulnerability during disaster. 
 Although vulnerable populations often hold one of the above characteristics, this 
taxonomic approach is not appropriate in all cases.  For example, “not all women are equally 
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vulnerable” (Wisner, 2005a, 3).  The above characteristics do not define vulnerability, but are 
rather characteristics of vulnerability.  In a disaster situation, a woman is not inherently 
vulnerable, but is more likely to be vulnerable than male counterparts.  Furthermore, these social 
characteristics are dynamic and are always modified by one another.  Fordham (2003) argues 
that “Women are not a homogenous category…we must also recognize difference in terms of 
race/ethnicity, class/caste, sexuality, [dis]ability, etc. which intersect in complex ways with 
gender (Fordham, 2003, 64).  Different combinations of these vulnerability characteristics 
depend on space and place.  As a result, there are large variations between and within 
communities, regions and nations in regard to the characteristics of vulnerable groups (Yodmani, 
2001). 
2.7 Types of Vulnerability  
 Anderson and Woodrow (1989) suggest three categories of vulnerability including: 
physical/material; social/organizational; and motivational/attitudinal (Anderson & Woodrow, 
1989).  These categories are useful because they enable monitoring of the processes that create 
vulnerability.  Physical, or material, vulnerabilities are the most recognizable during times of 
disaster.  These refer to a lack of resources to fulfill basic needs: i.e. food, water, clothing and 
shelter.  In disaster situations, it is usually the poor who experience physical/material 
vulnerability to the greatest extent (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989).  Often, the poor experience 
physical vulnerability pre-disaster and vulnerability increases in the event of a trigger agent.  In 
order to address physical vulnerabilities, promoters of the vulnerability approach ask why certain 
groups are materially vulnerable.  This may depend on their geographic location or on their 
livelihoods among other factors.   
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 Social/organizational vulnerability contributes in many ways to physical risk.  These 
vulnerabilities relate to the impacts of a disaster on social organizations.  Lack of access to social 
groups (including community groups, schools, and religious centers) can limit individual and 
community capacity and social cohesion, which can prove detrimental in disaster situations.   
 Finally, Anderson and Woodrow (1989) suggest that motivational/attitudinal 
vulnerabilities significantly impact an individual’s ability to cope with and recover from disaster.  
Motivational/Attitudinal vulnerabilities describe “how people in society view themselves and 
their ability to affect their environment” (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989, 11).  Some may adopt an 
‘it can’t happen to me’ disaster psychology and do not take steps to mitigate risk, while others 
may recognize their vulnerabilities and manage risk before a disaster strikes.  On a practical 
level, a vulnerability approach deals with motivational/attitudinal components by examining how 
disasters influence people’s motivations.  More specifically, vulnerability analysts would 
determine whether people felt victimized by disaster or empowered by community cohesion 
post-disaster.  Motivational/attitudinal vulnerabilities influence the ability of individuals to cope 
with disaster and are, in part, dependent on emotional and psychological health.  While physical 
and social vulnerabilities to disaster are easier to detect in a disaster, (Anderson & Woodrow, 
1989; Hewitt, 1997) are among the few authors who have linked the psychological impacts of 
disaster with the ability for resilience and recovery.  Fatalistic attitudes towards disaster can 
increase disaster vulnerability and impede appropriate responses to disasters (Kieft & Nur, 
2002).  The relationship between disaster recovery and emotional health is significant and should 
be emphasized and paid more attention in vulnerabilities discourse.  
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2.8 Vulnerabilities Assessments 
 Shifts in the disaster management paradigm have been congruent with changes in 
vulnerability models.  Methodologically, the vulnerability approach compliments a paradigm 
shift in the development field; towards bottom-up development and good governance (Yodmani, 
2001).  However, vulnerability assessments are not limited in scale and can be conducted at the 
community, regional and national levels.  Assessments focus on the factors that cause the 
severity of the loss and damage and on how capacity should be developed to reduce vulnerability 
in the future (Wisner, 2005a).  These assessments involve the ‘mapping’ of vulnerable areas and 
populations and the goal is to assess existing conditions “of a given area and its ability to cope 
and withstand to specific natural hazard events and their impacts” (Bertens, Bruschi, & 
Weichselgartner, 2000, 9). 
 There have been a number of key models for vulnerability assessment.  Most commonly 
cited is (Piers Blaikie et al., 1994) ‘Pressure and Release’ (PAR) model (See Figure VI.  This 
model is a tool for understanding how disasters affect vulnerable people and is based on the idea  
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that vulnerability originates in a series of social factors including: root causes; dynamic 
pressures; and unsafe conditions and exposure to hazard (Piers Blaikie et al., 1994).  The PAR 
model plainly outlines the root causes of vulnerability, but is problematic because it characterizes 
these causes as static, when in fact, vulnerabilities are dynamic.  In addition, the PAR model 
overlooks the relationship between the human and physical environments and shows the trigger 
event as isolated from social processes, when most often these act on each other to create 
vulnerability.  
 In the late 1990’s, the Sustainable Livelihoods (SL) approach was conceptualized as a 
way of dealing with vulnerability; by focusing on livelihood security to reduce vulnerability 






Figure VI: Pressure and Release Model 
Source: (Blaikie et. al, 1994)  
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in the South, while the parallel Northern framework is entitled Community Capacity.  The 
sustainable livelihoods approach is promoted by the British government’s Department for 
International Development (DFID), is participatory in nature, and aims to reduce vulnerabilities 
that affect people’s assets (Twigg, 2001).  However, by focusing on livelihoods this approach 
does not give sufficient attention to political, social and environmental causes of vulnerability.   
 The holistic approach to vulnerabilities has received significant attention within the past 
five years.  McEntire (2001) developed a holistic model which acknowledges both the 
capabilities and liabilities of a given population (David A. McEntire, 2001).  This model 
accounts for natural and human vulnerabilities and combines the dominant and alternative 
approaches to disaster management.  This model is not entirely new: it is similar to what was 
framed as Vulnerabilities and Capacities Analyses by Anderson and Woodrow (1989).  In 
McEntire’s (2001) model, vulnerability is shown as a product of risk, susceptibility, resistance 
and resilience, a perspective that has been adopted by a number of theorists (see for example 
Paton et. al. 2000; McEntire 2000; Pelling and Uitto 2001; Cardona 2003; Klein et al. 2003; and 
Pelling 2003.  The ideas of ‘resilience’ and ‘resistance’ are similar to what Anderson and 
Woodrow (1989) define as ‘capacities.’  Whereas resilience “describes an active process of self-
righting, learned resourcefulness and growth- the ability to function psychologically at a level far 
greater than expected given the individual’s capabilities and previous experiences” (Paton, 
Smith, & Violanti, 2000, 173), capacity refers to the strengths of an individual or community 
that will enable them to cope with or recover from disaster (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989).  So, 
while recent definitions of ‘resilience’ and ‘resistance’ are more complex, they are quite similar 
to the earlier defined ‘capacity.’   
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 Each of these models is useful for understanding vulnerabilities, but for different reasons.  
While (Piers Blaikie et al., 1994) PAR model clearly illustrates the root causes of disaster, 
McEntire’s (2001) is useful in considering the importance of both social factors and 
environmental factors in vulnerabilities.  Both of these are important reference tools for work in 
the field of disaster relief.   
2.9 Benefits and Limits of the Vulnerability Approach 
 The vulnerabilities approach is based on the notion that the extent of human suffering in 
past disasters is unacceptable.  Advocates of this approach view that disaster vulnerability results 
from both human-invoked factors and geophysical processes.  The social, political and economic 
factors of vulnerability, which are influenced by human behavior, frequently increase 
vulnerability for people who are often already marginalized by their age, gender, ethnicity, 
physical ability and poverty.  Decreasing vulnerability is about changing the human behavior that 
contributes to it, and the vulnerability approach is appropriate in advancing this objective.  The 
approach is significant for a number of reasons: it offers guidance for both development and 
relief organizations; it identifies risk and enables disaster mitigation strategies; it exposes 
inequity; and it reveals the factors, policies and people responsible for existing inequities. 
 The vulnerability approach is important because it challenges disaster management to 
extend beyond disaster relief, and to acknowledge and contend with broader socio-political 
structures that lead to vulnerability.  In order to do this, these broader issues need to be identified 
and analyzed within each disaster situation.  For this, Vulnerability Assessments are used, and 
there are many practical benefits to their use.  Weichselgarnter (2001) suggests that these are 
simple to carry out and do not require expert knowledge. Vulnerabilities analyses are beneficial 
because they: identify why a disaster happened; identify populations at risk; suggest how to 
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identify risk for future disasters; identify factors that should be ‘restructured’ rather than 
‘repaired’ during relief; keep relief teams aware of activities that could contribute to 
vulnerability in the future; can be applied across scales (i.e. communities, regions and nations); 
encourage local participation and value local knowledge; and can be repeated in order to assess 
changes over time. 
 The premise of the vulnerability approach is ideal; however, it has some practical 
limitations.  While a vulnerabilities assessment does ‘map’ vulnerable populations, these only 
represent vulnerabilities for specific moments in time and cannot make assumptions about how 
vulnerabilities will change in the future (Wisner, 2005a).  In addition, Yodmani (2001) suggests 
that Vulnerabilities Assessments often take place within the formal sector of society and do not 
gather information from those most vulnerable: they often capture information only from those 
sources available, generally not the most poor and most vulnerable (Yodmani, 2001).  
Weichselgartner (2001) suggests that the results of Vulnerabilities Assessments are vague and it 
is not possible “to arrive at exact results” (Weichselgartner, 2001, 92).  However, ‘exact results’ 
should not necessarily be the main objective.  The major type of data for Vulnerability 
Assessment is qualitative; however this is not necessarily a limitation.  The vulnerability 
approach may have merit in that it has compassion for the marginalized and seeks to empower 
them.  Kenneth Hewitt (1997) says it well: “empowerment may be much more critical to 
reducing… [vulnerability]… than any particular tools, information or regulations to combat a 
hazard” (Hewitt, 1997, 153).    
 Disaster mitigation strategies, including the vulnerability approach have gained 
significant attention within the past decade.  However, Yodmani (2001) suggests that “there is 
more room than ever before for addressing the issues of risk reduction for the poor” (Yodmani, 
   
 36 
2001, 2).  Disaster management initiatives and organizations that combine disaster relief and 
development remain subordinate on the agenda of the international community, and projects 
which do combine disaster and relief are few and under-funded (Yodmani, 2001).  Academics 
should, nevertheless, continue to develop the vulnerability approach, seeking to integrate disaster 
and development strategies and to establish a framework for measuring social and economic 
vulnerability pre-disaster.  The vulnerability approach is a key disaster mitigation strategy 
because it aims to decrease susceptibility and risk for those who will be most affected by 
disaster: those who are the most poor and the most marginalized.  Potential researchers of the 
vulnerability approach should be motivated by the fact that there is “still-untapped potential of 
situational, proactive self assessment of vulnerability and capacity” (Wisner, 2005a, 4).     
 Disaster vulnerability has only marginally been studied from a political economy 
perspective, but this perspective is useful because it seeks to understand the broader political 
structures which influence vulnerability and which may impede appropriate disaster response.  
The influence of political structures in shaping disaster vulnerability requires more attention 
since political structures can influence economic and social roots of vulnerability.  It is my 
hypothesis that governance significantly influences disaster vulnerability and that specific 
strategies are influenced by political ideology.  The political approach to vulnerability is 
therefore worthy of discussion. 
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3 THE IMPACTS OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY ON 
VULNERABILITY 
 Cannon (1994) suggests that the “vulnerability approach to disasters is immediately 
concerned with political and economic power” (Cannon, 1994, 28).  Broader political ideologies 
shape national and local economies, social life and, often, patterns of inequality.  Thus, an 
investigation of how different political systems influence their respective societies is a necessary 
step in understanding how political systems influence disaster vulnerability.  In order to 
understand the influence of politics on disaster vulnerability, I take a ‘power-centered’ approach 
to political economy.  The power-centered approach to political economy is based on the idea 
that those who gain wealth also gain power: “the expansion of wealth necessarily means an 
expansion of power…since wealth consists of objects that satisfy our wants, wealth gives us the 
power to achieve our ends” (Caporaso & Levine, 1992, 165).  If power stems from wealth, and 
influences an individual’s access to resources, it is important to determine how a nation’s 
political ideology influences the distribution of wealth.  In the next section I demonstrate how 
both neoliberal capitalism and state-led development or ‘managed capitalism’ can influence and 
accentuate disaster vulnerability.  In addition, I outline the South East Asian path to development 
and summarize Thailand’s political ideology.   
3.1 State-led Development  
 Traditionally, East and Southeast Asian growth has been characterized by 
“macroeconomic stability, high savings rates, and export and industry promotion based on close 
business-government relations” (Jongryn, 2005, 10).  The East Asian economic model is based 
on a strong central state which manages a liberal market and promotes foreign investment 
(Jongryn, 2005).  The key tenet to state-led development is the government’s role in ‘managing’ 
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the economy.  Pre-1997 financial crisis, East Asian economies were geared to advantage the state 
as a whole rather than the individual industries or shareholders.  Consumer lending during this 
time was generally discouraged, and critics suggest that financial institutions lacked 
transparency, with close relationships between bank managers and state officials leading to 
corruption (Beeson, 2003).  While neoliberals argue that government mismanagement sparked 
the Asian financial crisis, advocates of state-led development argue that market liberalization and 
a declined regulation of domestic finance initiated the crisis (Beeson, 2003; Phongpaichit & 
Baker, 1998).  Since the Asian financial crisis, East Asian governments, including Thailand, 
have reformed economic policies and reverted to priorities of good governance, increased 
privatization and market liberalization (Jongryn, 2005).  While some countries have reverted to a 
more Western-style capitalism (i.e. a free market system involving relatively low-levels of 
government intervention), others (including Thailand and Japan) have maintained a state-led 
development in which cooperation between the government and the financial sector has been 
maintained.   
 Since the 1997 financial crisis, Thailand has undergone some economic reforms 
(including increased privatization, market liberalization and greater emphasis on economic 
transparency) however, the government has maintained central state involvement in the Thai 
economy.  For example:  
• in 1998 the government established Radhanasin Bank, which was 
responsible for managing the assets of finance companies that went 
bankrupt during the financial crisis;  
• the Krung Thai Bank (KTB), also a state-owned bank, was used to control 
industry restructuring in the late 1990s, and; 
• Thai Airways International, threatened by the financial crisis, was 
maintained as a state-controlled enterprise for two years after the end of 
the crisis (ultimately privatized thereafter).  
   
 39 
Similarly, in 1999, a government stimulus package was introduced in order to encourage real 
estate investment and in the same year the government presented subsidy packages to producers 
of sugar (Unknown, 2005g).  Clearly, the central state has maintained significant control over 
Thailand’s economy since political restructuring after the financial crisis.  With a state-led 
development system focused on ‘managing capitalism’, it is important to investigate how 
Thailand’s political and economic environments and ideologies influence vulnerability to 
disaster.   
3.2 Linking Vulnerability and Poverty  
 The debate between the neoliberal and welfare state8 ideologies has continued since the 
1929 American stock market crash.  While liberal economists including Adam Smith and Milton 
Friedman argue that economic growth will ‘trickle down’ to the poor, welfare state advocates, in 
line with Keynesian economics, assert that capitalist economies fail to demonstrate effective 
trickle down effects, and argue the central government should actively pursue economic equity 
(Caporaso & Levine, 1992).  The goal here is not to affirm or reject either ideology but to 
determine the effects of each on disaster vulnerability.  
 The theoretical debate between the neoliberal and state-led development models does not 
focus on disaster vulnerability.  However, there are components of the debate which focus on 
poverty alleviation and inequality, both of which concern disaster vulnerability.  Though it is 
important to understand that vulnerability reduction and poverty alleviation are not synonymous 
(Chambers, 1982), they are certainly related.  Poverty reduction is in fact a component of and 
                                                 
8 Under the ‘ideal model’ the Centre for Public Policy and Management defines the ‘welfare 
state’ as “an ideal model of provision, where the state accepts responsibility for the provision of 
comprehensive and universal welfare for its citizens” (CPPM, 2006).  Advocates of the ‘welfare 
state’ system view “spending on welfare as a useful economic regulator, helping to balance the 
economy in periods of recession” (CPPM, 2006). 
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contributor to vulnerability reduction (Wisner, 2001).  ‘Basic Needs’ literature suggests that 
poverty is about deprivation and often inequality, and it refers to the inability of an individual or 
group to access opportunities or necessities that are critical within a society (Pyatt, 2000; Sen, 
1981).  Vulnerability refers to individual or group characteristics which make them susceptible to 
a hazard, or impact their ability to cope with or recover from a disaster, and this often includes 
poverty (Piers Blaikie et al., 1994).  Though poverty may contribute to vulnerability, it is not a 
necessary precondition for vulnerability (Cannon, 2000).  Still, poverty is an important indicator 
of vulnerability and often it is the most poor who are vulnerable in a disaster situation.  In order 
to determine whether free-market capitalism or state-led development would best reduce 
vulnerability, it is important to determine how each addresses issues of poverty.   
3.3 The Neoliberal Perspective on Vulnerability  
 Since the fall of the Soviet bloc and the market liberalization of China, the world has seen 
a near collapse of communism, a decline in welfare state advocates, and a virtual mainstreaming 
of neoliberal ideology (Beeson, 2003; Veltmeyer, 2002).  Neoliberal thought (or the New 
Economic Model) gained momentum in the late 1970s and 1980s, when Ronald Reagan and 
Margaret Thatcher were elected in the United States and England respectively (Chang, 1999).  
The neoliberal model is based on a laissez-faire liberal economic ideology in which, as Adam 
Smith argued, the invisible hand of the market would meet public interest.  As such, neoliberal 
economists advocate: free market systems which promote consumer power; privatization; 
liberalization of trade; deregulation of economic activity by the state; and decentralizing state 
enterprises (Chang, 1999; Pyatt, 2000; Thomas, 2001; Veltmeyer, 2002).  Similarly, liberal 
economics holds that increasing economic progress and market liberalization will result in 
decreased societal poverty because capital advantages of economic growth will ‘trickle down’ to 
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lower income populations (Brady, 2003).  The World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and World Trade Organization (WTO) have strongly supported a neoliberal agenda as the 
‘correct’ approach to development.  This perspective has been given so much institutional 
support that it has been frequently referred to as the Washington Consensus (Beeson, 2003; Fine, 
1999; Pyatt, 2000; Thomas, 2001).   
 The core neoliberal argument against state-led development is that the state is too heavily 
influenced by lobbyists, politicians, and elites who use political control to satisfy personal 
interests (Chang, 1999).  In addition, free market advocates argue that the high taxes and 
generous social welfare programs, which often accompany state-led development, reduce work 
ethic, while a free market system increases competition and provides incentives to work 
(Friedman, 1982 [1962]; Rapley, 2002).  One of the principle tenets of neoliberal economics is 
that market freedom is preferred above state control.  In fact, through a neoliberal lens, state 
intervention is a hindrance on the economy.  Thus, advocates of a neoliberal economic model 
presume that free market capitalism ensures prosperity and stifles poverty: as an example of this, 
Friedman (1982) stated that the “the economic progress achieved in the capitalist societies has 
been accompanied by a drastic dimunition in inequality” (Friedman, 1982 [1962], 169-170).  
 As sponsors of capitalism, neo-liberals made efforts to associate the success of East 
Asian economies between the 1980s and 1990s with economic liberalization, privatization and 
deregulation, and generally dismissed the role that central Asian states were playing in their 
respective economies (Newell, 2002).  Though East Asian countries were certainly involved in 
economic liberalization pre-financial crisis, many central governments in the region maintained a 
strong role in the financial sectors, and state-led development was central to East Asia’s success 
(Beeson, 2003).  The state-led development model adopted by the Asian tigers contradicts the 
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neo-liberal economic model and made it “extremely difficult to fit convincingly into the neo-
liberal framework” (Dixon, 1999, 448; Newell, 2002).   There has been much debate about 
whether Thailand’s economic success during the 1970s, 80s and 90s was resultant from free-
market capitalism, or state-managed economics, or a hybrid of both.  It is important to 
investigate how both systems have influenced disaster vulnerability in the past. 
3.4 Capitalism, Development and Vulnerability 
 Capitalism has led to decreased disaster vulnerability for many developed states (M. 
O'Connor, 1994).  In the United States, before 1950, private organizations and local groups were 
responsible for disaster response and death tolls and damages soared (Platt, 1999).  However, 
after the 1950 Federal Disaster Relief Act was passed, the financial and social consequences of 
disasters were dramatically reduced (Platt, 1999).  Insurance industries and federal disaster 
assistance plans, more common in advanced free-market states, often accompany 
industrialization and capitalistic development, drastically reducing disaster vulnerability.  For 
example, the higher income levels and disaster preparedness systems in capitalist America make 
people much less vulnerable to hurricanes than in Bangladesh (Cannon, 1994).  Over 1,300 
people were killed by Hurricane Katrina, a daunting number for the American public, but for a 
category 3-4 hurricane, with over 2.16 million people evacuated, the death toll was relatively low 
(Gidley, Batha, & Rowling, 2006).  Despite criticism of the Federal Emergency Management 
Association (FEMA), the large scale evacuations in New Orleans and the response post-disaster 
were efficient and controlled compared with similar disasters in developing countries.  In 
developing countries, lack of large scale disaster preparedness and assistance programs and 
insurance packages makes vulnerability more acute.  Developing countries “share a greater level 
of economic and social vulnerabilities” than do developed countries thereby making disaster 
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impacts much higher (Vatsa & Krimgold, 2000, 132).  For example, in the World Disaster 
Report (2001), prepared by the International Red Cross a study compared the impacts of natural 
hazards between countries of high and low Human Development Indexes9 (IFRC, 2001; Wisner, 
2003).  Of 2,557 disasters (between 1991-2000), two-thirds of all deaths were in countries with 
low HDI, while only 2% of deaths were recorded in countries with high HDI (IFRC, 2001; 
Wisner, 2003).  As in the Katrina example, capitalism in developed countries reduces 
vulnerability; however, in the global South, capitalism has the potential to, conversely, increase 
disaster vulnerability.   
 O’Connor (1994) suggests that liberal capitalism is notorious for the unequal distribution 
of resources, including power and wealth, and that the global economy “makes more people 
hungry, poor, and miserable every day” (J. O'Connor, 1994b, 154).  Though neo-liberals argue 
that economic growth will ‘trickle down’ to members of the lower class, this argument is not 
convincing, especially for developing nations.  Even in the United States, inequalities are in part 
resultant from the “widespread influence of the neoliberal political ideology” (Thomas, 2001, 
164), even though high national wealth does allow for national disaster preparedness systems 
which reduce hazard vulnerability.  In poorer nations, with limited means of creating and funding 
national disaster systems or federal disaster assistance plans, capitalism can be a detriment.   
 Market-led capitalism and low spending on social welfare systems has been associated 
with population explosions in Africa and Asia (Susman et al., 1983), a wide variety of ‘social 
costs’ (including: water, air, and soil pollution; environmental exploitation; poor working 
conditions; and underemployment) (Beckenbach, 1994) and has been coined unsustainable (Daly 
& John B. Cobb, 1994).  Negative associations between capitalism and vulnerability exist 
                                                 
9 The Human Development Index (HDI) is comparative way of measuring poverty, literacy, 
education, life expectancy, and well being for countries worldwide (Wikipedia, 2006b). 
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because the neo-liberal ideology does not support adequate avenues through which developing 
countries can address poverty.  For example, the increased privatization that accompanies 
neoliberal capitalism can impede a state’s ability to respond effectively to emergencies: “once 
assets are privatized, the state’s access to them in order to provide services in times of 
emergencies is limited by its purchasing power” (Thompson & Gaviria, 2004, 15).  Though some 
may argue that capital ‘trickles down’ to lower income groups in developed countries, there are 
significantly fewer avenues (e.g. social welfare programs, employment insurance) in developing 
nations through which wealth can ‘trickle’.   
 Capitalism, in both developed and developing nations can dramatically widen the gap 
between rich and poor.  Arguably, even more problematic is the observation that increases in 
wealth under capitalism result in increases in power (Caporaso & Levine, 1992) and the 
concentration of this power in the hands of relatively few people.  In fact “capitalist market 
economies tend to distribute wealth very unequally across persons, [and] such economies create 
a stratified structure of power” (Caporaso & Levine, 1992, 165).  Lack of financial capital in 
developing countries, coupled with high income inequalities, can lead to a lack of preparedness 
for disaster.  For example, low wages jobs that accompany neoliberal economics “funnel huge 
numbers of people into shanty towns and coastal cities” thereby making these marginalized poor 
more susceptible to hazard (Wisner, 2005a, 91).  In developing countries a free market neoliberal 
ideology seems a recipe for disaster: it is geared to market liberalization and decentralization but 
often lacks any alternatives for developing disaster programs and is deficient in poverty 
alleviation and vulnerability reduction strategies (Pyatt, 2000).   
 In countries such as India, Brazil and Mexico, capitalism exists at the expense of a vast 
number of poor (J. O'Connor, 1994b).  Emphasis on economic growth and lack of attention to 
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social welfare is particularly detrimental in disaster prone places, where market-led economies 
marginalize the poor and influence them to live in dangerous areas (Susman et al., 1983).  For 
example, before Hurricane Mitch, the Nicaraguan government cut public service spending which 
disabled an effective disaster response (Comfort et al., 1999).   
Wisner (2001) agrees that economic development based on “the invisible hand of the market” 
most often increases risk and vulnerability to disasters, using the example of El Salvador to 
support his position (Wisner, 2001, 262).  El Salvador has supported a number of core neoliberal 
principles including: free trade; extensive foreign investment; privatization; and state 
decentralization, but in the shift to market freedom, failed to establish government departments, 
or social programs oriented to protecting those most vulnerable to disasters.  The 2001 
earthquakes in El Salvador resulted in a chaotic reaction in which poorly organized and 
inadequate disaster responses were carried out.  In fact, the neoliberal model of development 
resulted in “extreme disparities in wealth” for El Salvador (Wisner, 2001, 260).  Wisner (2001) 
describes the situation in El Salvador as “run-away capitalism” in which neoliberal ideology 
accentuated vulnerability for everyone, save the richest (Wisner, 2001, 261).   
Authors such as Cannon (1994) suggest that widespread capitalism has increased 
vulnerability for some and has created new vulnerabilities for others.  In order to develop a fully 
effective hazard mitigation scheme, Wisner (2003) suggests that capitalist states need to 
challenge “the prevailing ideals of limitless growth, of ever-decreasing governmental regulation, 
and of the dominance of market values” (Wisner, 2003, 50). In summary, neo-liberal economics 
has had an uneven impact on disaster vulnerability: it has reduced vulnerability for some 
(through national disaster preparedness systems and insurance industries), and has increased 
vulnerability for others, primarily through increased economic disparities.  
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3.4.1 State-led Development and Vulnerability 
 State-led development is based on Keynesian economics, which asserts that imperfect 
markets require state interventions and calls for ‘managed capitalism’ (Beeson, 2003; Fine, 1999; 
Rapley, 2002).  Though many of his ideas, regarding international trade, had been rejected at 
Bretton Woods John Maynard Keynes had far-reaching influence on political leaders after 
WWII.  His idea of capitalism involved a greater role of the state than was allowed in the 
neoliberal economic scheme, particularly in the area of fiscal management (Rapley, 2002).  
Under the Keynesian view of state-led development governments ‘manage’ capitalism by 
adopting fiscal policies in which governments spend during recession periods and save in time of 
economic growth (Rapley, 2002).  After the second world war, the Keynesian Consensus 
emerged in most developing capitalist countries based on the ideas that market forces result in an 
unbalanced distribution of resources, and that direct government intervention is beneficial for 
managing the pace of economic development (Beeson, 2003; Rapley, 2002).   
 State-led development is also associated with the East Asian model of economic 
development, including market liberalization and a strong central state, and the success of Japan, 
Asian tigers, (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong) and the ‘tiger cubs’ (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand).  The principle assertion of state-led development is that state 
management of the market is important and necessary in guiding economic development and in 
ensuring a balanced allocation of resources (Rapley, 2002; Yoshimatsu, 2003).  In terms of 
disaster management, a more equitable division of resources would lead to vulnerability 
reduction.  Advocates of state-led development argue that unmanaged free markets can result in 
high economic disparities whereas government intervention in the economy, particularly during 
recession, could be used to create jobs “which in turn would create more demand for goods and 
services, which would cause factories to increase their output and then to take on more workers, 
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and so on in an upward spiral” (Rapley, 2002, p. 8).  If state-led development can lessen 
economic inequalities it would reduce poverty and, in turn, reduce vulnerability.  In addition, 
attention to social development and the provision of social welfare programs can reduce risk of 
disaster (Wisner, 2001).  Thus, in theory at least, state-led development could lead to decreased 
vulnerability, but it is important to investigate empirical examples of high levels of government 
control over societies in order to determine whether state-led development has the potential to 
successfully reduced hazard vulnerability.  Though state-led development and socialist systems 
of government are not synonymous, in the following examples socialist states are used to 
demonstrate how differing levels of government control can influence disaster vulnerability.   
 Cuban socialism has created an environment in which the central state effectively 
manages disaster.  Cannon (1994) believes that in socialist Cuba central government control has 
resulted in decreased vulnerability.  He suggests that Cuba has “achieved a much better record in 
dealing with hazards like cyclones” than some of its neighbors like Haiti, Nicaragua and 
Honduras (Cannon, 1994, 25).  Vulnerability reduction has occurred in Cuba in part because the 
central state has emphasized “social and economic development, an equitable distribution of 
resources, universal access to social services, and a narrower urban-rural development gap 
(Thompson & Gaviria, 2004, 15).  Wisner (2003) also expresses that a strong central state is 
important in mitigating disasters and believes that “hazard mitigation…is impossible without 
challenging the prevailing ideals of limitless growth, of ever-decreasing governmental 
regulation, and of the dominance of market values” (Wisner, 2003, 12).   
 However, socialist state systems also have the potential to be ‘undemocratic and 
authoritarian’ (Woo-Cummings, 1999).  Unlike Cuban socialism, Soviet and Chinese ‘absolute 
   
 48 
command economies’10 exhibited authoritarian domination over their respective societies 
(Grossman, 1963).  These are examples of which extreme state control has severely increased 
susceptibility to hazard.  Cannon (1994) suggests that authoritarian socialism can create different 
forms of vulnerability for its populace.  For example, Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward 
Campaign (1958-1962) resulted in an extensive famine in China.  In July of 1976, during the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution, the deadliest earthquake in the 20th century hit Tangshan, in 
Northern China.  There was no warning because the State bureau of Seismology was engaged in 
political power struggles and regular work was at a standstill (Cheng, 1986).  Similarly, the 1988 
Armenian earthquake killed over 100,000, in part because of inadequate communication and 
response systems that were controlled by the Soviet central state (Wisner, 2003). The poorly 
organized and defined systems of collective ownership, associated with strong central states, can 
create intense vulnerability (Cannon, 1994; Torry, 1986).   
 Both free market capitalism and state-led development systems have increased and 
decreased disaster vulnerability in different disaster situations.  States under both the direction 
neo-liberal ideologies and Keynesian economics have been involved in environmental 
exploitation, often exploit resources in an unsustainable manner, and both systems can increase 
vulnerability to disaster (Daly & John B. Cobb, 1994).    
At the state level, both free market capitalist societies and states under state-led 
development have had both effective and ineffective responses to disasters.  It is necessary to see 
how these ideologies influence community-level vulnerability.  Next, I demonstrate the influence 
                                                 
10 Grossman (1963) defines command economies as states in which “the central authorities 
prescribe everything and in the minutest detail to the production unit…without any ‘household 
choice,’ in which consumer needs are satisfied through physical doling out and labour is 
assigned” (Grossman, 1963, 105). 
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of governance on local level vulnerability and illustrate how political ideologies shape local 
vulnerability to disaster.   
3.5 Local-level Governance and Disaster Vulnerability 
 Local-level governance and disaster vulnerability at community levels are directly 
connected to national governance and the global economy.  Disaster mitigation strategies are 
embedded in political agendas at all government levels and this makes local-level disaster 
preparedness even more complex.  Regional governments must comply with national demands, 
must work within a regional budget, and must satisfy their local populace.  Disaster responses 
are often motivated by political rivalries and conflicts of interest, and these can severely impair 
effective disaster management (Winchester, 1992).  Politicians, often at the central state levels, 
bargain for funding because they have both local and state power groups and interests in 
protecting certain areas (Winchester, 1992).  In addition, decisions at local levels reflect national 
ideologies and global market demands.  For example, in the 1990s, the increased global demand 
for bananas, cotton and coffee drove local farmers in Honduras and Nicaragua to cultivate land 
on steep slopes (Comfort et al., 1999).  (Wisner, 2003).  Since global markets, the agendas of 
national government, and the power relationships between the central states and local 
governments all strongly influence disaster responses, the coping strategies and interests of 
community members are often unheard.  However, in order for mitigation efforts to be successful 
they must include local-level public participation (Pearce, 2003).  Residents should be 
encouraged to rebuild their lives and respond to disaster, and local authorities should seek to 
involve citizens in the disaster management process (Maskrey, 1989).  
 Local-level involvement in disaster management is important to disaster management, 
thus to effectively manage disaster, governments should decentralize decision-making power 
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(ADPC, 2003; Piers Blaikie et al., 1994).  Though it is important for disaster preparedness 
strategies to exist at the national level, it is equally important that local governance contribute to 
the design and implementation of these strategies at regional or local levels.  Newport (2003) 
suggest that community involvement, in both pre-disaster preparedness and disaster response, 
must exist in order to effectively mitigate disasters.  Local governance must be supported by both 
residents and national policies for effective disaster responses.  This is especially important for 
rural areas with the smallest governmental units because these experience the highest 
proportional impacts of disaster (Lewis, 1999).  In terms of development, local governance must 
ensure that growth is sustainable and is aimed at reducing vulnerability.  However, even if local 
officials have these intentions, central state agendas for economic growth often compete with or 
override priorities of sustainable development.  
 As an example of this local/national tension, in 1997, in the Kheda District of Gujarat, 
India, women worked as part of a government sponsored forestry scheme to raise saplings during 
dry seasons.  However, when faced with a drought and financial strain, the Forestry Department 
sold the saplings and the women felt that their labor was worthless (E. R. Bhatt, 1998).   
Local level governance is often tied up in national ideologies and development agendas.  
Though national-local government relationships can be detrimental in a disaster, when national 
and local governments cooperate, disaster responses can be very effective.  For example, in the 
Philippines, the national and local governments collaborated in establishing policies which 
encourage: the use of local resources to recover from disaster; self-reliance within communities; 
and mutual assistance between constituencies (ADPC, 2003).  In addition, disaster policy 
stipulates that the national government support the agendas and operations of local governments 
and requires that all government organizations and agencies document disaster plans and 
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emergency responsibilities (ADPC, 2003).  The municipal government of Ilo-Ilo province 
established links with religious and civic organizations, and created a Rescue and Emergency 
Assistance Movement and Municipal Economic Council to provide loans for economic recovery 
in times of disaster (ADPC, 2003).  As a result of community-preparedness and capacity building 
strategies, residents of Ilo-Ilo province are more confident in dealing with disasters because they 
are wiser about disaster protocol (ADPC, 2003).   
 Effective local governance, aimed at reducing vulnerability and building adaptive 
capacity is important to disaster preparedness and mitigation.  However, in order for 
vulnerability reduction to occur, there must be a commitment from all levels of government and 
a clear collaboration between national-local governments, non-governmental organizations, and 
civil society.   
3.6 Crony Capitalism, Corruption and Government Capacity 
 Regardless of political ideology, corruption disables government capacity from 
functioning in ways that enhance social welfare.  Though widespread economic debate between 
neoliberals and advocates of Keynesian economics has occurred since the 1920s, scholars of both 
paradigms agree that “uncorrupt governments are better at fostering growth than those riven by 
crony capitalism and corruption” (Kang, 2002, p.3; Rodrik, 1995).  Specifically, “corruption saps 
the resources available for development, distorts access to social services, and undermines public 
confidence in government” (Ramos, 2001, p.12).    
 Neoliberals often attribute state-led development and government intervention in the 
economy with corruption and crony capitalism11 (Ramos, 2001).  Indeed, there is some truth to 
the argument that state-led development provides a more likely environment for government 
                                                 
11 Crony capitalism is “a system in which those close to the political authorities who make and 
enforce policies receive favors that have large economic value” (Haber, 2002)  
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corruption.  For example “license administration enabled ministers and officials to reward 
favorites or demand kick-backs; directorships of marketing boards and public firms [can] be used 
to skim off resources for personal use; discretionary government budgets [can] be plumbed to 
further individual interests” (Rapley, 2002, p.40).  However, there are ways to combat corruption 
in the state-led development system.  The World Bank, in accordance with neoliberal economics, 
asserts that economic reforms, including deregulation, privatization and increased market 
freedom, would contribute to the battle against corruption (WB, 1997).  However, there are other 
avenues through which state-led development systems can reduce corruption and crony 
capitalism.  For example, the competing priorities of officials could be addressed.  State-led 
development often fails to demonstrate how officials should be kept accountable and often does 
not address the incentives of state authorities to maximize profit within their own firms (Rapley, 
2002).  In addition, systems of accountability and monitoring should be in place in order that 
lower echelons of government are responsible to higher-level authorities.  Too often “the 
problem of corruption is simply that of badly underpaid officials possessing wide discretionary 
powers over the conduct of business, the amount of taxes you must pay and even whether or not 
you are to go to jail for violating some law or other” (Ramos, 2001, p.10).  Though state-led 
development systems may offer easier avenues through which corruption can take place, free-
market societies are frequently victims of crony capitalism, fiscal scandals and government 
corruption.  In both free-market economies and those under a state-led development scheme, 
corruption can be addressed by building government capacity including the formation of 
transparent and efficient government bodies, skilled and honest officials and strong policies 
(Rapley, 2002).   
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 In the next section, I outline my research methodology, which provides the foundation for 
an analysis of local-national governance, vulnerability and disaster preparedness in Khao Lak, 
and Koh Phi Phi Don, Thailand. 
   
 54 
4 CASE STUDY BACKGROUND/ RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY  
4.1 Study Site 
 The devastating impacts of the December 26th tsunami in the Indian Ocean suggest 
significant vulnerabilities in Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia and Thailand.  In Thailand, 8,221 deaths 
resulted from the tsunami (ADPC, 2005).  My study is a comparison of the impacts and 
vulnerabilities of two case study sites in Thailand, Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don.  These sites 
were chosen for three reasons:  
a) these were the most tsunami devastated areas in Thailand (Unknown, 2005a);INET, 
2004 #116};  
b) ‘Step Ahead’, (my host institution during the four month Canada Corps Internship 
that facilitated and funded my research) has a base in Khao Lak and has established 
relationships with those affected by the tsunami; and 
c) I have personal interest in understanding how Koh Phi Phi and other southern coastal 
Thai residents were impacted by the disaster.  
4.1.1 Geography 
 The Kingdom of Thailand is situated in the tropical 
zone of the Southeast Asian peninsula and is bordered by 
the Andaman Sea, the Gulf of Thailand/South China Sea, 
and Malaysia (See Map I).  Thailand’s northern land 
borders connect with Burma, Laos and Cambodia.  
Thailand has 72 provinces with Bangkok as its capital.   
Both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don are located in 
 
Map I: Map of Thailand   
(CIA World Factbook, 2006)  
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Southern Thailand within the Malay Peninsula (see Map II).  Khao Lak district is situated on the 
west coast of Phang-nga province and faces the Andaman Sea.  The district includes three 
national parks including Thai Muang National Park, Sri Phang Nga National Park, and Laem Ru 
National Park.  Kao Lak district includes 25 kilometers of coastline with shallow, long beaches.  
Research was conducted in two small towns within Khao Lak district: Bang Niang and Ba Nam 
Kem (See Map II).  
Map II: Map of Southern Thailand 1 
 
 
Source: (Pitsch, 2000) 
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 Approximately 15,000 people were in Bang Niang when the tsunami hit and 3000 lost 
their lives.  The small town, stretching approximately 12 km, is low-lying with ground levels 
approximately 4-5 meters above sea level (CCOP & DMR, 2006).  During the tsunami, 
inundation levels in Bang Niang were 10-12 meters (CCOP & DMR, 2006).  Since most 
buildings in Bang 
Niang were 2-3 





but not completely 
destroyed (CCOP 





 Ba Nam Kem, a predominantely fishing village, is located approximately 25km north of 
Bang Niang, closer to the border with Myanmar (Field Notes 2005).  Approximately two-thirds 
(3000) of the population of Nam Kem were killed in the tsunami (CCOP & DMR, 2006).  The 
inundation level in Nam Kem was 8 meters with most of the town sitting only 3-6 meters above 
sea level (CCOP & DMR, 2006).  Unlike Bang Niang, many buildings in Nam Kem collapsed 
during the tsunami since they lacked similar support structures.    
Picture 1: Bang Niang Building  
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 Koh Phi Phi Don, meaning ‘hilly island’, is the larger of two Koh Phi Phi Islands in the 
Phang Nga Bay, Andaman Sea, Eastern Indian Ocean.  The island is in Krabi province and 
comprises part of Hat Noppharat Thara/Koh Phi Phi National Park.  Koh Phi Phi Don is a 
dumbbell shaped island made largely of limestone, and is approximately 6.6km in length with an 
area of 282 km.  The island can be accessed only by boat and is approximately equidistant from 
Phuket Island and mainland Krabi Province.  Much of Koh Phi Phi Don is zoned as a marine 
reserve; however recent development of tourism infrastructure such as hotels, bungalows, 
restaurants and handicraft stalls has been intense as a result of poorly enforced development and 
building laws.  Research was conducted in the Tonsai Strip of Phi Phi Don.  This is the most 
inhabited area on Phi Phi and was the area most devastated by the tsunami.  The Tonsai strip is 
sided by two bays: Tonsai and Lo Dalam.  The tsunami waves hit Koh Phi Phi Island from both 
sides of the Tonsai strip (See Picture 2). 
Picture 2: Overview of Phi Phi Island 
  
 
Tonsai Bay (right) and Lo Dalam Bay (left) 
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4.1.2 Political Environment 
 Literally translated as ‘land of the free,’ the Kingdom of Thailand is the only Southeast 
Asian nation that was never colonized.  Thailand, named Siam until 1939, had an absolute 
monarchy until 1932, at which time a peaceful coup d'état, led by young academics, encouraged 
King Prajadhipok to accept a constitution: a constitutional monarchy has been in place ever 
since.   Thailand’s political system is made up of two Houses: the Senate, and The House of 
Representatives.  The legislative body is chosen through national elections, and the Prime 
Minister is elected by these representatives.  In this system, the King is the recognized Head of 
State, though the Prime Minister is primarily responsible for governing parliament.  King 
Bhumibol Adulyadej has reigned since 1946 and is influential and well-loved by Thai people 
(CIA, 2005). 
 Thailand has three levels of basic government: the central, provincial and local 
administrative levels.  The local administrative levels are based on principles of decentralization 
and aim to involve local participation in decision making processes (Tummakird, 2001). 
However, the administrative system which is used to delegate authority is itself highly 
centralized.  Authority begins at the central level and is passed down to the regional and local 
levels.  Although the new constitution (1997, Article 78) gave “significant responsibility to 
subnational governments” in a move toward decentralized power within government (Beschel et 
al., 1999, 25),  development policy in Thailand remains inspired by both top-down and bottom-
up approaches (Tummakird, 2001).   
 At the local level, the government branches into three sub-groups: district, sub-district 
and village-levels.  The Nampu is the district official, the Ohbadah leads the sub-districts, and 
each village has a head official called a Puyaiban.   
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4.1.3 The Role of the State in Thailand 
 From the early 1980s to the late 1990s, the Thai government was progressively less 
involved in Thailand’s economy.  However, since the Asian financial crisis, the Thai government 
has renewed its belief that government involvement in the financial sector is necessary (Dixon, 
1999).  In the early 21st century, Thailand continues to encourage a market-oriented and market-
based economy, but has followed Japan’s lead and maintained an economic ideology based on 
state-led development (Yoshimatsu, 2003).  As such, the Thai government remains focused on 
generating foreign investment and promoting tourism, but is also concerned with rural 
development. Governmental reform in Thailand has focused on combining government 
decentralization with socially progressive principles.  O’Rourke (2004) suggests that the state 
should “balance[s] its support for the emergence of a capitalist class, with the need to continue 
protecting the interests of peasants and workers” (O'Rourke, 2004, 244).  Thailand appears to be 
doing just this: it encourages decentralization, while maintaining a strong central state, and 
encourages market liberalization.   
 The head of the Thai Rak Thai Party, Prime Minister Thaksin Chinnawat, has a 
nationalist political platform which emphasizes a strong, though small, central state.  Thaksin has 
made a number of decisions which suggest that he will continue to advocate a strong central 
state.  One of the most recent examples was the dismissal of the governor of the central bank, 
Chatu Mongol Sonakul.  Chatu advocated less government involvement with the central bank 
and his dismissal indicates that the central state will continue to control the bank (APFC, 2001).  
The government further delved into private economics when it created a state-owned commercial 
bank to manage the assets of finance companies (CW, 2005).  Prime Minister Thaksin, a 
business tycoon himself, has headed various activities which involve the central state in 
Thailand’s economy: he introduced a subsidized health care system; a system of loans with low 
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interest rates; created stimulus packages for rural communities, real estate investment, and 
foreign investment; and created a subsidy fund for sugar producers  (APFC, 2004; CW, 2005).  
These activities demonstrate state-led development however, despite government involvement in 
the Thai economy, Thaksin still aims for decentralization.   
 In November 1999, The Decentralization Act was passed in order to downsize the central 
state and shift responsibility to local governments (ADB, 2005).  Traditionally, provincial 
governments have controlled small districts; however this created a reliance on provincial 
authorities and gave little incentive for locals to be involved in community initiatives.  In 1997, a 
new constitution took effect and its main aim was to eradicate corruption in Thai politics and to 
make the government more transparent (CW, 2005).  The Decentralization Act is compatible 
with this Constitution: Chapter 4, Section 290, states that local government organizations have 
power over “the management, preservation and exploitation of the natural resources and 
environment in the area of the locality” (Paramintharamaha, Adulyadej, & 
Borommanatthabophit, 1997).   
Decentralization seems to be a positive initiative by the Thai government which will 
assist disaster mitigation and vulnerability reduction: it will allow for local decision making and 
permit officials to address unique community vulnerabilities which may have been overlooked in 
the broader provincial policies.  In fact, Lewis (1999) suggests that small islands need disaster 
management strategies that are organized specifically for their needs and with their involvement, 
rather than only being part of a national strategy (Lewis, 1999).  However the switch to local 
level governance needs to be made with clear systems of accountability and direction from the 
upper echelons of government.   
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Koh Phi Phi Don has already suffered from inadequate local governance.  Much of the 
overdevelopment and environmental degradation on Koh Phi Phi can be linked to a lack of 
enforcement of existing National Park laws and other examples of inadequate governance (Scott, 
2005).  The limited staffing, lack of expertise and poor zoning on Koh Phi Phi Don means that 
local park officials on Koh Phi Phi are not equipped for coastal management.  Though local 
authorities may have the legal power to govern their respective districts and towns, they need to 
be trained for their new responsibilities and to be kept accountable for their actions. 
4.1.4 Economy 
 Thailand has a free enterprise economy and has welcomed foreign investment since the 
1980s.  Traditionally, fishing-related industries were dominant in coastal communities around 
Phuket and Krabi.  However, with an increase in tourism, many fishing communities have 
redirected attention to tourism-related livelihoods.  The worst hit provinces in Thailand, Pha Nga 
and Krabi, including Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Island, were tourist spots often located in and 
reliant on environmentally fragile areas (Unknown, 2005f).   
Islands often experience economic difficulties as a result of their geographical isolation.  
They are often dependent on export markets, lack financial capital and human resources, and 
experience high transport costs.  Consequently, tourism has been a positive option for many 
tropical islands: the tourism industry generates income and employment and boosts development 
and economic growth for islands (Gossling, 2003).  On Koh Phi Phi Don tourism-related 
businesses have been on the rise since 1992 when ‘The Beach’ was filmed on the neighboring 
island of Koh Phi Phi Ley.  On Phi Phi Don, local residents earn their livelihoods through 
investment or employment in restaurants, hotels, souvenir shops, and ocean transportation, and 
as tourism has increased, livelihoods in fishing and agriculture have subsided.  The same 
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situation is true of Khao Lak.  Though Khao Lak only escalated to a major tourism destination in 
2000, tourism increased dramatically in only five years: major hotels sprung up quickly, and 
local economies began to rely less on fishing and more on tourism (Field Notes 2005).  
Livelihoods in both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don are heavily reliant on the tourism industry.  
The relationship between tourism and vulnerability in both case study sites are explored in more 
detail in later sections. Thailand experienced extremely rapid economic growth during the 1980s 
to 1997 period when the Asian financial crisis hit, with an approximate average annual economic 
growth of 9% (ICEM, 2003).  However, as in most capitalist societies, economic benefits were 
unequally distributed and huge economic disparities resulted (ICEM, 2003).  For rural residents, 
poverty was a great threat and by 1992, the percentage of rural poor hit 92 per cent (ADB, 2005; 
ICEM, 2003).  Rural poverty continues to be a problem in Thailand, however Koh Phi Phi Don 
and Khao Lak are largely exempt from the levels of poverty experienced by rural communities in 
the North because of their appeal for tourists (Field Notes, 2005).   In fact, pre-tsunami, 
businesses on Koh Phi Phi flourished.  The same was true of Bang Niang in Khao Lak district.  
Employment opportunities in hotels, restaurants and souvenir shops were abundant in Bang 
Niang and the town was developing a reputation as one of Thailand’s diving hotspots (Field 
Notes, 2005). However, Ba Nam Kem, only 20km from Bang Niang, did not experience tourism 
increases to the same extent as Bang Niang (Field Notes, 2005). Before the tsunami, the 
economy of Ba Nam Kem was primarily driven by fishing livelihoods (Field Notes, 2005).  Still, 
with many of the town’s inhabitants involved in livelihoods that brought them nearer the ocean, 
disaster vulnerability was high in Ba Nam Kem (Field Notes, 2005).  
 The number of tourists visiting Thailand has exploded in the past decade (See Figure 
VII). Tourism “surpassed rice as the largest source of foreign exchange in 1983” (Raksakulthai, 
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2003, 6).  In 2003, tourism accounted for upwards of 10 per cent of the employable work force 
(ICEM, 2003).   
 
Most residents of Koh Phi Phi Don depend on tourists for their livelihoods.  The total 
revenue from tourism just for the Koh Phi Phi islands is 205 million US$ per year (ICEM, 2003).  
Tourism is an integral part of Koh Phi Phi’s economy, however, a huge influx of people over the 
last decade, and the associated development of tourism infrastructure, have caused significant 
environmental degradation on Koh Phi Phi Don.  For example, tourism has contributed to the 
clearance of mangroves, the depletion of coral reefs, as well as the pollution of both beaches and 
sea water (ICEM, 2003).  In rural areas including Koh Phi Phi, high rates of tourism have 
depleted water reserves and have increased pressures on waste disposal systems making them 
insufficient even to support the local population (ICEM, 2003).  Though tourism has stabilized 
livelihoods and incomes for residents of Koh Phi Phi and Bang Niang, it has stimulated 
environmental mismanagement and, I contend, disaster vulnerability. 
   



























Source (TAT, 2006)  
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4.1.5 Environment   
 Koh Phi Phi Don’s coastal environment has been deteriorating since the 1980s as a result 
of extensive development and increased tourism.  Before the tsunami, large buildings prevented 
sunlight from reaching the reefs and increased tourism lead to the pollution of beaches 
(Cummings, Bao, Martin, & Williams, 2003).  In fact, prior to the tsunami, an environmental 
assessment revealed that the area of coral reefs that was ranked either ‘good’ or ‘very good’ 
decreased from 34% to only 16% (UNEP, 2005).  Because Khao Lak has only recently been 
deemed a tourism hot spot, the area did not experience as much environmental degradation as on 
Koh Phi Phi Don although such degradation was beginning to emerge.  Large-scale hotels; 
bungalows and vendors contributed to the cutting of coconut trees and increased diving resulted 
in oceanic pollution and broken coral reefs, but the affects of increased tourism were far less 
drastic than those experienced on Koh Phi Phi.      
 Though negative impacts of tourism were apparent in both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi, 
there were also some benefits of tourism in these locations.  For example, dive operations had a 
business interest in environmental preservation and raising coral reef awareness (Field Notes 
2005).  In both study sites, diving lessons often emphasized environmental preservation and 
encouraged diving students not to stand on or break pieces of coral (Field Notes 2005).     
4.1.5.1 Defining Earthquake Zones and Tsunamis 
 Unlike a tidal wave, a tsunami (Japanese for ‘harbor waves’) is not influenced by the 
moons’ gravitational force, and is not a single wall of water, but is usually a series of waves.  
Tsunamis can be caused by landslides, undersea volcanic eruptions, and, as in the case of the 
December 26th, 2004 tsunami, underwater earthquakes. Earthquakes occur primarily on the 
boundaries of the earth’s tectonic plates.  Thailand’s southern coastal strip follows the fault line 
   
 65 
 
between the Eurasian and Indian Australian plates and this position makes it particularly 
earthquake-prone (See Figure VIII).   
Figure VIII: Map of Plate Tectonics 
 
 
Source: (Weber, 2006)  
 
The epicenter of the December 26th earthquake was off the western coast of Sumatra, Indonesia, 
but had such an intensity and displaced such a volume of water that the resultant tsunami 
affected people as far away as Somalia.   
 Subduction is an ongoing geophysical process but earthquakes driven by 
subduction result when ‘stuck’ plates are suddenly released and realign rapidly.  
The Burmese plate is considered part of the greater Eurasian plate, while the Indian plate is 
portion of the Indian Australian plate.  During subduction, the older and heavier Indian plate was 
pushed beneath the other into the earth’s mantle or asthenosphere (See Figure IX), while the 
lighter Burmese plate was simultaneously forced upwards. The rapid shift created an earthquake 
resulted in a huge displacement of water, triggering the tsunami.  
   
 66 
 
Figure IX: Process of Subduction 
 
 
Source (Kious, 1996)  
 
 In deep ocean waters, tsunami waves are almost indistinguishable from normal ocean 
fluctuations, and are 
therefore, difficult 
to monitor.  The 





Figure X).  It is only during the inundation phase that tsunamis are clearly recognizable; 
unfortunately this is the time of contact with land.  Tsunami waves only show their height when 
Figure X: Tsunami Generation 
 
Source (Weesakul, 2005)  
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they reach the shallow waters of coastal areas: the depth of water decreases, the wavelength 
shortens, and the height of the wave increases (See Figure X) (FEMA, 2006). 
 Tsunamis in the Indian Ocean are relatively rare.  In fact, the last major tsunami in this 
region was caused by the Krakatoa volcanic eruption in 1883.  Even then, the death tolls were 
significantly less.  Though tsunamis are relatively rare for Thailand, the country was a member 
of the Pacific Tsunami Warning System pre-tsunami, and still a warning was not issued (UNEP, 
2005).  This, coupled with a lack of local knowledge about tsunami identification, resulted in a 
disaster for both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don.  On Koh Phi Phi, the tsunami reached heights 
of eighty feet, and as of February 2005, the Thai Government estimated that 5,393 people were 
dead, 8,457 injured and 3,062 missing (UNEP, 2005).   
4.1.6 Culture/ Demography 
 The majority of people (75%) in Thailand are of Thai ethnicity, with Chinese-Thai 
accounting for 14% (CIA, 2005).  Thai is the dominant language, but English is widely spoken 
and accepted, especially in tourist areas.  Ninety-five percent of religious adherents in Thailand 
practice Theravada Buddhism (CIA, 2005), however Islam is common in Thailand’s southern 
provinces, and is the most commonly practiced religion for locals on Koh Phi Phi Don.   The 
King of Thailand is a highly respected and valued as both an authority and as a model for Thai 
citizens.  
 Until 1950, Koh Phi Phi Don was uninhabited.  However, Moken people, often referred 
to as sea gypsies, have periodically settled on Koh Phi Phi Don for decades.  The first permanent 
settlers to the island were from Koh Yai, Koh Lanta and Krabi provinces.  Descendents of these 
original settlers maintained ownership of Koh Phi Phi Don until recently.  These ‘locals’ practice 
Islam, making Phi Phi a primarily Muslim island.  On Phi Phi, it is common social knowledge 
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that those from the mainland practice Theravada Buddhism, while locals practice Islam.  Today 
there are a large number of Buddhist business operators on Phi Phi, but few consider Phi Phi 
their home.  Before the tsunami Koh Phi Phi Don had a population of approximately 3000 
people, with 80% of the Thai population being Muslim (Horn et al., 2006).  However, Boxing 
Day comes during the high season and when the tsunami hit there were between 9,000 and 
10,000 people on Koh Phi Phi (Horn et al., 2006).  Approximately 690 people were killed on Phi 
Phi Island and between 500 and 12,000 people remain missing (Horn et al., 2006). 
 Bang Niang and Ba Nam Kem, both in Khao Lak district, were devastated by the 
tsunami.  Pre-tsunami, the population of Bang Niang was approximately 750 and the population 
of Ba Nam Kem was between 4,000 and 4,500 (ADPCb, 2005).  Theravada Buddhism was 
dominant in both towns; however the tsunami sparked change in the religious environments of 
both Ba Nam Kem and Khao Lak.  Since the tsunami many Christian organizations and churches 
have developed in both places and with increases in Christian institutions have come tensions 
between Buddhists and Christians.  Media reports have alleged that Christian organizations have 
offered support only to those who convert to the Christian faith, making claims that Christians 
are ‘attempting to buy conversions’.  Regardless of the accuracy of these claims, the tsunami 
triggered a religious impact whereby the former religious makeup of the community in Khao Lak 
has changed, with as yet uncertain results.   
 Though both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi have ethnic diversity, Khao Lak’s demographic 
is more ethnically diverse than is Koh Phi Phi Don.  In Ba Nam Kem, and to a lesser extent in 
Bang Niang, Burmese migrants (usually lacking legal identity cards) work as laborers in 
construction, farming and in Thai restaurants and shops.  There are clear tensions between the 
Burmese and Thai in Khao Lak, with Burmese considered by ethnic Thai’s to be second-class.  
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The relationships and tensions between the Thai and Burmese populations have influenced 
community cohesion in Ba Nam Kem and strongly shaped disaster vulnerability. 
4.2 Characteristics of a Mixed Methods Approach 
 One of the aims of this study was to explore the impacts of Thailand’s political 
environment on disaster vulnerability and this was done primarily through a mixed methods 
approach12.  A mixed methods approach is beneficial because it allows for a combination of both 
qualitative research methods (i.e. generation of theory, the researcher as the collector of data, and 
qualitative analysis) and quantitative methods (i.e. standardized data collection, theory testing, 
and statistical analysis).  This study followed qualitative approach in regard to data collection 
while the more quantitative statistical analysis was used to demonstrate trends in interview 
responses.   
 As in most qualitative research, the researcher was immersed in the site of the 
participants.  This approach was beneficial because cultural immersion helps the researcher 
develop a personal understanding of the culture, traditions and practices of the participants, and 
enables familiarity with participants’ daily lives and behaviors (Creswell, 2003; Neuman, 1997).  
The qualitative portion of this research was conducted with the intent to develop assumptions, 
theories and understandings of social situations and life (Neuman, 1997). The questions were 
largely open-ended and allowed the participants to give detailed and descriptive responses, as 
opposed to highly structured closed-end questions with pre-categorized responses into categories 
that may not be fully understood by participants. When participants are able speak freely through 
open ended questions, the interview itself becomes more personal and interactive.  Indeed, 
                                                 
12 Mixed methods research is defined as “the class of research where the researcher mixes or 
combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or 
language into a single study” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, , p. 17) 
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qualitative researchers have traditionally aimed to build relationships and trust with individuals, 
maintaining sensitivity to participants and aiming to observe the study site without disturbing it 
by their presence (Creswell, 2003).   
 The data analysis component of this study also followed a mixed methods approach, and 
therefore qualitative data was quantified to identify specific themes and possible relationships. A 
content analysis was conducted based on interview notes and transcripts, allowing lengthy 
responses to be categorized into both preset and emergent categories.  After the responses were 
coded according to theme, they were analyzed and interpreted through statistical analysis. The 
limited number of respondent interviews provided a simple statistical analysis, which focused on 
the frequency of responses in order to identify particular trends or possible relationships.  
In line with qualitative research the interpretation of data was the responsibility of the 
researcher.   Data was categorized, filtered and expressed by the researcher and is therefore 
prone to personal interpretations and is inescapably influenced by the researcher. Since 
qualitative research can be subject to the interpretation, a good qualitative researcher reflects on 
the characteristics that shape him/her as a person and acknowledges how his/her values could 
influence the research (Creswell, 2003).  Since a qualitative approach was taken in regard to data 
collection, the following paragraph outlines the researcher’s personal characteristics and suggests 
how these may have influenced this study. 
4.3 The Role of the Researcher 
 As a Western, feminist, Mennonite faith-inspired student who was researching a 
predominantly Buddhist South East Asian coastal community, I acknowledge that my personal 
biases, values and interests have shaped my research throughout this study.  I addressed these 
biases in a number of ways.  Through use of open-ended rather than closed interview questions, I 
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enabled participants to stray from the original question and encouraged discussion of their 
personal opinions and experiences.  In addition, I attempted to counter act my personal biases by 
using local translators and encouraging discussion of their interpretations, opinions, and insight 
into Thai culture.  I have enjoyed learning about Buddhist practices, Thai traditions, history and 
culture, but recognize that as a non-Thai, I am unable to fully appreciate the complexities of life 
in Thailand and my lack of full contextual understanding therefore inhibits my ability to be able 
to fully understand disaster vulnerability in Thailand.   
 As a graduate student at the University of Waterloo, I have been able to conduct research 
in Thailand with significant institutional support.  However, the prospect of researching post-
tsunami Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don presented an ethical dilemma regarding the soundness 
of a Western female researching, interviewing and interpreting the disaster experiences of Thai 
people.  Though I sought to compassionately listen to tsunami victims, to understand and 
document their experiences and vulnerabilities, and to provide them an outlet to discuss their 
opinions, I was at risk of being perceived as journalistic and not contributing to practical 
vulnerability reduction.  To avoid this, I made efforts to explain my position in the research and 
to ensure that participants were comfortable with the study. 
  I have engaged in research in a location where I do not share the culture, history or 
religion of the participants. In the following section I demonstrate the steps I took to minimize 
and recognize the potential bias that I may have inadvertently introduced to my research.    
4.3.1 Institutional Influences 
 Institutional partners can serve as accountability partners, and can both enhance research 
credibility and impose institutional rules and other avenues of influence on the research process.  
The institutions that have shaped my research include: the sponsoring agencies (the Canadian 
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International Development Agency, Canada Corps Internship Programme, and the Association of 
Universities and Colleges of Canada), my affiliate University (the University of Waterloo), and 
my host organizations in Thailand (Global Youth Network, YWAM Thailand, and Step Ahead).   
The University of Waterloo acted as an accountability institution throughout this 
research.  As the primary investigator, I have been required to uphold university regulations and 
protocol, and was required to obtain clearance from the Office of Research Ethics before 
beginning research.   
Since the research conducted for this study was funded through an internship with the 
Canada Corp University Partnership Program (sponsored by the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) and the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada 
(AUCC)), the values and agendas of these institutions also shaped and influenced this research 
project.  These sponsoring agencies approved a research proposal and work plan, and required 
that I and my research assistant complete a pre-departure training course which focused on issues 
related to field research and travel abroad including cultural sensitivity, security and gender 
equity.  Though these institutions have increased the credibility and legitimacy of this research, 
the research has also been limited as a result of these structures.  For example, this research 
project was a required part of my Masters Degree: my personal interests in obtaining this degree, 
and fulfilling the requirements of the University of Waterloo, have outweighed my desire to fill 
potential long term needs of the research participants.  Thus, I spent only 4 months in the field.  
In addition, the Canada Corp Internship Program, which is designed for an internship of 
approximately 3-4 months, leaves little room for divergence from the proposed work plan, 
despite local needs which arise during field work.   
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Finally, the religious values of the host institutions also influenced this research.  YWAM 
is a self-described ‘family of ministries’ and as a branch of YWAM, Step Ahead is also 
influenced heavily by the Christian faith.  Step Ahead is a branch of YWAM’s Relief and 
Development department and is focused on gender equity, poverty alleviation and community 
development.  Step Ahead assisted in developing relationships between the researcher and the 
community of Khao Lak and although interviews were not religious in nature, participants from 
Bang Niang were sometimes aware of my Christianity.   
4.4 Research Approach 
 The research approach for this thesis combines institutional analysis of Thailand’s 
national policies regarding land-use and tourism on Koh Phi Phi and in Khao Lak.  In order to 
collect relevant data, I gathered information on government compensation plans, assistance 
packages and reported damages from the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre and the United 
Nations Development Program in Bangkok.  I focused on documents that discussed government 
disaster management initiatives and those that outlined the details of the Thai government’s 
response to the tsunami.  The ADPC was a valuable resource for collecting this information; 
however most data was collected from the reports and working papers printed by the ADPC, thus 
my research was limited to the information included by staff at the ADPC.  As a result, I was 
able to identify policies that contributed to disaster vulnerability and to outline the strategies and 
priorities of the Thai government.   
The field research component, in Khao Lak and on Koh Phi Phi Don, involved the use of 
local residents as sources of data by way of interview.  This research was guided by the 
vulnerability approach to disaster management, which was developed in the 1970s and was used 
as the principle theoretical framework for this study.  The vulnerability approach to disasters is 
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focused on identifying populations most vulnerable to disaster and attempts to understand why 
certain groups are impacted more than others.  In many cases, vulnerability is influenced by a 
number of individual characteristics including: gender, ethnicity, age, physical ability and class.  
Most often, those most vulnerable to disasters are the poorest members of society (Anderson & 
Woodrow, 1989); (Cuny, 1983).  A number of key models directed this research including: 
(Piers Blaikie et al., 1994) Pressure and Release (PAR model); McEntire’s (2001) Holistic 
Model of Vulnerability: and Anderson and Woodrow’s (1989) Capacities and Vulnerabilities 
Analysis Matrix.   
4.5 Research Methods and Data Collection 
 The research methods for this study were based on: a secondary literature review of the 
vulnerability approach; a secondary literature review of the influence of political ideology on 
poverty and vulnerability reduction; key informant interviews (n=40), participant observation 
and interviews on Koh Phi Phi Don (n=20) and in Khao Lak (n=20).   
  I adopted a social constructivist perspective towards this research and therefore relied 
significantly on the opinions of the participants to determine if and how governance influenced 
disaster vulnerability (Creswell, 2003).  I have also adopted the assumption that participant 
perspectives are based on individual histories, social experiences and culture, and I recognize 
that meanings are socially constructed.  Thus, since my experiences, culture and history differ 
from the participants, there is potential that I may extract different sets of meanings than those 
that were intended by participants.  My experiences, values and culture have inescapably 
influenced this research.  However, as much as possible, I have attempted to demonstrate my 
relationship to the research and reveal my influences and bias on this study.   
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 My data analysis involved categorizing data based on observable social patterns and 
human experiences.  From a literature-based grounding in vulnerability theory, I developed a 
content analysis13 framework for identifying, deciphering and categorizing ‘important’ data 
gathered through interviews (Holsti, 1969; Stemler, 2001).  The content analysis included 
detailed coding of interviews based on themes.  In this way consistencies between interviews 
were revealed.  For example, the content analysis revealed both similarities and differences in 
received aid and incited further research into the compensation policies outlined by the Thai 
government.  A content analysis was conducted in order to theorize about broader socio-political 
phenomenon which influenced vulnerability to the December 26th tsunami.  My intentions have 
been to document and analyze observable data; I have aimed to demonstrate how participants 
have experienced the tsunami disaster and how they view the relationship between governance 
and vulnerability.   
 The data collection for this project was broken down into four stages: preliminary review 
of disaster management literature in Waterloo, Ontario;  data collection through field research in 
Khao Lak; data collection through field research on Koh Phi Phi Don; and analysis of data and 
organization of findings in Bangkok, Thailand.   
a) The first stage of my research involved the review of disaster management 
literature, with a focus on vulnerabilities literature.  This preliminary phase took 
place at the University of Waterloo between January and August of 2005.  
b) The second and third stages of research involved primary data collection 
techniques including key informant interviews and field observations.  A singular 
interview process was used and involved semi-structured in-depth interviews with 
                                                 
13 Holsti (1968) defines content analysis as “any technique for making inferences by objectively 
and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages” (Holsti, 1969, 14).  
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tsunami-affected residents of Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don.  Interviews began 
after one week of exploring each community and familiarizing the research team 
with the state of each town and the extent of recovery.  Since the host institution 
in Khao Lak had built a rapport and trust with community members this trust was 
extended to the research team.  After initial relationships were built, interviews 
were arranged and conducted by both the primary investigator and a research 
assistant with the help of a local interpreter.    
c) The fourth phase of research took place in Bangkok from December 1st to 
December 15th 2005.  Aggregate data for both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don, 
including information on government compensation packages, spending records 
and priorities, as well as maps and census data were obtained during the fourth 
stage of research at the ADPC in Bangkok.  During this time, interview data was 
organized into themes through a content analysis.  By the end of the analysis 
process, findings were established and documented.  
4.5.1 Interview Procedure 
 Interviews were conducted in the language preferred by each participant, with the 
majority of interviews conducted in Thai, two in Burmese and three in English.  For participants 
whose first language was Thai or Burmese, a translator was used.  Field notes were taken both by 
the primary researcher as well as the assistant, and were compared for accuracy during the data 
analysis phase.  These notes detailed the answers of the participants as well as the interview 
environment, including any other people present or nearby.  Interviews were approximately sixty 
to ninety minutes in length.  In addition, audio recordings of each interview were made and 
referred to during the data analysis phase of the study.  Though interview questions for each sub-
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group were similar in theme, interview questions were manipulated in order that they were 
compatible with the expertise and position of each interviewee.  For example, questions were 
slightly adjusted for non-Thai interviewees, in order to make these more relevant to his/her 
experiences.  Prior to the interviews, a review with the translators was done to ensure that the 
research questions were understood by the whole research team.  In addition, the translator was 
provided with a set of guidelines regarding appropriate interview protocol.  Those who were 
selected for interview were questioned either immediately or within the week.  Broad question 
themes were generated by the principle investigator prior to leaving Canada, however, these 
were revised after the first week of orientation in the field, and questions were modified 
throughout the interviewing phase in order to incorporate newly identified issues.  All 
interviewees were made aware of the purpose of the research and requests were made for 
voluntary participation.   
4.5.2 Research Sample 
 In each of the two case study sites,  Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi, the team conducted 
interviews with 9 males and 11 females between the ages of 15 and 70 for a total sample size of 
n=40.  In both case studies, the majority of interviews were with Thai nationals, however in 
Khao Lak, three Burmese immigrants and one German resident of Bang Niang were interviewed, 
while on Koh Phi Phi, one Chinese-Thai and one French foreigner were interviewed.  The large 
Burmese population in Khao Lak became apparent approximately half-way through the 
interview process, and some Thai interviewees speculated that the Burmese were the most 
vulnerable during the tsunami.  As such, we sought to interview three Burmese migrants.  Still, 
when statistically analyzing questions directed at Thai nationals responses from Burmese 
migrants were excluded.  The Chinese-Thai participant on Koh Phi Phi first described herself as 
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Thai, she was a major land owner on the island and a prominent business woman.  Because Koh 
Phi Phi Don has a large Chinese-Thai population, who have been integrated in the community 
for more than a decade, all of her responses were included in the statistical analysis.  The 
German and French participants, in Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi respectively, were people who 
had resided in the area for more than 5 years.  These interviews proved valuable because they 
offered a foreigners perspective on Thai society and culture however, like the Burmese 
interviews, their responses were sometimes excluded from the statistical analysis14.  In 
retrospect, the interviews with foreigners should have been conducted as key informant rather 
than ‘impactee’ interviews. 
 Participants were selected for interview only if they met one or more of the three criteria: 
1) they were present during the December 26, 2004 tsunami; 2) they had resided in the area for 
over two years prior to the tsunami, or; 3) they had a family member or friend who was impacted 
by the tsunami and demonstrated an understanding of the reasons that they were impacted.  Of 
those who met the above criteria, forty people were selected for interview, twenty participants 
from Khao Lak and twenty from Koh Phi Phi Don.  Selections were made based on availability; 
trust; and willingness to participate.  All of those selected for interview were informed that all 
answers would be kept confidential.  In addition, all participants were made aware that 
participation in the research was voluntary and that withdrawal from the interview was 
acceptable at any time.  During interviews, participants were encouraged to offer their personal 
stories and to describe their disaster experiences.  Interviews were guided by open-ended 
                                                 
14 Interviews with participants other than Thai nationals were excluded from statistical analysis 
where appropriate.  For example, in questions regarding assistance provided by the Thai 
government only responses from Thai participants were included because the others were not 
eligible for government compensation packages. 
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questions offered by the researcher and designed to elicit the views and opinions of the 
participant.   
4.5.3 Method of Analysis 
 All interview data were kept in the respondents’ own words and interview notes were 
transcribed to computer and were both qualitatively and quantitatively compared.  The data 
analysis included a statistical analysis using SPSS, which highlighted trends among participants, 
and between case study sites.  This analysis helped to identify the population groups most 
vulnerable to the December 26th tsunami and helped to highlight their vulnerabilities. A 
qualitative analysis was also conducted in order to identify the concerns, opinions, experiences 
and feelings of the participants.  Finally, the data was organized by theme and was summarized 
in paragraph form.     
4.5.4 Research Limitations and Potential for Error 
 The vulnerability approach to disaster management is focused on identifying groups that 
are most vulnerable and most impacted by disaster, and using representatives of these groups to 
offer explanations about the reasons for their vulnerability.  In the cases of Khao Lak and Koh 
Phi Phi Don, the ‘most vulnerable’ people were those in fact killed by the Asian tsunami, and as 
such I was reliant on the perceptions of remaining residents and staff of relief and reconstruction 
agencies working in the area.  
 The accuracy of the data retrieved for this study is dependent on the honesty of the 
participants, and I have no reason to question their truthfulness.  In order to avoid information 
based on hearsay, each interviewee was encouraged only to discuss information that they had 
learned through personal experience or from the experience of a close friend or family member.  
In addition, though this research reflects an accurate description of the participants experiences 
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and opinions, the sample size is too small to be able to extrapolate the results of this study to the 
wider population.  
 This study was conducted under both time and financial limitations.  As funding for this 
project was provided in order to meet the needs of a four month internship, my research agenda 
needed to follow a strict budget and timeline.  This affected the study in a few important ways.  
Had there not been financial and time restrictions, I would have developed a slightly different 
interview sample.  For instance, the realization that Burmese migrants experienced significant 
vulnerability to the tsunami could have lead to further research and interviews in order to 
determine the ways that Burmese populations experienced vulnerabilities and the underlying 
reasons for their susceptibility to hazard.  In addition, an unforeseen change in host institutions 
three weeks prior to the project start date contributed to a heavier reliance on interviews with 
local residents in the two case study sites.  The planned internship with the initial host institution 
would have allowed for increased policy analysis in Bangkok and easier communication with 
local officials.   Lack of time and finances during the field research stage meant that these 
avenues difficult to explore within the projects timeline.   
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5 RESULTS 
 This research stems from a desire to identify the socio-economic, environmental and 
political factors which contributed to disaster vulnerability in Thailand.  The central results of 
this thesis are based on the opinions and insights of 40 participants.  The vulnerabilities 
experienced by the participants must first be recognized and revealed before they can be 
analyzed and applied to broader global issues of disaster vulnerability.  The following results 
provide a socio-economic and environmental picture of Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don pre-
tsunami, and illustrate the effects of the tsunami on communities, families, livelihoods, 
environments and politics.  
5.1 Environment 
 The coastal environments of Koh Phi Phi Don and Khao Lak were compromised before 
the tsunami (See Table 1). Excessive tourism in both places led to water pollution, littering, 
Table 1: The Influence of Environmental Degradation on Vulnerability 
Type of Environmental 
Degradation 
Influence on Vulnerability 
Mangrove removal • Mangrove forests act as a natural buffer reducing 
and slowing large waves  
Cutting coconut trees  • Coconut trees could have reduced wave impact 
Extensive coastal development • The debris from broken bungalows and guest 
houses caused injury during the tsunami 
Water pollution/solid waste 
disposal in coastal areas 
• Kills coral reefs which could have served to reduce 
wave run-up 
cutting of coconut and palm trees to make room for hotels and bungalows, and damage to coral 
reefs (Interviewee 2k, 2n).  However, participants from Khao Lak expressed that before the 
tsunami, the beaches were beautiful and clean because of a recent government initiative to make 
Khao Lak a tourist destination.  Some participants from Ba Nam Kem also mentioned heavy air 
pollution including strong odors caused by shrimp farming and described dumping of waste 
water into the ocean by farms and restaurants.  Participants expressed similar concerns on Koh 
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Phi Phi and described that Phi Phi’s waste management systems were inadequate before the 
tsunami.  Some mentioned that solid waste was infrequently collected and remembered tourists 
plugging their noses and wearing masks in some areas of the island.  Some participants also 
mentioned that restaurants and hotels consistently dumped waste water into the ocean and said 
that though businesses were required to dump far from the island, the did not adhere to that rule.  
The environmental conditions in Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi pre-tsunami were not optimal and 
the tsunami certainly contributed to some types of environmental destruction.  However, the 
tsunami literally created a clean slate in both places which now offers these two communities an 
opportunity to change or implement environmental policies and better regulate environmental 
management in the future.   
 Participants were asked both to describe the environmental conditions before the tsunami 
and to explain the impact that the Asian tsunami had on their respective environments.  The 
responses between Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi were similar, and resulted in seven different 
categories of environmental change including: broader streams and rivers; fewer trees; increased 
soil salinity; change in beach shape and length; increased waste on the beach; changes in oceanic 
species in the vicinity of each site; and damage to coral reefs.  In Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi 
changes to beach shape and fewer trees were the most commonly mentioned environmental 
changes, with 11 participants from Khao Lak and 13 from Koh Phi Phi mentioning fewer trees 
and 13 people from Khao Lak and 10 from Koh Phi Phi mentioning a changed beach shape.  In 
both cases the tsunami pulled sand into the ocean, while pushing the remaining sand upwards, 
creating a heavily sloped and smaller beachfront.  The force and impact of the tsunami resulted 
in snapped tree trunks and semi or completely uprooted trees.  As a result, there were far fewer 
trees at each site after the tsunami.  
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 The impact of increased soil salinity on the natural landscape was another environmental 
concern of Khao Lak residents.  Both Bang Niang and Ba Nam Kem are low-lying towns 
extending back from the coast about 3-5 kilometers.  Greenery in both places was devastated by 
the increased salinity that resulted from the tsunami and many participants described the 
environment as dry and uncultivable for months after the waves.  The most devastated area on 
Koh Phi Phi was the Tonsai/Lo Dalam strip.  This area was heavily developed and lacked the 
gardens and green areas that existed in Bang Niang, therefore increased salinity was not as great 
a concern.  Coral reef depletion was mentioned by half of the participants interviewed on Koh 
Picture 3: Tree Damage from Tonsai Bay  
 
This picture highlights destruction caused by the tsunami waves.  Pre-tsunami the density of 
coconut trees and buildings made it impossible to see from Tonsai Bay to Lo Dalam Bay.  
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Phi Phi while none of the participants from Khao Lak mentioned coral reef damage from the 
tsunami.   
 In addition to being asked to discuss the environmental impacts of the tsunami, 
respondents were questioned about their personal reasons for valuing the environment.  During 
the analysis phase, these responses were divided between two categories: 1) participants who 
value the environment for the environment’s sake and 2) participants who value the environment 
as an economic resource.  In both case studies, the majority of respondents considered the 
environment important for economic security and growth.  In Khao Lak twelve interviewees 
valued the environment as an economic resource.  One woman suggested “the environment is 
important because if the area is pretty, a lot of tourists can come and bring employment” 
(Interviewee 1a), another said, “when the beach is beautiful, many tourists come here and spend 
money and it’s good for everybody” (Interviewee 1f).  Only five respondents in Khao Lak and 
five from Koh Phi Phi valued the environment for its own sake. 
5.2 Facilities 
 The availability of public services, social programs and facilities in an area indicate a 
community’s level of development, reveal the extent of government involvement in that area, 
and serve as an indicator of relative pre-disaster social vulnerability (i.e. communities without 
such services are generally more vulnerable to disaster).   Respondents were asked to identify all 
facilities and free services available in their communities before and after the tsunami and to 
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Affected Free Not Free 
*Clinic    Primar
y 
School 
   
Kindergarten     Mosqu
e 
   
**Kids 
Centre 
    Hospita
l 
   
☼Burmese 
Health Centre  
N/A N/A   ♦Police 
Station 
 N/A N/A 
School N/A N/A   ♦Post 
Office 
 N/A N/A 
☼Local 
Radio  
N/A N/A       
☼Preschool N/A N/A       






N/A N/A       
*Now the health centre has better equipment, more staff, better service because organizations 
have donated/assisted.  Often subsidized for the poor. 
**Moved to a new building after the tsunami, farther from the beach. 
☼Opened after the tsunami in response to need 
♦Not rebuilt post-tsunami 
 
 Before the tsunami, Khao Lak had more free facilities and post-tsunami there was a trend 
of increased facilities and services, while on Koh Phi Phi, facilities that existed before the 
tsunami were not-yet replaced or rebuilt at the time of the research (See Table 2).  While Khao 
Lak received a new preschool, orphanage and kids centre relatively quickly, the primary school 
on Koh Phi Phi Don was not re-opened until November 1st 2005, eleven months after the 
tsunami.   As of November, 2005, neither the police station nor the post office, on Koh Phi Phi 
Don, had been reconstructed.  Residents had to travel to mainland Krabi, a 2 hour boat ride 
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away, to use the post office and the five policemen on the island were relocated to a small ‘police 
box’ next to a pancake shop.  In fact, one respondent indicated that the police box was actually 
owned by a hotel and that the landlord planned to evict the policemen (Interview 2k).   
 After the tsunami, organizations offering computer training, English lessons and 
hospitality classes developed quickly in Khao Lak, while Koh Phi Phi was assisted only by Help 
International Phi Phi “Hi Phi Phi”, a grassroots organization which focused on clean-up and 
reconstruction.  Organizations in Khao Lak were often developed by churches, families who had 
lost loved ones in the Tsunami, or as branches of International organizations, whereas Hi Phi Phi 
was developed from a core group of tourists who were on the island when the tsunami hit and 
who felt a personal conviction to return and assist local residents in rebuilding and reconstructing 
the island (Field Notes, 2005).   
 In terms of hospital and medical services post-tsunami, residents in Khao Lak, from Bang 
Niang and Nam Kem, travel to Takuapa for hospital care.  The hospital is approximately 40 
minutes away from Bang Niang and 10 minutes from Ba Nam Kem, but both towns have closer 
access to a health centre.  Organizations in Khao Lak assisted with the redevelopment of the 
health centre in Ba Nam Kem and many respondents expressed that the quality of the health 
centre improved after the tsunami (Interviewee 1a; 1e; 1f; 1g; 1o; 1t).  However, on Phi Phi 
Island, health services worsened after the tsunami.  Before the tsunami, the hospital on Koh Phi 
Phi offered 24 hour service, but with only one doctor to service the island after the tsunami, the 
hours of operation reduced to 8 hours per day (Interviewee 2a).  One man explained: “If we’re 
sick at night we rent a speedboat, it’s about 1 hour to the mainland in a speedboat” (Interviewee 
2d), while another said that if there is a medical emergency at night, you can go wake up the 
doctor (Interviewee 2f).  Respondents on Koh Phi Phi Don indicated that free health care 
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services were provided after the tsunami, but mentioned that services were provided by ‘Hi Phi 
Phi,’ rather than by the Thai government.  Usually, hospital care is not free in Thailand, but is 
heavily subsidized.  Thai nationals carry a government initiated ‘thirty baht health card’ which 
lowers the cost of each hospital visit to roughly 75 cents US (Interviewee 2i).   
 After describing the facilities available on the island, respondents were asked about the 
facilities available for children, elderly and disabled people.  Facilities available for children 
received the highest number of responses, with 70 percent (n=14) of the respondents in Khao 
Lak and 40% of the respondents (n=8) on Koh Phi Phi mentioning facilities for children.  
However, many of the respondents (n=6) on Koh Phi Phi cited the school and kindergarten as 
facilities for children, despite the fact that neither was open at the time of interviews.  The 
situation for elderly people was quite different with only 5% of respondents (n=2) from Khao 
Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don mentioning any facilities.  From the two respondents that mentioned 
facilities in Khao Lak, one suggested that she had heard that a community member takes care of 
all the elderly, which does not suggest the presence of a facility for elderly people.  The other 
respondent referred to an organization that takes care of old people in the tsunami survivor camp, 
which suggests that such services were not available pre-tsunami.  One of the respondents on 
Koh Phi Phi mentioned that elderly residents go to the mosque to socialize (Interview 2u), while 
another suggested that they get enough care from their families.  Neither in Khao Lak nor on 
Koh Phi Phi were there any organized facilities or services available for the elderly population.  
 Interviewees were also asked about the facilities available for the disabled.  In general, 
responses fell into two categories: either no facilities were mentioned, or participants explained 
that there were few disabled people in the community.   
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 After discussing the facilities available for children, the elderly and the disabled, 
respondents were asked whether these groups were adequately cared for within their respective 
communities.  In regard to the elderly population, responses from both case studies were split 
relatively evenly with some believing that the elderly received enough care from their families, 
(n=7) in Khao Lak and (n=7) in Koh Phi Phi, and others stating that the elderly were not cared 
for enough, (n=6) in Khao Lak and (n=9) on Koh Phi Phi.  One respondent from Khao Lak stated 
that elderly get enough care “because the hospital is free for old people” (Interview 1g).  With 
regard to children, responses to the question of adequacy of services in Khao Lak were 
approximately even (n=9 vs. n=7) in Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi respectively, however most 
respondents (n=9) on Koh Phi Phi expressed that children did not receive adequate care.  For all 
three sub-groups (i.e elderly, children and the disabled), most respondents (67%) who believed 
that the three groups received adequate care referred to the family care they received and did not 
mention government sponsored social programs or facilities.   
5.3 Residence 
 Disaster vulnerability is acknowledged to depend significantly on location15, and this was 
found to be true in the two southern Thailand case studies examined (Hewitt, 1997).  In southern 
Thailand, people who held ocean-related employment and those who resided near the coast were 
particularly vulnerable to the tsunami.  One of the aims of this study was therefore to explore 
residential patterns at each study site and to investigate whether place of residence is influenced 
by employment, ethnicity or income.    
                                                 
15 Hewitt (1997) describes that “geography is an intrinsic aspect of risk…any given risk or 
disaster event is distinguished by its geographic location and setting” (Hewitt, 1997, 12).  
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5.3.1 Residence and Employment 
In both Khao Lak and on Koh Phi Phi Don, the majority of respondents (75% and 65% 
respectively), indicated that residence is strongly shaped by occupation.  In both places, all 
fishers were described as residing within the same area, generally close to the water.  However, 
on Koh Phi Phi one respondent indicated that the number of fishers had decreased in recent years 
explaining “there’s not so many now: they are men and poor” (Interview 2a).  Hotel employees 
in both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi were also said to reside in close proximity to the coast, and 
many had been provided with accommodation by their employer.  One Khao Lak resident 
explained “Fishermen live close to the bay with other fishermen, people working in hotels live in 
the same area: they live close to where they work” (Interview 1a).  However, in Khao Lak, place 
of residence seemed more strongly influenced by occupation than it was on Koh Phi Phi, 
however confirming this relationship was beyond the scope of this study.  In Khao Lak, 
respondents gave a long list of the types of workers who reside within the same near-coast area 
including: hotel employees, fishers, shop keepers, construction workers, and gardeners.  
However, on Koh Phi Phi, only construction workers, hotel employees and fishermen were 
described as living within close proximity to each other while the rest of the population was 
dispersed.  In Khao Lak, the residency patterns of entire towns were shaped by occupation, with 
Bang Niang being described as a ‘hotel village’ and Ba Nam Kem as a ‘fishing village’ 
(Interview 1j).  In summary, in both case study sites affected by the tsunami place of residence 
was strongly influenced by occupation. 
5.3.2 Residence and Ethnicity 
Interviewees were asked to comment on the link between ethnicity and place of 
residence, yet differing responses from both case studies suggest that such a link, if it exists,  is 
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complex and place-specific. The majority of respondents in Khao Lak (75%), but only one from 
Koh Phi Phi (5%), responded that ethnicity influences place of residence.  
In Khao Lak, Burmese people were described as living at the place of their occupation 
(Interview 1m).  One woman suggested that “Burmese live in gardens16; they don’t live in the 
village because police will catch them” (Interview 1a).  Burmese people often lived with other 
Burmese people and close to their place of employment.  When working in construction, 
Burmese built their own temporary accommodation close to the construction project, then 
disassembled their homes and relocated to their next job site when the job was complete.  In 
addition, Moken people (or sea gypsies) lived completely separately from Thai and Burmese: in 
Khao Lak “Moken people have a village where they stay together, the government set up the 
village, before they worked and lived on the sea, now they live in a village” (Interview 1g).   
The residential separation between Burmese and Thai was in part caused by tensions and 
suspicions between the two groups.  One Burmese male gave an example: “if a Thai person goes 
to buy something and sees a Burmese, he says ‘don’t come down here’ to the Burmese person.  
Thai people will say ‘Where are you going…don’t come on my street” (Interview 1p).   
Similarly, a male Thai respondent expressed that “Some organization wants to help the 
government make a social map, if they ask me I want to move so that Burmese live together and 
Thai live together.  Many Thai people do not trust Burmese” (Interview 1t).  There were no 
obvious or observable tensions between Thai and Burmese people on Koh Phi Phi.  However, 
Burmese people were still described by some respondents as living separate from Thai, with 
Burmese generally living in the construction site camps where they worked.  A number of 
                                                 
16 What were commonly referred to as ‘gardens’ by participants, I understood as plantations.  
Burmese migrants often lived on coconut and rubber tree plantations in temporary 
accommodation, or accommodation provided by their employer. 
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respondents mentioned that there were fewer Burmese on the island since “Police knew Burmese 
came illegally, they check the permits for construction workers now” (Interview 2i).   
As in Khao Lak, respondents on Koh Phi Phi described a clear locational/ residence 
divide between Moken and Thai people and offered examples of poor relations between them.  
Similar to Khao Lak, Moken people on Koh Phi Phi lived separately from Thai nationals.  In fact 
they lived on the other side of the island.  One French respondent, who resided on Koh Phi Phi 
for five years, explained “there are not a lot of sea gypsies here anymore.  They’re a minority.  
Sea gypsies were always pushed out by Muslims and Buddhists, they are a minority” (Interview 
2n).  This position was supported by the statement of another Thai male who said that “sea 
gypsies live by the sea, they don’t believe anything, they have nothing and they don’t shower 
also” (Interview 2s).  In both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi, the more marginalized ethnic groups 
were more likely to reside in temporary housing and lived in places physically separate from the 
dominant ethnic groups.  Though there is a relationship between ethnicity and place of residents 
the research did not conclusively demonstrate that ethnically marginalized groups are living in 
areas that make them more vulnerable to disaster. 
5.3.3 Residence and Income 
 A minority of respondents in both study sites believed that place of residence was 
influenced by income.  Though eight respondents from Khao Lak (or 40%) mentioned a 
relationship between income and location of residence, only three participants from Koh Phi Phi 
(15%) agreed.  In Khao Lak, some suggested that people with lower incomes lived inland, while 
more wealthy people lived by the beach (Interview 1a, 1b).  Although respondents did not 
describe a strong connection between income and place of residence, there was a clear 
relationship between income and ethnicity, with Burmese often described as ‘poor’.  One 
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respondent said that “In Nam Kem, 70% of Thai people are rich.  All of Burmese are poor” 
(Interview 1r).  Thus, since residential patterns in Khao Lak are strongly influenced by ethnicity, 
and since Burmese are described as the most poor, residence is in fact partly influenced by 
income, with the low-income Burmese populations residing in the same place.  While ethnicity 
and income created residential patterns in Khao Lak, on Koh Phi Phi religion and income were 
the factors that strongly influenced place of residence17.  People who resided in the Thai Market 
(located in the low lying interior of the island) were described as poor.  This area was inhabited 
by the local Muslim population, who were traditionally fishermen.  Over the past decade much 
of the land on Phi Phi Island has been sold to people from the mainland and one respondents 
indicated that a result of this was that “Most of the places now belong to the rich, poor people 
don’t have a place, they must rent” (Interview 2f).  Local Muslims on Phi Phi Island sold much 
of their land in the early 1990s, and now occupy a small portion of the Tonsai-Lo Dalum strip, 
known as the Thai Market.   
 Low-income groups in both study sites (i.e. Burmese migrants in Khao Lak, and Muslims 
on Koh Phi Phi) were particularly vulnerable to the tsunami, while those who lived on higher 
ground were less impacted.  In Khao Lak this meant that people involved in rubber tree and 
coconut farming were less impacted, however there was no clear income or ethnic division 
between those who lived in high or low lying areas.  On Koh Phi Phi however, the budget guest 
houses and bungalows were in the low lying areas between Tonsai and Lo Dalam Bays, while 
more luxurious and expensive hotels were located on the side of the mountain.  Thus, wealthy 
tourists and hotel owners were less vulnerable to the tsunami.   
                                                 
17 Though some argue that religion is an aspect of ethnicity, in the case of Koh Phi Phi responses 
were compared sometimes by the religion of participants since both Muslim and Buddhist groups 
described themselves as Thai nationals. 
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5.4 Vulnerability 
One of the main objectives of the in-depth interviews with tsunami victims was to 
determine the community sub-groups most vulnerable to the tsunami.  As such, participants were 
asked in an open question to describe the groups that they felt were most vulnerable to the effects 
of the tsunami, and through probing questions, were encouraged to discuss and explain their 
answers.  Respondents were asked to describe the gender, occupation, income levels, nationality 
and age of those most vulnerable to the tsunami disaster (see Table 3 for details).   
Table 3 outlines how the participants from both Koh Phi Phi Don and Khao Lak 
characterize the most and least vulnerable population groups.  There are a variety of conclusions 
that can be made from this table.  Firstly, participants were consistent in expressing that lower 
income groups experienced greater physical threat, while wealthier populations were most at risk 
of financial loss.  Although the numbers do not conclusively demonstrate the high vulnerability 
of one ethnic or religious group over another, the explanations of vulnerability reveal that Thai 
nationals and Buddhists were described as more vulnerable than their counterpart populations 
because they had larger population bases.  However, the explanations provided for high 
vulnerability experienced by foreigners, Burmese and Muslim populations associate vulnerability 
with location and lack of knowledge.  Conversely, Moken people were described as least 
vulnerable as a result of their knowledge regarding tsunamis.  Children and the elderly were 
described as vulnerable primarily because of their limited physical abilities to respond quickly to 
the disaster.  Finally the table demonstrates a widespread consensus relating low-lying areas in 
close proximity to the shore line with high vulnerability, and high locations away from the shore 
with decreased vulnerability. 
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Table 3: Characteristics of Vulnerable Populations 
Mentioned Characteristics of the Most Vulnerable 
Most Vulnerable Explanation  
Business People/Rich 
 (n=2) 
*Lost the most as a result of the tsunami 
*They had more investments and had more money to lose 
* “Rich people were more resilient” (Interviewee 1p). 
Lower Income People 
 (n=6) 
* “Poor people lost family members, their houses were made from  
wood.  Richer people had two floors, sometimes their houses were  
made of bricks, sometimes wood” (Interviewee 1b).  
* Lower income groups lost their lives, but not financial security 
* “Poor people were killed more. Poor people work on the beach,  
right on the beach in tents/restaurants/sun chairs” (Interviewee 1d). 
Thai 
 (n=7) 
*Thai were more affected because there were more Thai people in the 
village (Interviewee 1c).  
Foreigner 
 (n=11) 
*Curious about the withdrawal of water and stayed on the beach 
*Lacked knowledge regarding tsunami warning signs 
*Tourists had a Christmas party the night before and were sleeping in 
bungalows on the beach (Interviewee 2n). 
Burmese 
 (n=2) 
* “They don’t have rights at all” (Interviewee 1n). 
Muslim 
(n=5) 
*Muslims live in the low-lying Thai Market (Interviewee 2k). 
Buddhists 
(n=2) 
* “More Buddhists died because there are more of them and they  
didn’t know anything, the waster disappeared and they ran to the  
ocean” (Interviewee 2o). 
People Closest to the 
Beach, Within 3 
Kilometers 
(n=19) 
*Houses by the beach were built close together. 
*Greatest force of the tsunami 
Elderly People 
(n=3) 
*Lacked education and general knowledge (Interviewee 1r). 
*Unable to run quickly  
Children (age 3-7) 
(n=12) 
*Required assistance to escape 
*Unable to run quickly 
Fishermen 
(n=1) 
*There is a larger male population 
*Fishermen were getting their nets ready when the tsunami came;  
they were on the beach. 
Characteristics of the Least Vulnerable 
Moken (n=1) *Stories passed down 
Rich (n=1) *Fewer rich people died 
Poor (n=1) *Lacked investments to lose 
Thai (n=2) *More Thai than other groups 
People who live on higher 
ground (n=26) 
*Hit with less force, or not at all. 
People out on a boat (n=2) *”If they were out fishing, even if they were close to the island, they 
were fine because if they were out 100-200 meters it is deep there” 
(Interviewee 2f). 
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5.4.1 Gender 
When asked whether more women or men were killed by the tsunami, the majority of 
respondents, in both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi, indicated that men and women were similarly 
affected (See Figure XI).  However, while 8 respondents in Khao Lak, and 3 on Koh Phi Phi 
suggested that women were more affected, only one respondent out of the 40 interviewed in both 
case studies believed that men were more impacted by the tsunami (See Figure XI).  This 
respondent, a Burmese male, explained that more men were affected by the tsunami because 
there were more men in Khao Lak before the tsunami.  Though the Gender Adviser of Oxfam, 
Ines Smyth, expressed the difficulty of retrieving gender disaggregated data after natural 
disasters, experts from both the World Health Organization (WHO) and Oxfam have confirmed 
Figure XI: Disaster Impacts by Gender 
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that there is evidence that more women than men died in the tsunami in Thailand (WHO, 
2005)18.   
When interviewees were asked whether they thought men or women were more affected 
by the tsunami, many respondents differentiated between immediate and longer-term post-
tsunami impacts. Most respondents believed that an even number of men and women were 
killed, however, when asked to explain the tsunami’s impacts, most described the post-tsunami 
hardships that the tsunami caused for women.  One interviewee said “more ladies were affected 
because men went out in the boat that morning, but ladies stayed in the houses with children” 
(Interview 2m).  Respondents offered a variety of explanations for female vulnerability during 
the tsunami:   
• women run slower, so they couldn’t escape;  
• women were too scared and they didn’t know what to do;  
• women are weaker;  
• women couldn’t swim, and;  
• women were more concerned for the children.   
One of the more practical and insightful responses was from a female respondent in Khao Lak 
who said: “Mostly women died because they work at hotels.  The uniforms that the girls wore 
made it hard for them to escape.  Men wear better clothes to run: girls wore tight skirts and high 
heels” (Interview 1a).   Two respondents also believed that pregnant women and children were 
extremely vulnerable during the tsunami and explained that “At that time a lot of pregnant 
                                                 
18 To date, it has not been possible to retrieve data comparing death tolls by gender in Thailand.  
However, data from other tsunami-affected countries gives an indication of the trend that women 
have been disproportionately affected by the tsunami.  For example, in the Aceh Besar district in 
Indonesia “females accounted for 77 percent of deaths” and in Cuddalore, India 391 females 
were killed, compared with 146 men (Oxfam, 2005, 1 ) 
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women were on Phi Phi, I don’t know why, but mostly they died, they couldn’t run.  They got 
stuck or they couldn’t run” (Interview 2k). 
Gendered vulnerabilities were, to a large extent, related to livelihoods.  The occupations 
that men and women engaged in often determined their level of vulnerability to the tsunami.  For 
example, one respondent explained that when the tsunami hit, men were getting their fishing nets 
ready and were therefore lost at sea.  Women, primarily responsible for domestic and child care, 
were at home when the tsunami hit.  Female vulnerability was increased because women were 
often responsible for evacuating both themselves and their children making it even more difficult 
to escape the tsunami. 
Table 4: Gendered and Ethnic Vulnerability 
 1Male Livelihoods  1Female Livelihoods  
Thai 2Hotel Driver 
Hotel Maintenance 






















1Men earn more money than women: “Men can get 4000-5000 baht per month; women can 
get only 2000-3000” (Interview 1s).  
2It was easier for men to escape in the Tsunami (Interview 1a). 
3Men engaged in fishing were less vulnerable during the tsunami because they were on the 
water, whereas women stayed on land to sell fish and fix nets. 
4Women working in the hotels wore high heels and skirts and these uniforms made it hard for 
them to escape from the tsunami (Interview 1b).  
5Burmese and Thai are paid different rates for their labour: “Burmese people get 180-200 
baht/day; Thai people get 350-400 baht/day” (Interview 1r).  
6Burmese are more economically marginalized in Khao Lak.  Though they may be engaged 
in the same types of jobs as Thai, they earn less. 
i.e. “I heard that Thai and Burmese don’t get the same salary” (Interview 1s). 
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Tsunami Survivor Stories 
We had a restaurant near the beach, we saw the 
white on the ocean and I said ‘I think it’s maybe a 
tsunami.’  I jumped on my motorcycle to look for 
my son, I drove my bike right through the shop, my 
son was playing in the back with his friends.  I saw 
my son and daughter about 50m away.  I dropped 
the motorbike and ran, but the wave took them, my 
son and my wife, they were holding on to plastic.  I 
got on a big boat and the wave pushed it back.  I 
walked everywhere to look for my family.  I walked 
to the temple.  My wife and daughter came to the 
temple at 3pm.  I walked along the beach for 10km 
to follow the footprints from the ocean, there were 
four tracks, but I couldn’t find my son.  I saw my 
manager sitting shocked in the truck, just driving 
the truck, not knowing where to go.  I only had 
water, no food or shower for four days.  I didn’t 
find my son. (Interview 1g) 
5.4.2 Vulnerable Livelihoods 
5.4.2.1 Khao Lak 
 Respondents described a number 
of livelihoods that increased 
vulnerability for residents of Khao Lak 
including: people who worked in the 
tourist industry, construction workers, 
and hotel workers.  Interestingly, there 
were strong differences in how 
‘vulnerability’ was interpreted.  Some 
understood vulnerability as physical 
vulnerability, leading to death or injury, 
while others equated vulnerability with 
economic loss. 
 When asked to describe 
vulnerable livelihoods, one woman 
explained that “Mostly women died 
because they work in hotels” (Interview 
1a) and could not see the wave coming.  However, others suggested that business people were 
the most impacted because they experienced the greatest financial loss (Interview 1r, 1m).  In 
terms of economic vulnerability, the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre found that informal 
workers faced significant problems post-tsunami because they were often found to be ineligible 
for compensation packages (Kessler, 2005; MACAW, 2005).  In addition, sub-contractors, who 
do not fit in the category of small business owners, qualify only for humanitarian government 
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aid, rather than the assistance packages provided to businesses (Kessler, 2005; MACAW, 2005).  
Thus, while the physically vulnerable lost their lives, others were financially vulnerable and have 
struggled extensively post-tsunami. 
 Other respondents in Khao Lak described the unemployed as least vulnerable because 
they stayed at home during the tsunami (Interview 1a).  Insofar as the level of vulnerability for 
fishers, there was inconsistency in the responses.  Some described that fishers were safe because 
they were out on the water (Interview 1a, 1g), while others explained: “fishers came in from the 
sea at that time, to prepare for the next day.  In the tsunami they were in from the sea, so many 
fishers were lost in the tsunami because they were on the beach” (Interview 1r).  The most 
consistent response (77.5%), however, was that people in low lying areas, those closest to the 
beach, were more vulnerable during the tsunami and those whose livelihoods rely on ocean-
related activities were vulnerable.  
5.4.2.2 Koh Phi Phi 
 On Koh Phi Phi, respondents were less likely to mention the relationship between 
vulnerability and livelihoods and more commonly associated vulnerability with physical 
closeness to the beach.  When asked which occupations were most vulnerable to the tsunami one 
respondent said the most vulnerable were those “who worked by the beach in a resort or hotel.  
The fishing boats were far from the beach and were all fine.  Even if they were fishing 100-200m 
out they were fine because it is deep there” (Interview 2f).   
5.4.3 Income and Vulnerability 
 In most disasters, members of lower income households are less resilient and have a 
lower capacity to overcome the impact of the disaster and this was true in post-tsunami Thailand 
(ADPCb, 2005).  In Khao Lak, there was some discrepancy between interviewees in terms of 
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their response to questions about whether the rich or poor were more vulnerable to the tsunami.  
Some of the inconsistency can be explained by the residential locations of Khao Lak’s higher 
income groups (sites nearer the shoreline), and in the different housing styles for higher and 
lower income households.  Many suggested that “Poor people lost family members because their 
houses were made from wood. [Whereas] “Richer people had two floors sometimes made of 
brick” (Interview 1b) and could therefore escape the wave.  However, others disagreed with this 
analysis suggesting that higher income families lived closer to the beach (Interview 1b, 1c) and 
that “People near the beach were more affected” (Interview 1e, 1g, 1k).   
 Respondents were consistent, however, in stating that “The people who had more 
investments and more money were more affected because they lost” material wealth (Interview 
1d, 1m), whereas poor people who lacked assets lost their lives (Interview 1d).  One respondent 
explained: “Poor people were killed more.  The owners of the hotels didn’t stay in the hotel, but 
the workers and poor people who worked on the beaches were vulnerable” (Interview 1d).  In 
addition, other respondents said: “Rich people were more resilient” (Interview 1q), but “Poor 
people were the most vulnerable” (Interview 1d). 
 As in Khao Lak, respondents on Koh Phi Phi associated vulnerability with the type of 
housing.  For example, one interviewee said: “Poor people [were more vulnerable] because rich 
people stayed in a strong building (cement), but Muslims are poor and have a small house mad 
with wood (bamboo), the water just took it” (Interview 2m).  Similarly, as a tourist island, one 
person explained that hotel and business owners stay on the mainland and that “More poor 
people died because the rich don’t live on Phi Phi” (Interview 2d).   
In both cases respondents suggested that lower income family’s experienced greater physical 
risk, while higher income persons were more economically vulnerable to the tsunami. 
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5.4.4 Vulnerability and Nationality 
5.4.4.1 Khao Lak 
 Khao Lak is situated one hour’s drive from one of Thailand’s border crossings with 
Myanmar, and has a large population of Burmese migrants.  Though some Burmese people hold 
work permits, there is a large population of illegal Burmese migrants.  Lack of information on 
the number of Burmese in Khao Lak before the tsunami makes it difficult to speculate on the 
number of Burmese who lost their lives.  Still, an idea of the number of Burmese in Khao Lak 
was given by the governor of Phang Nga Province who estimated that there were 40,000 migrant 
workers in the province of Phang Nga, the majority of which were Burmese (Unknown, 2005c).   
As with Burmese and Thai, a Moken village called Pakarung, which is located between Bang 
Niang and Ba Nam Kem, adds further complexity to the vulnerability analysis of Khao Lak 
district.  This village was created for Moken people by the Thai government in an attempt to 
deter them from living at sea and to help them settle in Thailand.  In addition to these three local 
population groups, Khao Lak’s position as one of Thailand’s tourism ‘hot spots’ meant that it 
was brimming with European and Asian tourists in the December 2004 high season.  With each 
of these population groups in mind, it was one of the research objectives to determine whether 
participants believed vulnerability was influenced by ethnicity or nationality.   
 Interviewees in Khao Lak were asked who was most vulnerable to the tsunami.  
Respondents were consistent in categorizing tsunami victims into four types: Thai, Burmese, 
Moken, and foreign tourists, however there was some discrepancy in the responses.  Some 
agreed that Burmese were more affected than Thai and Moken people (Interview 1b, 1a, 1h, 1e).  
However others claimed that Thai people and foreigners were vulnerable and stated that only a 
few Burmese were affected by the tsunami (Interview 1d, 1n).  One respondent explained that 
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“There were more Thai people affected because there are more Thai people in the village” 
(Interview 1c, 1k).  
 Some respondents described that Burmese people are poor and lower income people were 
more affected in the tsunami (Interview 1b).  In fact, one man outlined the situation for Burmese 
migrants: “It was very sad because the Burmese came here to work for money, they lost family, 
they lost everything.  Thai people also lost, but this is their motherland, so the government gave 
them money, they could get food, but Burmese people can’t get enough” (Interview 1p). 
 Despite the discrepancies between interviewees, the Thai Department of Disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation 
reported that the highest 
number of deaths in Phang 
Nga province (which 
incorporates Khao Lak 
district) were experienced by 
foreign tourists, with the 
death toll second highest 
among Thai nationals 
(DDPM, 2005).  Further, 
1,325 deaths were recorded 
for which the nationalities were ‘not available.’  It is possible that these represented illegal 
Burmese immigrants who did not hold identity cards.  Moken people or ‘sea gypsies’ were 
described by interviewees as those least vulnerable to the tsunami, explaining that “Moken’s 
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were taught as children by their grandfathers, they knew when the water came and they went up 
high” (Interview 1g, 1d).   
5.4.4.2 Koh Phi Phi  
 Koh Phi Phi Don had a significantly lower Burmese population than did Khao Lak, and 
though there was a Moken village on the island, the Moken people lived on the opposite side of 
the island, separate those who lived in the Tonsai-Lo Dalum strip, the lowland area hit most 
severely on Phi Phi Island.  On Koh Phi Phi Don, populations were most often defined by 
religion rather than nationality.  Respondents often expressed the differences between Thai 
Buddhists and Thai Muslims, explaining that Thai Muslims were locals to the island, whereas 
Thai Buddhists came from mainland Thailand (Interview 2e).  Respondents also classified 
foreign tourists and sea gypsies as separate population groups.   
 When asked who was most vulnerable to the tsunami, many respondents compared 
Buddhist and Muslims groups.  Phi Phi Island is comprised of over 500 Muslims and 3000 
migrants from the mainland, described by Koh Phi Phi residents as Buddhists (ADPCb, 2005).  
Interviewees consistently described local Muslims as poor (Interview 2h, 2e), while people from 
the mainland (Buddhists) were described as having higher incomes.  Muslims were described as 
being so poor that they sold off their land in the early 1990s and now struggle to pay rent to 
owners.  Some attributed the lower incomes of Thai Muslims to their refusal to sell or distribute 
alcohol, giving Muslim businesses a disadvantage on Koh Phi Phi.  Muslim respondents 
explained that their religious beliefs prohibited them from selling alcohol, thus Buddhists from 
the mainland profited from selling alcohol to tourists.  Some (23% of respondents asked19) 
                                                 
19 Only after conducting some interviews on Koh Phi Phi did I realize the potential influence of 
religion on disaster vulnerability.  Thus, only thirteen respondents were asked whether Buddhists 
or Muslims were more affected by the tsunami. 
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believed that Muslims were more affected by the tsunami (Interview 2h, 2J, 2t), because they 
were poor, and lived in the low lying Thai market area: “Everyone in the Thai Market and 
(living) by the viewpoint was more affected” (Interview 2i, 2j). Many also believed (31% percent 
of those asked) that more Buddhists were affected because the Buddhist population on Koh Phi 
Phi was larger.  One man explained that since the Buddhists were not local to the island “they 
didn’t know anything, the water disappeared and they ran to the ocean” (Interview 1o). However, 
most respondents who answered the question (46%) expressed that Buddhists and Muslim 
populations were equally vulnerable to the tsunami.  
Figure XIII: Comparing Disaster Affects, Tourists vs. Thai Nationals 
 Respondents on 
Koh Phi Phi Don also 
expressed that causes 
of vulnerability to the 
tsunami were different 
for foreign tourists and 
local Thais.  One man 
expressed: “More 
foreigners were killed 
in the tsunami because at that time there was a Christmas festival.  More people drank that night 
before” and slept on the beach (Interview 2a, 2j).  Another man explained that tourists were more 
affected because “the Thai people knew where to go.  The tourists just arrived the day before and 
didn’t know where to go” (Interview 2n).  Another reason given was that the tourist 
accommodation (primarily bungalows) were located on the beach, and when the tsunami came, 
the tourists were still sleeping (Interview 2d, 2o, 2s). 
SameThaiTourists
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Tsunami Survivor Stories 
I stayed in the house with my daughter and 
three grand kids.  I lost three 
grandchildren, my house; everything in the 
house was gone.  Our boat was gone.  The 
wave hit me, I felt like I was in a washing 
machine, I was hit by three waves.  It 
ripped my clothes off and I was left in a 
tree.  I went to another house to ask for 
clothes.  I went to the hospital and came 
back to stay in a tent for two months, then I 
went to the shelter.   
(Interview 1o) 
 As in Khao Lak, Moken sea gypsies were said to have a story about a tsunami that had 
been passed down from past generations.  One woman said: “The sea gypsies knew before that a 
tsunami would come.  They had a story from old people.  Nobody of the sea gypsies died” 
(Interview 2m).  On Koh Phi Phi Don island the death toll was estimated to be nearly 1,000 
(Charoenpo, 2005a), however, the deputy commissioner of the Royal Thai Police said “No one 
knows exactly how many people on the island were killed by the tsunami on that day” 
(Charoenpo, 2005a).  However, through the research, Koh Phi Phi residents have contributed to 
an understanding of disaster vulnerability in the area:  those most vulnerable to the tsunami are 
seen to be foreign tourists and local Muslim populations. 
5.4.5 Vulnerability and Age  
 In a study done by the Asian Disaster 
Preparedness Centre (2005) Earl Kessler, 
deputy of the ADPC, comments that those 
most vulnerable to the tsunami were widows, 
children and the elderly (Kessler, 2005).  
Responses in both Khao Lak and on Koh Phi 
Phi were consistent with this finding.  One 
man believed that the elderly “run very slowly 
and the tsunami came on Sunday [when] all 
the old people and kids stayed at 
home…many kids and old people died in the 
tsunami” (Interview 1e).   
   
 106 
 Children were also extremely vulnerable to the tsunami.  A number of respondents on 
Koh Phi Phi suggested that when local children are not in school, they are on the beach.  Since 
the tsunami hit on a Sunday, children were playing in the ocean and were among the most 
vulnerable (Interview 2j, 2k, 2m).    
 As in most disasters, the human characteristics that influenced disaster vulnerability in 
Khao Lak and on Koh Phi Phi Don were: ethnicity, income, age, gender and physical ability.  In 
Thailand, this meant that lower income groups, women, children, the elderly and the physically 
disabled were among the most vulnerable.  However, since income is influenced by ethnicity 
(Khao Lak), and religion (Koh Phi Phi), Burmese immigrants and Muslims were also more 
vulnerable to the tsunami. 
 In summary, the most vulnerable groups identified by respondents in each of the two case 
study sites are listed in Table 5.  In general, similar groups were identified as vulnerable to the 
tsunami; however the differing demographic compositions of the two case study sites resulted in 
some variation.  
Table 5: Vulnerable Groups in Case Study Sites 
Vulnerable Groups Unique to Each Case Study Vulnerable Groups Identified in 
Both Case Studies Khao Lak Koh Phi Phi Don 
• Women20  
• Children  
• Elderly  




• Thai Muslims23 
 
                                                 
20 One Khao Lak resident described men as a vulnerable group explaining that more men were 
affected because they had a larger population base (Interviewee 1r).  Here, I exclude men as a 
vulnerable population because the chart aims to highlight those most vulnerable not those most 
affected. 
21 Higher income populations were described by interviewees as financially vulnerable.  I 
exclude higher income populations because a) they were described by interviewees as resilient 
and b) they lack the intensity of physical vulnerability experienced by the poor 
22 Thai nationals are excluded from this chart because it defines groups most vulnerable and not 
those most affected.  Thai nationals were described by interviewees as the most affected. 
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5.5 Disaster Education  
 Lack of preparedness plans and disaster education in both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi 
increased vulnerability for residents of both communities.  One of the research objectives was to 
determine whether tsunami victims had any disaster education, including any previous awareness 
or understanding of tsunamis.  Interviewees were asked if, before December 26th 2004, they had 
any education about tsunamis.  Sixty-five percent of people interviewed in Khao Lak and Koh 
Phi Phi, had never heard of a tsunami before that day, and 70% expressed that they had no 
previous disaster education (See Figure XIV).  Of those who were aware of tsunamis, previous to 
December 24th 2006, many 
mentioned that they had 
learned what a tsunami was 
5-7 years before, when a 
professor was on the news.    
Many respondents 
remembered the professor 
saying that “there would be 
a big wave in the Andaman 
ocean in the year 2000” 
(Interview 1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 
2j, 2t).  
One man also mentioned 
that he learned about tsunami behavior from television, from reading and from “a professor from 
                                                                                                                                                             
23 Thai Buddhists were described by interviewees as being more affected than Muslims because 
they had a larger population base (Interviewee 2d, 2o).  I exclude Buddhists as a vulnerable 
population because the chart is meant to reflect those most vulnerable, not those most affected. 
Figure XIV: Comparing Tsunami Awareness 
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university [who] came to give education” (Interview 1g).  A few respondents described stories 
learned from Moken people and from Buddhist Monks which involved a ‘big wave’.  One man 
explained: “People said it was going to happen.  [The stories] were a Muslim tradition…from 
monks that live in the mosque and know the future” (Interview 2f, 2t).  Other respondents were 
surprised when the wave came and said that “people thought there was a low tide when the water 
went out” (Interview 2i).  When asked what her thoughts were when she first saw the wave a 
woman from Koh Phi Phi said: “I was thinking it’s the end of the world” (Interview 2u).  Lack of 
disaster awareness and education in Southern Thailand contributed significantly to delayed 
responses and confusion when the tsunami struck, and intensified disaster vulnerability for 
residents of Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don. 
5.6 Economic Impacts and Related Vulnerability 
 The tsunami resulted in extensive economic losses for businesses throughout the 
provinces of Krabi and Phang Nga (See Table 6).  In addition to these measurable losses, are 
future economic losses influenced by changes in the flow of tourists (Israngkura, 2005). The 
Bank of Thailand has estimated that the reduction in tourism will result in a reduced tourism 
income of 40,000 million baht or roughly 10.68 trillion US$ (Israngkura, 2005).  Economic 
losses for residents of Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don were particularly devastating and 
disrupted lives and livelihoods even more for lower income members of these villages.  Since 
vulnerability is associated with resilience, and an individuals ability to bounce back after 
Table 6: Economic Losses 
Losses on Businesses Estimates (US $)     
Province Fisheries Livestock Agriculture Small Business Total 
Krabi 4,993,856.26 8,435.26 8,925.01 69,911,345.55 74,922,562.08 
Phang Nga 23,798,708.93 355,869.51 64,743.96 161,747,589.46 185,966,911.86 
Source: (ADPC 2005b) 1 
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disaster, lower income households were subject to economic vulnerability.  The lack of prior 
insurance and post-tsunami adequate assistance plans has made it nearly impossible for lower-
income families to revive their businesses and as a result, many were forced to rely on tsunami 
survivor camps for housing and provisions.  One woman described her family’s financial 
situation post-tsunami: “Now I think only about saving money to help my kids.  My husband 
does hard work but only has a salary of 3,700 baht per month (96US$).  The house fee is 1,000 
baht every month (26US$).  So for our family, we only have 2,100 baht (54US$) for food, 
health, education and everything” (Interview 1s).  Another said “it changed my life because 
before I had a lot of things, now my wealth is lost.  For three years I saved, my wealth is gone” 
(Interview 1r).  Small business owners on Koh Phi Phi were particularly affected since many are 
still unsure of whether they will be permitted to rebuild and restart their businesses.  Newly 
enforced building restrictions have limited reconstruction on Koh Phi Phi, and though wealthier 
business owners have ignored these rules, small business owners lack the financial means to 
repair their buildings, and the new building restrictions prevent them from obtaining permission 
to rebuild or obtain small business loans.  In addition, the downturn in tourism following the 
tsunami has further limited lower-income business people by making it difficult for them to 
secure enough funds to reestablish tourism-related businesses.   
5.7 Policies, Preparedness and Planning 
One of the main research objectives was to investigate the relationship between 
governance and disaster vulnerability in Southern Thailand.  Thus, interviewees were questioned 
about the role of the Thai government in mitigating and responding to the tsunami disaster, with 
specific questions asked about any disaster policies, plans or emergency measures that were in 
place before the tsunami.  Responses indicated (see Fig. XIII) inadequate disaster preparedness 
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in both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi, with 37.5% of participants expressing that no disaster 
policies existed pre-tsunami, and another 37.5% stating that although some disaster policies 
existed, they were poorly enforced by government officials.  Though it is possible that disaster 
policies existed unbeknownst to respondents, there was a consensus among interviewees that the 
practical implementation of any existing disaster policies, preparedness plans or mitigation 
efforts was inadequate. 
5.7.1 Built Environment: Corruption and Lack of Awareness 
 When asked about pre-tsunami disaster policies, the majority of respondents were either 
unaware of any disaster policies before the tsunami, or suggested that policies existed but were 
inadequately enforced (See Figure XV).  In both case studies, respondents suggested that 
building laws and restrictions were in place before the tsunami but few people obeyed these 
restrictions because they lacked consequences (Interviewee 1d, 1g, 1i, 1k, 1m, 2d, 2e, 2f, 2h, 2i, 
Figure XV: Awareness of Disaster Policies 
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2j, 2k, 2l, 2o, 2s).  One Khao Lak resident said, “They had a law about public land, not to build.  
They tried to save the environment on the beach and tried not to let people build on the beach, 
but people didn’t follow that law” (Interview 1d).  Before the tsunami, one building law in Khao 
Lak prohibited building closer than 30m from the seashore and allowed only single story 
buildings between 30 and 70 meters from the shore (Interview 1g, 1i).  However “Some people 
built anyway.  The government didn’t check or enforce the law” (Interview 1g).  One German 
national explained an experience of poor enforcement in regard to building laws:  
I had to sell tour packages and diving packages on the beach and often 
people with a uniform came to measure how close we were.  I asked my 
neighbor [what was happening] and he said to me ‘you have to move, you 
are too close to the beach.’ The official told us to move, but nobody did.  
The whole community paid the measurement people so we could move at 
the end of the season, but we never did (Interview 1k). 
 
 Similar experiences were echoed by many others: “Rich people went further than 30m 
because they gave money to the authorities” (Interview 1d); “People with money can come and 
build whatever they want” (Interview 2f); “They had a rule, but when you have money you can 
do anything” (Interview 2s).  Respondents in both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi were consistent in 
suggesting that laws were not enforced if local officials were offered financial bribes. 
 In Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi, most interviewees were unaware of any building laws and 
those who were aware of building restrictions did not find it necessary to adhere to them.  Before 
the tsunami, building laws in Koh Phi Phi and Khao Lak were poorly enforced: “They had a 
building law, but it wasn’t strong enough, people build anyways” (Interview 2j).  Since the 
tsunami, conflicts of interest between residents and the Thai government regarding land-use and 
building restrictions, have delayed solid development plans on Koh Phi Phi Don.  Despite the 
severe impacts of the 2004 tsunami, residents on Phi Phi Island have been negotiating with the 
government since early 2005 to reduce the number of meters required between the shoreline and 
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new developments.  Initially after the tsunami the Thai government attempted to enforce a 
building code on Koh Phi Phi that would restrict any building 60 meters from the shoreline 
(Interview 2e).  However, in January 2006, a draft report of the development plan for Koh Phi 
Phi outlines the government’s expectations:  
• No reestablishment of bungalows is allowed 
• Totally destroyed houses are not permitted to be rebuilt without land titles 
• A required setback of 30 meters from the coastline is required for all buildings 
• Only open roofed single storey buildings are allowed 30-200 meters from the coastline 
(Sirichana, 2006). 
 Evidently, negotiations with residents on Phi Phi Island have encouraged the government 
to reduce the setback requirements to 30 meters from the coastline.  Still, the densely populated 
section of the island (Tonsai strip) sits between Tonsai Bay and Lo Dalam Bay and is no more 
than 1.5 kilometers wide including beaches and is no more than 2 meters above sea level 
(Sirichana, 2006).  Thus, neither a 30 nor 60 meter setback from the coastline would be an 
effective mitigation measure against a tsunami of the magnitude that struck in 2004.  Despite 
post-tsunami government restrictions, construction projects on Phi Phi Island continue, with 
residential buildings and restaurants lining the water front again (Field Notes 2005).    
   Regardless of the recent negotiations between residents of Koh Phi Phi and the 
government, Koh Phi Phi’s post-tsunami landscape has revealed that despite talks, few adhere to 
building regulations.  In fact: “Mostly people can do whatever they want on the island” 
(Interview 2e).   The building code has been a sensitive issue for people on Koh Phi Phi.  Before 
negotiations one man questioned what people would do if the 60 meter building restriction zone 
was passed: “How many people will be able to make money? There will be fewer rooms for 
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people, so how many tourists can come” (Interview 2k)?  Another illustrated that “If people and 
the population follow the plan from the government it’s good, maybe safer, but then people 
won’t have a place to earn money” (Interview 2l).  Despite some worries about the economic 
consequences of restricted building, some people responded positively to the building law: “For 
me the new plan is better because it won’t be full like before, but I’m sure in two years 
everything will be full again because now the government said not to build yet, but they build 
anyways.  Nobody listens” (Interview 2f).  Unfortunately, even when participants were 
supportive of the government plans, they had doubts that the plans would be properly enforced.   
5.7.2 Infrastructure 
Though few participants were satisfied with the redevelopment plans and building 
restrictions post-tsunami, many residents of Khao Lak were supportive of new infrastructure 
including roads, street lights and electricity systems.  In Khao Lak, roads were broadened and 
straightened post-tsunami and some residents expressed that clearer evacuation routes eased their 
anxiety about future disasters.  In regard to redevelopment in Bang Niang one woman said “They 
have bigger roads, they are more developed now.  [The government] has a zoning plan and it is 
more organized” (Interview 1a).  Other respondents were pleased with the new houses and 
buildings (Interview 1c), and with improved roads and better provision of electricity. 
In November 2005, the progress of redevelopment on Koh Phi Phi was far behind that of 
Khao Lak (Field Notes 2005).  Because of land disputes between the local population and the 
government, the development plan was idle.  However, some respondents commented on the 
proposed plan which included aims to: broaden pathways; create a direct path from the interior 
of the Tonsai Strip to the mountain path; and to plant new coconut trees and greenery: “The new 
plan looks better, there’s going to be a lot of nature here, not full like before” (Interview 2s).  
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However, another alleged tenet of the new redevelopment plan was to relocate lowland residents 
of Phi Phi Island to the mountains, and this received fervent objection: “The new plan on Phi Phi 
is to move people to the mountain, but it’s not a good idea.  If people work in the mountain, who 
will come?” (Interview 2g, 2p).  Another participant commented that the plan is “good because 
they build for safety, so it’s easy to get to the hill.  But it means that you have to take off the 
businesses” (Interview 2o).   Still others explained that the mountain land is owned by wealthy 
people: “It’s not good, the new plan.  If the new plan works, poor people won’t be able to live 
here anymore.  That’s what the government wants” (Interview 2r).  Government-resident 
disputes, under the guise of negotiations, have slowed the formation of a proper development 
plan, but have not altogether prevented building on Phi Phi Island (Field Notes 2005).  Though 
most interviewees agreed that the proposed plan would increase safety for residents and tourists, 
and would benefit the natural environment, few expressed a willingness to sacrifice Koh Phi 
Phi’s economy in order to decrease vulnerability. 
5.8 Governmental Response to the Tsunami 
 Interviewees were asked to discuss the Thai government’s response to the tsunami and 
were encouraged to elaborate on the quality of the disaster response.  In most cases, respondents 
in both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi indicated a lack of trust in the Thai government and a general 
dissatisfaction with its disaster management strategies.   Respondents in Khao Lak described:  
“They’re slow” (Interview 1g); “I’m scared, I don’t trust the government” (Interview 1b, 1h); 
“They’re not ready to help the people, they didn’t plan anything for a disaster” (Interview 1d); 
“the government isn’t taking care of me.  The government doesn’t care about people” (Interview 
1e).  Only two of the 40 respondents were pleased with the governments’ disaster response.  One 
woman explained “I’m happy with the government.  They try their best to help the people [and] 
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it was the first time that a tsunami hit Thailand.  The way that they helped us was fine” 
(Interview 1j).  It is important to note, however that the woman who made this comment was a 
wife of one of the town leaders: her husband was a member of the small group chosen by the 
local official and contributed to local decisions pre and post tsunami.  Not surprisingly, their 
family received the highest amount of financial assistance of all interviewees surveyed, (100,000 
THB or about $2,900 CAN).  Though this study can not conclusively demonstrate that damages 
to this family were less than those compensated for, the large compensation package received is 
significantly greater than amounts received by any other participant and, at the very least, this 
fact encourages further inquiry into government corruption, specifically into the skimming of 
funds. 
 As in Khao Lak, participants from Koh Phi Phi were also frustrated with the 
governments’ response.  Some respondents said that although a warning siren had been installed 
by the government, it was inadequate because it was not loud enough (Interview 2a).  Another 
concern was that an evacuation path was still not built.  Participants complained that the 
government was slow in responding to community needs (Interview 2a).  This lack of trust in the 
government by Koh Phi Phi residents is motivated by prior broken promises and inaction in the 
past.  Participants were not confident that the development plan would be carried out properly, or 
that it would involve the interests of the community.  For example, one woman said that the 
government is “always talking, but they never do anything” (Interview 2p); another described a 
total lack of faith in the development plan: “I don’t really know the plan, but I’m sure it’s not 
going to work” (Interview 2k).  Still another believed:  
   
 116 
“The government can help if they want, but if they don’t want they 
won’t help.  But I know that after the tsunami they didn’t help.  They 
were supposed to help the kids, 25,000 baht/year, to go to school, 
they were supposed to, but they didn’t” (Interview 2i).  
 
 Some of the negative feelings towards the government are theorized to stem from the lack 
of participatory development post-tsunami.  Only 1 respondent in Khao Lak and 2 from Koh Phi 
Phi indicated that they had been involved in the post-tsunami development plans (See Figure 
XVI).   






















Further, the respondent from Khao Lak who was involved in the development plans was a 
member of the small group chosen by the local official and was a wealthy community member.  
In October 2005, a variety of NGOs had sprung up in Bang Niang and Ba Nam Kem, many 
offering similar community services: lessons in English, hospitality and computer literacy (Field 
   
 117 
Notes 2005).  There was a significant overlap and surpluses in the types of services provided by 
many organizations and as a result resources and programs were often under-used (Field Notes 
2005).  A lack of attempt, both between government bodies and NGOs, to engage residents in the 
process of decision-making for post-tsunami reconstruction and development plans resulted in an 
surplus of services for which there was low demand, and large numbers of people (in Ban Muang 
survivor camp, and in the village of Ban am Kem) who remained desolate (Field Notes 2005).  
With the tsunami came a large influx of services and resources in Khao Lak, but these came 
without sufficient research into the needs of local communities and without adequate regard for 
incorporating the expressed needs of the public (Field Notes).  Despite attempts at philanthropy, 
aid that is not guided by the expressed needs of disaster victims is less likely to provide valuable 
relief and is more likely to be wasteful of resources and skills (Pearce, 2003).  
 Residents in both Khao Lak and on Koh Phi Phi often described feelings of 
powerlessness and an inability to voice their opinions.  One woman expressed that “The people 
have no power to tell them to change something.  When they try to do that, nothing changes” 
(Interview 1o).  Another said “Leaders never ask the people. People want to talk but they’re 
scared to talk to the leaders” (Interview 1e).  Still, the Thai government did not completely 
overlook public involvement in redevelopment plans.   Town meetings were held in both Khao 
Lak district and on Koh Phi Phi.  In fact, on one visit to Khao Lak, Prime Minister Thaksin asked 
the public for suggestions (Interview 1a).  However, many respondents indicated that 
participation was limited to listening at town meetings.  On Koh Phi Phi, a small group was 
formed in order to negotiate with the government, however the group was chosen by the local 
government official who chose ‘people with power’ to join the group (Interview 2j, 2s).  One 
interviewee explained that the government “doesn’t come to ask me or the population, they ask 
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people that are part of the group” (Interview 2q).  Another expressed that attending the public 
meetings was useless, since they are not permitted to talk anyway (Interview 2r).  Although most 
survivors know what they need in order to recover from the tsunami “their voices often fall on 
deaf ears” (Kessler, 2005; Mactaggart, 2005). 
 There is a wide disconnect between Thai authorities, who are responsible for carrying out 
disaster policies and relief/reconstruction programmes, and the locals who are affected by these.  
The majority of respondents were unimpressed with the disaster response, but it is important to 
identify practical reasons for these feelings.  Thus, respondents were asked to describe how the 
Thai government influenced recovery through provision of financial and material resources.   
5.8.1 Compensation Scheme 
 Post-tsunami, the Thai government set up a compensation scheme (see Table 7) which 
provides a breakdown of aid distribution and considers variables such as: damages to homes; loss 
of livelihoods; damage to businesses; and loss of family members. The total relief and 
reconstruction budget from the Royal Thai Government was estimated at US$ 1.75 billion but 
the Thai government later reported spending of approximately US$ 9 million (Kessler, 2005).  
The Ministry of Finance was responsible for setting guidelines for aid to individuals, while the 
Ministry of Education, Labour Ministry, Provincial Administration Department and Disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation Department provided assistance packages (Kessler, 2005).  In 
addition, the Royal Thai Army provided reconstruction assistance, specifically with housing, 
including areas in Khao Lak.   
Yet, despite the assistance packages “Centralized bureaucracy has made the distribution 
of aid ineffective and only a fraction of more than 50,000 local victims were able to receive the 
assistance they need” (COHRE, 2005). In fact, people who were partially hit, in areas 
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surrounding Bang Niang, did not receive any assistance (Key Informant #1, 2005).  Uneven 
distribution of aid has meant that “Some communities have been luckier than others” 
(Mactaggart, 2005).  This was precisely the case in comparing Khao Lak, which received a great 
deal of governmental assistance, and Koh Phi Phi, where government involvement was slow and 
inconsistent after the tsunami (Field Notes 2005).  Government assistance packages were also 
ineffective in providing for home renters and informal sector workers.  Renters were not 
provided with new accommodation post-tsunami and many were forced to live in tsunami 
survivor camps, or with family.  The government’s compensation scheme also lacked adequate 
provision for sub-contractors and informal workers who were not recognized as small business 
owners and were therefore only entitled to 2000 baht ‘humanitarian aid’ rather than the 20,000 
baht for ‘small business operators’ (MACAW, 2005) (Kessler, 2005). 
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Table 7: Compensation Scheme 






Meals 50/day/person 1.25/ day/ person   
Kitchen Utensils 3,400/family 87.5/ family   
Slightly damaged house 20,000/item 500/ item   
Completely damaged house 30,000/item 750/ item   
Completely damaged 
livelihood/household 
8,000/item 200/ item   
Slightly damaged 
livestock/household 
3,000/item 75/ item   
Electrical Lighting 200/family 5/ family   
Rental Accommodation 100/day/person 2.5/ day/ person Not more than 7 
days 
Rental house 1,500/month 37.5/ month Not more than 2 
months 
Modified temporary shelter 2,000/family 50/ family   
Building temporary shelter 4,000/family 100/ family   
Bathroom 1,500/room 37.5/ room Available for 10 
people 
Toilet 1,500/room 37.5/ room Available for 10 
people 
Clothes 1000/person 25/ person 2 sets per person 
Uniform  1000/ person 25/ person 2 sets per person 
Instruments for 
occupation/capital 
10,000/family 250/ family   
Funeral 15000/ person 375/ person   
Funeral/Head of the family 25,000 $625.00   
Medicine 25,000 $625.00   
Hospital Fee 2,000/ 3 days/month 50/ 3 days/ month   
Consolation 2,000/ person 50/ person Unable to work 
Injured/crippled 10,000/person 250/ person   
  Plus 2000 per 
person/month 
Plus 50 per person/ 
month 
Not more than 2 
years 
Scholarship 1000/month 25/ month Primary level 
Scholarship  1500/month 37.5/ month High School Level 
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5.8.2 Real Financial Assistance  
 Though the compensation scheme sets financial guidelines for aid distribution, actual aid 
received often strayed from these guidelines.  Thus, interviewees were encouraged to elaborate 
on the services, equipment and financial aid that were given to them.  Responses were first coded 
according to the amount of financial aid that participants received.  The categories are divided 
into those who received: less than 5000 baht (or 144$ CAN), between 5000 and 9,999 baht (or 
144$-287$ CAN) between 10,000 and 19,999 baht (287$-575$ CAN), between 20,000 and 
49,999 baht (575$-1437$ CAN) and greater than 50,000 baht (>1437$ CAN) (See Figure XVII).   
Figure XVII: Received Aid from Government Sources 
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In the cases of both Koh Phi Phi Don and Khao Lak, the majority of respondents received 
between 20,000 and 49,999 baht (See Figure XVII).  However, as shown in the above graph, 
more respondents from Khao Lak received larger assistance packages. All other governmental 
assistance was divided into five categories including: a house; a television; kitchen and 
restaurant equipment; a fishing boat; and compensation for a deceased family member (see 
Figure XVIII).   
As indicated in Table 7, the Thai government provided compensation for damaged housing.  
Households were either reimbursed for the damages, or, in the case of completely destroyed 
houses, the funding was allocated to the organization or department responsible for housing 
Figure XVIII: Non-financial Government Assistance 
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development (i.e. Habitat for Humanity, or the Royal Thai Army) and houses were given out 
upon completion.  Again, the results differed between the two case studies.  In many cases, 
respondents from Khao Lak received a house, television, restaurant/housing equipment, and 
compensation for a deceased family member.  Only two respondents from Koh Phi Phi received 
any of these.  In fact, one woman from Koh Phi Phi said: “Mostly the government doesn’t help 
with things like a TV and equipment” (Interview 2e).  Still the CGO explains that redevelopment 
of Phi Phi Island will take approximately three years and promises that facilities will be 
improved from pre-tsunami standards (Horn et al., 2006).  Despite plans for redevelopment on 
Phi Phi, eleven months after the tsunami hit, in the categories of both financial assistance and 
resource provision, participants from Khao Lak have received much more than did those from 
Koh Phi Phi Island.  One viewpoint may be that interviewees from Khao Lak suffered greater 
losses than those on Koh Phi Phi, and this research can not conclusively refute that argument.  
However, the consensus amongst interviewees from Koh Phi Phi is that: government officials 
were slow to respond to the post-tsunami needs on Phi Phi Island; the majority of relief efforts 
were attributed to efforts of Hi Phi Phi and international travelers; and that there was a lack of 
attention given to creating a prompt and appropriate development scheme.  The slow speed with 
which the needs on Koh Phi Phi have been addressed paired with the data collected on financial 
and resource compensation indicates that, in comparison to Khao Lak, Koh Phi Phi Don had less 
priority.    
 Interestingly, the differences in assistance received are linked to respondent participation 
in reconstruction.  In Khao Lak, where respondents received significant material and financial 
aid, few people (25%) assisted other community members with reconstruction or clean-up (See 
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Table 8). The opposite was true on Koh Phi Phi where the majority, 80% of interviewees, 
assisted other community members in their efforts (See Table 8).   
 Table 8: Involvement in Reconstruction 
Case Study   Frequency Percent 
Khao Lak Provided Assistance 5 25.0
  Was not Involved in Reconstruction 9 45.0
  Missing24  6 30.0
Koh Phi Phi Provided Assistance 16 80.0
  Was not Involved in Reconstruction 4 20.0
 
This relationship can be interpreted in different ways: either residents on Koh Phi Phi were 
forced to engage in self-help and community reconstruction because they were inadequately 
assisted, or they proved more resilient and demonstrated more community cohesiveness than did 
Khao Lak.  A conclusive interpretation however was beyond the scope of this research.   
 Although I have presented interviewee accounts of the actual provision and assistance 
provided by the Thai government, it was also necessary to probe whether this provision was 
considered adequate by the recipients themselves: inconsistencies in aid would not be as 
problematic if all communities and individuals were satisfied with the assistance received.  
Subsequently, respondents were asked whether they (and people they knew) were given enough 
assistance post-tsunami.  In both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi, the majority of respondents (55% 
and 80% respectively) indicated that assistance was inadequate (See Table 9).   
                                                 
24 ‘Missing’ refers missing data, questions that were not answered or themes not referred to by 
participants. 
Table 9: Perceived Sufficiency of Assistance 
Case Study  Khao lak Koh Phi Phi Total 
Yes 6 2 8 
No 11 16 27 
Don’t Know 0 1 1 
Missing 3 1 4 
Provided Sufficient 
Assistance 
Total 20 20 40 
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 In particular, the discrepancy in responses on Koh Phi Phi was overwhelming: 16 people 
indicated that aid was insufficient while only 2 were pleased with the amount of assistance they 
received (See Table 9).  Respondents were also asked who helped them the most post-tsunami.  
Only 4 respondents in both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi mentioned the Thai government, while 
most indicated that they ‘helped themselves’ or were assisted by NGOs or concerned 
tourists/foreigners living in the area (See Figure XIX).   
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One man explained “The government helped very little.  Mostly people from around the world 
helped” (Interview 2e).  Another said: “Here is what happened, 70% of help was from the 
tourists, and 20% of help was from the government” (Interview 2o).  
5.8.3 Government Corruption 
 Throughout the interview process and during data analysis, it became clear that 
interviewees were displeased with the response of the Thai government to the tsunami; lacked 
trust in their local officials; and did not have confidence that the government would be able to 
properly enforce new buildings laws and development plans.  Though participants were not 
asked directly about government corruption, many alluded to governmental acts of bribery; 
dishonesty in recording assistance requirements; fraudulent assistance claims by officials; and 
aid profiteering.  In fact, without being questioned on these issues, 11 participants from Koh Phi 
Phi and 9 from Khao Lak discussed government corruption.   
 Lack of trust in the Thai government is severely affecting disaster response and the 
ability of local officials to communicate effectively with civil society.  One woman believed that 
“Even if the wave comes again we’ll never get enough help.  Because of corruption” (Interview 
2q).  Another respondent said that governmental corruption is a reality for most countries and 
“It’s in Thailand too.  If the government gets 100 baht, the people only get 50” (Interview 2g).  
These perceptions are actually quite consistent studies on corruption in Thailand.  Transparency 
International annually publishes a corruption perceptions index (CPI) which measures corruption 
on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 representing a highly ‘clean’ country and 0 being highly corrupt.  
In the 2004 corruption index, Thailand received a CPI score of 3.6 (Lambsdorff/TI, 2004).  
 Government corruption has penetrated many areas of Thai society.  For example, one 
interviewee spoke of electoral corruption explaining that political candidates bribe voters: “they 
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pay people to put an ‘x’ by their name. They give 10,000 baht to people” (Interview 2k).  
Another explained: to avoid Thailand’s mandatory 2-year army service “I will have to pay.  This 
is something that’s not legal; it’s like under the table.  My name will be in the army, but not 
myself” (Interview 2k).  In the following sections I will further describe the unethical practices 
that have stifled adequate disaster response and contributed to a lack of trust in the government 
since the tsunami.     
5.8.3.1 Nepotism 
 Some respondents alleged that government officials made a practice of providing 
excessive aid packages to immediate family members and relatives. One respondent said that the 
disaster assistance “dropped to only the local official and his relatives” (Interview 1o).  In 
tsunami-affected areas, local officials were responsible for creating and maintaining lists 
specifying the losses and needs of community members.  One local official in Khao Lak was 
accused of embellishing these needs in order to gain excessive assistance packages and distribute 
them to friends and family members (Field Notes 2005).  One respondent claimed that the 
official requested extra equipment and televisions under the name of a community member, and 
when the provisions arrived, he assigned the ‘extra’ equipment to his relatives (Interviewee 1e).   
  Nepotism was also suspected within higher levels of authority.  Some respondents 
believed that Khao Lak received more governmental assistance because the King’s grandson, 
Bhumi Jensen, was killed there (Interview 2r).  Another woman said that “of all the money, more 
than 70% went to Khao Lak (Interview 2q).  In fact, a community’s recovery “can be directly 
tied to its position in the local political power structure” (Morrow, 1999) and the perception that 
Khao Lak received much of the government aid may be accurate.   
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The data collected on both financial assistance and material provisions demonstrate that 
Khao Lak residents received significantly more than those on Koh Phi Phi.  This is in large part 
explained by the fact that Khao Lak suffered the highest loss of life of any single community in 
Thailand (Supratid, 2005): approximately 80% of those killed in Thailand were in Khao Lak 
(Tangwisutijit, 2005).  On closer examination, not only was aid greater in Khao Lak than in Koh 
Phi Phi, but assistance was concentrated in some areas of Khao Lak, and some people remained 
unassisted (Field Notes 2005).  This is, in part, a result of poorly managed aid and government 
corruption.  Local officials in Khao Lak were accused of providing aid to their friends while 
ignoring the needs of other community members.  Some respondents alleged that in order to 
receive financial or material assistance it is necessary to know the village leader: “If you know 
the head of the village they can get your family a house.  If you don’t know officials you can’t 
get anything” (Interview 1a, 1b).  Another said: “You can get money if you know the Puyayban 
(village-level official), if you know the Ohbadoh, (district-level official), but not me” (Interview 
2s).   
5.8.3.2  Bribery and Building Laws 
 Participants consistently mentioned bribery as a major problem, and it proved one of the 
most apparent types of government corruption in disaster relief and reconstruction efforts in 
Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi25.  When asked why building laws were not enforced, one respondent 
alleged that “the government doesn’t say anything because all of the money is under the table” 
(Interview 1o).  Financial enticement was most often used in order to persuade officials to ignore 
building/retail laws.  In Thailand, retailing is illegal on public land, so landless hawkers use 
                                                 
25 “Thai Laws have specific provisions on offering or pay bribes to state officials and on state 
officials misappropriating state assets in such as Penal Code Book II Title III: Offences Relating 
to Justice, Organic Act on Counter Corruption B.E. 2542 (1999), Art 84 123, and The Anti-
Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999) Art 3(5) 5)” (ADB/OECD, 2005).  
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financial incentives to coax officials into ‘turning a blind eye’ on such laws: “They pay officials 
under the table to turn their heads” (Interview 1a).  One woman in Khao Lak suggested that 
bribery is a fairly open and common practice.  In one instance a community of hawkers paid a 
law enforcement officer in order that they could remain on the beach until the end of the season 
(Interview 1k).  These negotiations were quite common in both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi 
before the tsunami.   
 On Koh Phi Phi, illegal building is also present in national parks even though national 
park laws make this illegal.  Though it is illegal for any building to occur on any of Thailand’s 
national parks, Koh Phi Phi Don is part of Hadnopparattara National Park and building has been 
rampant on the island since the late 1980s.  Illegal building, some respondents say, has a lot to do 
with power relations between civil society and the Thai government: “I know if it’s a national 
park you can’t build….but if you have a lot of power you can.  In Thailand it’s like this.  
Corruption.  It’s corruption” (Interview 2d).  Another Koh Phi Phi resident suggested that “There 
is a law, but not a strong law.  People with money can come and build whatever they want” 
(Interview 2f).  Years of open bribery between local citizens and officials have made this type of 
corruption the norm on Koh Phi Phi: “If you give money under the table you can do anything” 
(Interview 1i, 2s).  
5.8.3.3  Aid profiteering  
 Aid profiteering, or ‘skimming funds’ is a frequent occurrence in Thailand, and has been 
a problem that has affected the country’s tsunami relief efforts.  Aid profiteering occurs when 
financial aid is filtered through a hierarchy of aid distributors and each skims a portion or 
extracts a payment for personal financial gain.  Unfortunately this type of government corruption 
can have devastating affects on foreign aid as a willingness to provide assistance can be tainted 
   
 130 
by a lack of trust that relief aid will reach those who need it most.  After the tsunami in Thailand: 
“officials took a lot of money instead of using it to help people.  The leader of the village took a 
lot of money and got rich” (Interview 1d).  The same woman explained that “every level of 
government takes a little bit and a little bit until it gets to the people” (Interview 1d).  In the 
village of Ba Nam Kem, in Khao Lak, many respondents were bothered by the extent to which 
the local official skimmed funds for personal profit: “The leader was poor before the tsunami, 
now he has a big beautiful house” (Interview 1e, 1o).  In this village, officials were responsible 
for doctoring assistance claim sheets in order to acquire more goods for themselves and their 
families: “the officials make fake reports and send it to Bangkok…maybe they have fifty people 
who need help, but they say that they need help for a thousand” (Interview 1e).   In Khao Lak 
and Koh Phi Phi, aid profiteering decreased the quality of aid that was provided to tsunami 
victims and sometimes, “money from the Thai government didn’t get to people” (Interview 2e). 
 Inadequate disaster preparedness plans certainly increased disaster vulnerability pre-
tsunami in Southern Thailand, but even more, governmental corruption post-tsunami reinforced 
and perpetuated vulnerability for many in Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don.  Governmental 
corruption not only stifled the initial equitable distribution of aid, but has established a social 
environment in which many lack trust and respect for local government officials.  In the next 
section, I address my research objectives beginning with an analysis of the relationship between 
governance and vulnerability in the two case study sites.  This analysis reveals how some 
governmental decisions and actions have influenced disaster vulnerability. 
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6 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
 In the following section, I address and respond to each of my initial research objectives:  
a) To analyze the relationship between vulnerability and governance in Thailand and to 
demonstrate how public policy influenced vulnerability 
b)  To determine the degree to which economic inequalities, socio-political 
marginalization and the environmental landscape influenced disaster vulnerability  
c) To influence re-development through recommendations on how to reduce future 
disaster vulnerability. 
In addition I demonstrate the link between political philosophy and vulnerability and 
explain why this relationship is important.  
6.1 Governance and Disaster Vulnerability 
6.1.1 Natural Environment 
 Residents of both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi mentioned that the tsunami: broadened 
streams; changed beach shape; increased soil salinity; uprooted trees; damaged coral reefs; 
altered oceanic species in certain regions; and contributed to waste on the beaches. One report 
indicated that “The main cause of coral loss (post-tsunami) was from the sediments washed off 
the land, as well as large quantities of debris from houses and tourist resorts washed from the 
heavily populated parts of Phi Phi Don”(GCRMN, 2006).  However, these were environmental 
consequences of the tsunami.  
Southern Thailand’s natural environment was under threat long before the tsunami hit, 
and these threats contributed to enhanced vulnerability to the tsunami’s impact.  For example, 
most coral reefs in Thailand were only slightly affected by the tsunami, but it was human forces 
that resulted in severe pre-tsunami damage to coral reefs: Between 1995 and 1998 the 
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Department of Fisheries conducted a reef assessment of 250 sites in the Gulf of Thailand and 
found that only 4% were in excellent condition, 13% were good, 33% were fair, and an 
astounding 50% were in poor condition (GCRMN, 2006). In addition, mangrove forests 
experienced minimal damage as a result of the tsunami: only 306 hectares of mangrove forests 
were damaged in the tsunami (GCRMN, 2006).  Still, as with coral reefs, most damage to 
mangroves has been a result of human infrastructure development (GCRMN, 2006) prior to the 
tsunami, leading one author to conclude that, in fact, the tsunami “made only minimal impact to 
the natural environment” (Israngkura, 2005).  This is important because: It illustrates the 
seriousness of Southern Thailand’s environmental degradation pre-tsunami; it reflects an 
inability or unwillingness of the Thai government to accept and confront the real causes of 
environmental problems, and it exposes the enhanced vulnerability to tsunami impacts that 
environmental degradation causes. 
6.1.2 Built environment 
 Local interests in sustained economic growth over environmental management certainly 
impacted the landscapes of Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi Don before the tsunami, and contributed 
to both decreased and increased disaster vulnerability for residents of these places.  Vulnerability 
was decreased for some, since successful business owners on Phi Phi can afford to live off the 
island (Interviewee 2q), while it was increased for others, for example, lack of environmental 
appreciation and protection contributed to the deforestation of mangrove swamps on Koh Phi Phi 
Don resulting in the elimination of a natural buffer against large waves.  However, the public 
cannot be held solely accountable for poor law enforcement and environmental mismanagement.  
Laissez-faire environmental policies and enforcement by government authorities in Khao Lak 
and Koh Phi Phi sharply increased vulnerability to the tsunami.   
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 Before the tsunami, the built environments of Khao Lak, and particularly Koh Phi Phi 
Don, were disorganized and poorly planned with beach front bungalows, restaurants, and 
makeshift vendor huts developing in an unplanned manner and in contravention of exisiting 
policies.  The “modification of shorelines and removal of natural vegetation in combination with 
high concentration of human activities…contributed to the destruction caused by the Tsunami 
waves” (Unknown, 2005c).  Unchecked development dramatically increased disaster 
vulnerability and most of this occurred as a result of poorly enforced building and environmental 
laws.   
Such patterns of development are not confined to the two case study sites and are 
symptomatic of a wider country-wide coastal governance problem. For example, under the 
Building Control Act (1979), developers in coastal areas in Phuket province were only allowed 
to erect buildings situated at least 20 meters away from the pre-tsunami shoreline.  However, this 
law was not properly enforced.  In fact, in Phuket there have been a series of coastal zone 
management and development plans which have been poorly implemented “…due to a 
combination of lack of political will, lack of coordination between relevant agencies, [and] 
corruption” (Raksakulthai, 2003).  Coastal development on Koh Phi Phi in particular, is in direct 
conflict with Thailand’s National Park Act (1961).   
6.1.3 Governance of National Parks 
 Koh Phi Phi Island is situated within Hat Noppharat Thara National Park and thus, the 
protective laws that apply to the national parks of Thailand should also apply to Koh Phi Phi 
Don.  Chapter III Section 16 of the National Park Act B.E. 2540 (A.D. 1961), states that no 
person shall “occupy or possess land” that is zoned as a National Park (Adulyadej, 1961).  
Regardless of this stipulation, Gray (1991) estimated that almost 11 million people in Thailand 
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were living in National Forest Reserves (Gray, Piprell, & Graham, 1991).  Encroachment on park 
land, resulting from mismanaged and unregulated development, was certainly evident on Koh 
Phi Phi Don before the December 26th tsunami.  Bungalow resorts, restaurants and vending-huts 
lined the beaches and were not consistent with the agenda of the protected area (ICEM, 2003).  
In fact, when asked about the building laws and restrictions on Koh Phi Phi most residents 
interviewed were unaware that Phi Phi Don is part of a National Park (see Figure XX). 
 
 The Royal Forest Department (RFD) is the overarching administrator of Thailand’s 
Marine National Parks (MNPs), however it is the Marine National Park Division (MNPD) that is 
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responsible for the management and the protection of the MNPs and for the enforcement of laws 
(Sethapun, 2005).  To represent the MNPD, a park superintendent and two assistants are 
responsible for law enforcement and park management at the local levels (Sethapun, 2005). 
However, residents of Koh Phi Phi indicated that park officials do not work on Koh Phi Phi Don, 
but usually stay on other islands, including Maya Bay and Bamboo Island.  They do this in order 
to collect a 20 baht ($.50 US) island charge from tourists visiting Phi Phi’s from its neighboring 
islands. In addition, poor zoning of National Parks has resulted in land disputes that park rangers 
are not trained to address (Sethapun, 2005), and when disputes arise, the results often favor 
development (ICEM, 2003). Inadequate staffing on Koh Phi Phi, paired with lack of expertise 
and training, have resulted in poor park management, unchecked development, decreased 
attention to National Park laws and, ultimately, increased disaster vulnerability for residents. 
 The consequences of prioritizing economic growth in parks and protected areas over 
environmental protection were revealed in the 2004 tsunami (UNEP, 2005).  Post-tsunami, there 
has been a high degree of protest from local residents who still support development because 
their livelihoods are caught up in the ‘protected’ land (Newell, 2002).  Though hotel and 
bungalow developments located too near the seashore increased vulnerability to the December 
26th disaster, local residents depended on these developments for their economic survival.  The 
pressure for the MNDP to preserve and protect park land is consistently countered by local needs 
to utilize environmental resources to sustain livelihoods (Sethapun, 2005).  It is especially 
difficult for the MNDP to enforce building laws since human settlement on Koh Phi Phi (1950s) 
predates the National Park Act of 1961, and thus, some families have legitimate claim to the 
land.  It is therefore quite difficult both to enforce park boundaries and to convince people of the 
benefits of environmental preservation (ICEM, 2003).  Though locals value economic growth 
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over environmental viability, it is the job of the government and parks officials to enforce laws 
that protect the environment and reduce disaster vulnerability.  Regardless of issues around land 
rights, it remains that Koh Phi Phi lacks a solid environmental management plan or the 
governance capacity to implement one.   
 The Thai government, specifically the MNDP, needs to develop strong laws which 
incorporate and protect Koh Phi Phi’s collective interests.  Newell (2002) argues that 
governments often intentionally disregard building regulations in order to attract foreign 
investors and capital.  If the MNDP continues to allow laissez faire development on Phi Phi 
Island then such an allegation may be justified.  Unfortunately, residents of Koh Phi Phi are 
caught in a catch-22: they depend on economic security for their livelihoods, but with most of 
the jobs on Koh Phi Phi tourism-related, they also depend on the natural environment which 
attracts many of the tourists.   
 The tension on Koh Phi Phi and in other parts of Thailand is that people are increasingly 
reliant on natural environments for their livelihoods at the same time that these environments are 
being placed ‘off limits’ (ICEM, 2003).  Koh Phi Phi Don residents have become exceedingly 
reliant on a pattern of unsustainable tourism development and related livelihoods which often 
contribute to environmental degradation.  Although this pattern of development has neglected 
environmental laws, park officials are in a weak position to control tourism (Sethapun, 2005).  
To protect Koh Phi Phi, the MNDP needs to: 
• develop and enforce a legal framework to improve park management;  
• enforce zoning laws, create clear park boundaries and clearly label protected land; 
• enforce management schemes with knowledgeable and trustworthy local level staff; and 
• seek real community involvement in park management 
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However, even these suggestions are unrealistic without increased and extended funding as well 
as local cooperation.  One participant expressed that when national park signs were placed on 
Koh Phi Phi (indicated restricted zones) residents tore down the signs (Interview 2k).  Inadequate 
governance by the MNDP, and by local officials, permits this behavior and has led to lax 
environmental management on Phi Phi Island.    
 One of the biggest tragedies of the tsunami is that development lessons that should have 
sparked a straight forward and safety-oriented development plan seem to have been overlooked 
by residents of Southern Thailand, government officials and land-use planners alike.  One land-
use planner, Amnuaysart Hassadin of the Special Areas Tourism Organization still aims for 
construction to be forbidden within 30 meters of the shoreline but says “We cannot stop 
investors from rebuilding their businesses.  And once they have already invested hundreds of 
millions of baht, we cannot tell them to tear down their buildings” (Tangwisutijit, 2005).  Unless 
government officials at the local level assert their authority and commit to the serious and 
forceful implementation of building laws in Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi it is likely that 
unmanaged rampant rebuilding will continue.   
6.2 Socio-economics and Vulnerability 
 Morrow (1999) suggests that “The impact of a natural event on any given community…is 
not random, but determined by everyday patterns of social interaction and organization” 
(Morrow, 1999).  In this study, results show that age, gender, physical ability, class, nationality, 
and religion all contributed to disaster vulnerability in Southern Thailand.   
6.2.1 Children, Elderly and the Disabled 
 Physical barriers made children, elderly populations and the physically disabled 
particularly vulnerable to the tsunami.  In Thailand, grandparents often tend to children while 
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parents work.  In some cases on Koh Phi Phi, grandparents, with limited physical abilities, were 
left to evacuate themselves and their grandchildren during the tsunami, increasing the 
vulnerability of both the grandparent and the child.  A study conducted by Helpage International 
(2005) found that the elderly were particularly affected by the tsunami (Sharma 2005).  
Vulnerability, age and class often have a direct relationship in disaster situations.  In the tsunami-
hit regions in Thailand “the elderly are among the poorest in the community,” and their lower 
class status increases risk of social and political marginalization and decreases their ability to 
prepare for and recover from a disaster (Sharma, 2005).  Post-tsunami, elderly female survivors 
were seriously impacted because they lacked means to provide for themselves and lost the 
support of their daughters or daughters-in-law (Sharma, 2005).  This is important because it 
reveals how household traditions shape vulnerability.  Dependents in Thailand refer not only to 
children, but also to the elderly.  Thus, in order to develop effective preparedness and response 
plans it is necessary to account for the elderly ‘dependent’ population. 
 The relationship between age and employment also contributed to disaster vulnerability 
in Thailand.  In the Helpage study, elderly respondents told researchers that “they had worked as 
unskilled laborers packing fish and squid at fishing wharfs” (Sharma, 2005).  This type of 
employment increased vulnerability in two ways: employment on fishing wharfs brought the 
elderly close to the shoreline; and as low-skill informal sector workers, they faced “problem[s] of 
not being entitled to any compensation or benefits” (MACAW, 2005).  Without benefits, many 
elderly tsunami victims were forced to rely on government aid post-tsunami and unfortunately 
“relief was not targeted at them” (Sharma, 2005).  Response plan coordinators must give greater 
attention not only to workers in informal sectors, but specifically to elderly citizens of those 
sectors. 
   
 139 
Tsunami Survivor Stories: 
“My mother has nothing now, just only life…it is 
such a painful memory, I cannot forget this.  I have 
no future now because my mother has gone 
bankrupt, my mother has nothing” (Meungaek, 
2005). 
 Children were also particularly vulnerable to the tsunami disaster.  The Asian tsunami 
struck on a Sunday, when children were 
not in school, but instead were playing 
on the beach.  As dependents, children 
were not only at a risk of losing their 
lives, but at a risk of losing their 
guardians: more than 1,200 children in Thailand were orphaned by the tsunami waves (Kessler, 
2005).  Child tsunami victims in Thailand have experienced severe psychological trauma and 
continue to deal with the loss of not only their families, but their entire communities (Kessler, 
2005).  In one account of her experience of the tsunami a thirteen year old year old wrote “a lot 
of people died and my heart disappeared” (Thongert, 2005).  The lesson is that physical 
provisions for children post-disaster are not necessarily adequate.  Long-term child assistance 
plans should include: 
• Sustained counseling and psychological guidance 
• The investigation of reconnection with family members 
• The monitoring of care providers to prevent neglect or mistreatment 
• A quick return to school or educational programs 
 Disaster preparedness should involve an assessment of the number, age and gender of 
children in each community in order that post-disaster response is effective and appropriate 
(Morrow, 1999).  
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It is still traditional in Thailand to view the disabled as a burden: “being born with a 
handicap is a sign of bad Karma.  The disabled are often ‘locked away’ in Thai society” (CG, 
2005, 1; Punong-ong, 1997).  Although many respondents in both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi 
said that there were few disabled people in either community, only 1.85% of Thailand’s total 
population are described as disabled (Punong-ong, 1997) so this is perhaps not surprising.  In 
1991, the Thai government made efforts to support the disabled population by passing the 
Rehabilitation of the Disabled Act (1991) which provides disabled people with free: medical 
assistance; education; occupation advice and training; entitlement to participation in social 
activities and access to various facilities; and government lawsuit services.  Still, true integration 
and acceptance into Thai society 
depends significantly on the community.  
In fact, “many principals and teachers 
will not let them [the disabled] in their 
classrooms” (CG, 2005, 1).  On Koh Phi 
Phi Don, much of the island’s population 
was made up of migrants from the mainland who had left their families in Phuket or Krabi, thus, 
there were smaller populations of children, elderly and disabled.  Although the history of social 
alienation that disabled people have faced in Thailand is increasingly understood, and it is 
plausible that their marginalization increased their vulnerability to the tsunami, the research 
could not confirm this.  
6.2.2 Vulnerability and Gender 
 Although most respondents believed that an equal number of men and women lost their 
lives in the tsunami, a Gender Adviser of Oxfam suggested that although “It is difficult to get 
Tsunami Survivor Stories: 
“The owners of a [resort in Khao Lak] have five 
daughters and one son.  One daughter was in a 
car accident and became disabled.  The people 
built a house with a big wall around it and 
nobody saw this girl again” (Interiview 1k). 
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gender disaggregated data following natural disasters…it is now clear that far more women than 
men have died in the tsunami” (WHO, 2005, 1).  The gender disparity in the death toll is an 
important indicator of heightened disaster vulnerability.  Though women are frequently a 
vulnerable group in disaster situations, female vulnerability can be lessened if women are given 
greater priority in disaster preparedness and response plans.  However, in order to do this, relief 
agencies need to better understand the lives of women pre-disaster, during-disaster and post-
disaster (Enarson, 1998).  Female vulnerability is influenced by gendered divisions of labour, 
local traditions, household responsibilities, and by their unique vulnerabilities (e.g. pregnancy, 
and a high vulnerability to rape, trafficking, exploitation and domestic violence (UNFPA, 2005)).  
It is not enough to know that women are more vulnerable to disasters; we must learn how to 
lessen vulnerability and increase empowerment.  Future research on gender and disasters should 
commit to a lengthy monitoring of female disaster victims with goals to better understand the 
post-disaster difficulties unique to women (e.g. gender inequality pre-disaster, access to 
resources, psychological resilience, post-disaster responsibilities, increased reliance on men/ loss 
of independence, re-introduction into the workforce, responsibilities in the home and 
community).  
6.2.3 Vulnerability and Economic Class 
 Intersecting social relations of gender, age, nationality and economic class create unique 
disaster vulnerabilities for marginalized people which intensify risk.  Though women may be 
more vulnerable than men, they are even more susceptible if poor.  In Southern Thailand it was 
“The poor and the recently made poor [who experienced] the greatest difficulties in 
reestablishing their life’s routines” (Kessler, 2005, 10).  On Koh Phi Phi Don, vulnerability and 
economic class were directly related as lower-income households resided in the low-lying 
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portion of the island.  In Khao Lak, lower-income people were described as more vulnerable 
because of the size of and materials used for their housing.  In both cases, the poor were 
described as more likely to lose their lives in the tsunami while wealthier citizens lost only 
assets.  The poor who do survive use shelters and temporary housing, and stay in these places 
longer (Morrow, 1999).  There is a frequent observation from disaster situations that 
economically marginalized people experience greater vulnerability in disaster situations.  There 
is an inhumane reality that those most poor are generally most vulnerable to disaster.  Disaster 
vulnerability reduction should not be a private good whereby those who are willing to pay for 
more receive more (Boyce, 2000).  There is a strong and troubling tensions “between an 
egalitarian allocation of the right to life (and hence to disaster-vulnerability reduction) and the 
inegalitarian allocation of economic wealth and political power” (Boyce, 2000, 7).  The 
discrepancy in disaster vulnerability between the wealthy and the poor is wide and should have 
strong implications for disaster response coordinators.  However, addressing economic 
inequalities would not solely serve a humanitarian purpose. If the needs and problems facing 
lower-income groups were dealt with in disaster mitigation planning it would be more cost 
effective because it would reduce temporary housing and shelter costs and would allow for 
increased spending on lasting social programs, homes and facilities (Morrow, 1999).  In order to 
reduce disaster vulnerability in any meaningful way, governments must first address the needs of 
those most vulnerable, including the poverty-stricken. 
6.2.4 Nationality and Vulnerability 
 In Khao Lak, the Burmese population was among the highly vulnerable to the Asian 
tsunami.  Often lacking legal status in Thailand, Burmese migrants experienced language 
barriers, intense ethnic prejudice and were excluded from access to and the benefits of social 
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resources.  The Burmese population lives on the margins of society: they tend to hold the most 
labour intensive and lowest paying jobs; occupy temporary housing; and are considered inferior 
to their Thai counterparts.  The marginal position of Burmese migrants in Thailand made them 
extremely vulnerable to the tsunami.  
 In disaster situations, deaths tend to be higher for minority groups (Bolin and Bolton 
1986).  In Thailand, however, it was difficult to determine the death toll for Burmese since there 
was a large population of unregistered migrants.  Some estimate that over 3,000 Burmese were 
killed in Thailand (GCRMN, 2006).  Post-tsunami, the Thai government actually increased 
Burmese vulnerability by searching for and deporting illegal Burmese residents (AHRC, 2005).  
The Asian Human Rights Commission reported that both registered and non-registered Burmese 
migrants (whose work permits and ID cards were lost in the tsunami) were forcibly deported 
(AHRC, 2005).  Rather than seek disaster assistance, many Burmese people went into hiding in 
order to avoid deportation and were therefore completely isolated from any disaster assistance 
(COHRE, 2005).  Instead of focusing on relief and reconstruction, “the Thai authorities have 
used the tsunami incident as an opportunity to crack down on illegal migrant workers” (AHRC, 
2005, 2).  As a result, the families of Burmese tsunami victims are reluctant to report missing 
persons, or to participate in the identification process for fear of repercussions (Unknown, 
2005c). Not only does post-tsunami discrimination make Burmese migrants at risk of 
deportation, those who remain experience economic vulnerability because they lack the capacity 
to access assistance.  For example, migrant workers are equally entitled to compensation for 
deceased loved ones, but many are unsure of how to access and apply for these compensation 
packages (MACAW, 2005).  
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 The discrimination experienced by Burmese tsunami victims is in “violation of 
international laws and standards” (AHRC, 2005, 3).  Ethnic minority groups deserve equitable 
assistance in disaster situations.  Unfortunately, this has not been the case in Thailand.  
Discrimination against minority groups, specifically Burmese, during disaster response was not 
surprising given their marginal position pre-tsunami.  Thus, in order to decrease minority 
vulnerability in the future, issues of prejudice and mistreatment in Thai communities must first 
be recognized and addressed.  One of tensions between Thai and Burmese nationals is caused by 
the large population of illegal Burmese migrants.  To decrease disaster vulnerability for minority 
groups, the local Thai government and aid agencies need to focus on: 
• Repairing and reconciling relationships between Thai nationals and Burmese migrants 
• Understanding and recording the discriminations faced by Burmese minorities 
• Developing a social map which would identify the number and locations of Burmese 
families and the ages of each family member 
• Creating accountability institutions that will guarantee that the rights of Burmese are 
respected  
 Tensions between Thai and Burmese are significantly caused by a large illegal migrant 
population which threatens and irritates Thai nationals.  Heavier security along the 
Thailand/Myanmar border, as well as increased systems of accountability for border control 
officers could reduce the number of illegal immigrants to Thailand, and could potentially aid in 
easing tensions between Thais and Burmese.  
6.3 Political Philosophy and Vulnerability 
 To illustrate the influence of political ideology on disaster vulnerability I address three 
key questions: 
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i. How has governance in Thailand impacted disaster vulnerability? 
ii. Is the political ideology of Thailand compatible with vulnerability reduction? 
iii. Is vulnerability reduction (with goals of equity) possible in Thailand? 
6.3.1 Governance and Vulnerability in Thailand  
 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Thailand was a sweetheart of neoliberal economists 
who supported capitalistic development and, until the 1997 financial crisis, was a blot on the 
arguments of dependency theorists (Unknown, 2001).  Thailand’s economic agenda has followed 
state-led development in which the Thai government has ‘managed capitalism’ allowing limited 
government involvement in some areas of the economy; decentralizing power to local levels; and 
by continuing to promote foreign direct investment.  Despite this, practical governance in 
Thailand, especially related to tourism and coastal development, has been laissez-faire with a 
focus on foreign direct investment, free trade and a commitment to free-market capitalism.  
Thailand’s rapid economic growth has created large disparities in wealth across the country and 
has resulted in mismanagement: “business has reveled in the atmosphere of free-for-all.  The 
machinery for social protection has proved very pliable.  The legal framework is defective.  The 
judiciary suspect.  The police are unreliable [and] Efforts to strengthen the social infrastructure 
have been brushed aside” (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1998, p.322).  In fact, Thailand has a Gini 
coefficient26 of 3.2 and ranks 82nd out of 124 countries, thereby demonstrating a medium to high 
social and economic inequality (Wikipedia, 2006c).  However, Thailand’s economic policies 
towards tourism have not been radical compared with other tropical countries: “In most cases, 
governments argue in favor of tourism” (Gossling, 2003, 30).  Wisner (2001) believes that some 
                                                 
26 The Gini coefficient is a standard measure of inequality, but is most often used to measure 
income inequality.  “It is a number between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds to perfect equality and 
1 corresponds to perfect inequality (Wikipedia, 2006a). 
   
 146 
of the claims of neoliberal economics are mere propaganda: “neoliberalism the world over shares 
a faith that opening the country up to business interests, without any regulation geared towards 
protecting the most vulnerable and ensuring that basic services and access to opportunities are 
guaranteed to all, will take care of poverty and develop the country” (Wisner, 2001, 258).   
Unfortunately, while the invisible hand of the free market has facilitated a thriving 
tourism industry in Thailand, it has also increased disaster vulnerability for many.  Thailand’s 
excessive focus on a tourism-based economy, particularly at the local levels, has neither been 
adequately organized nor has it given sufficient attention to environmental management.  In fact, 
one of the biggest setbacks to responsible coastal zone management in Thailand is the lack of 
government organization.  Efficiency and capacity in the areas of law enforcement and policy 
implementation are particularly impeded by the realities of governmental administration in 
Thailand: decentralization of power has occurred without the development of adequate lines of 
communication between levels of government (E. R. Bhatt, 1998).  In addition, Thailand’s 
governments are usually formed by coalition.  That is, municipalities are sometimes headed by 
officials of different political parties, with interests that oppose the national agenda.  For this 
reason, policies are difficult to pass (Tan, 1998).  Likewise, decisions at the local level are 
heavily influenced by the vested interests of local authorities and powerful community members, 
and since Thai culture has long preferred non-litigious means of settlement “many environmental 
disputes are settled out-of-court through mediation efforts” (Tan, 1998, 8).   
 Lack of organization in Thailand’s lower-level echelons of government, paired with lax 
environmental and coastal zone management initiatives, has influenced disaster vulnerability in a 
number of important ways:   
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i. lack of attention to environmental management and heavy tourism marketing pre-tsunami 
strongly increased environmental degradation and disaster vulnerability for coastal 
communities 
ii. heavy reliance on the tourism industry led to an absence of diversification in coastal 
economies and inhibited resilience post-tsunami 
iii. inadequate enforcement of building laws and national park laws enabled rampant 
development on coastlines and beaches 
iv. decentralization of power without transparency or accountability systems enabled aid 
profiteering, nepotism and backhandedness of authorities  
v. lack of control over local officials allowed for the mistreatment of special population 
groups. 
Thailand’s coastlines are heavily degraded and under threat.  As an industry, tourism has 
been successful in Thailand, but in some cases, over-development in coastal areas has devastated 
the environment and has made communities extremely susceptible to disasters.  Thailand’s 
commitment to neo-liberal economic policies paired with its weak municipal governments has 
amplified disaster vulnerability.  Capitalism and disaster reduction can only co-exist only if 
governments play a responsible role in balancing the two.  There is a lot of room for increased 
vulnerability reduction in Thailand, but vulnerability reduction will only be trivial if it is not 
paired with significant modifications to Thailand’s economic strategies and governance patterns.   
6.4 Recommendations 
 
The Asian tsunami caused enormous damage to Thailand’s natural coastlines and its 
tourism and fishing industries, and was devastating for families and friends of tsunami victims.  
However, in brainstorming adequate disaster preparedness strategies and vulnerability reduction 
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schemes, the Royal Thai government, as well as NGOs and civil society need to be realistic 
about the real hazard risk for Southern Thailand’s coastal communities27.   Risk Management 
Solutions (2006) reported that areas experience a high risk of tsunamis if they have a return 
period of under 500 years and concluded that “the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami has a return 
period longer than 500 years, and there is no prospect of another event of comparable size being 
generated on this particular section of the plate boundary” (RMS, 2006, 21).  Another report, 
conducted by the Norwegian Geotechnical Institute 2005, has a similar conclusion: the 
December 24th earthquake “released much of the energy that had accumulated” along the 
subduction zone and that “it will take at least 300 to 400 years before an event of similar 
magnitude and consequences will occur again” (CCOP & DMR, 2006, 1).  However, the report 
also indicates that an earthquake of up to a magnitude of 8.5 is possible within the next 50-100 
years (CCOP & DMR, 2006).  Though such an earthquake would have only a small risk to 
human life, if a tsunami were to occur during a storm surge or during high tide, inundation levels 
would be much higher and risk would increase (CCOP & DMR, 2006).  Though the societal 
tsunami risk for Thailand is considered “tolerable” within the next 100-200 years, experts from 
the Norwegian Geotechnical Institute have made it clear that risk increases as time passes and 
“the long-term risk is definitely unacceptable” and that “similar events will inevitably happen 
again” (CCOP & DMR, 2006, 2, 13).  The same report emphasizes the importance of developing 
“lasting long term awareness” of tsunami risk and recommends that “authorities in Thailand 
already now plan for implementation of some mitigation measures that can reduce the exposure 
to, and consequences of severe tsunamis to future generations” (CCOP & DMR, 2006, 2).   
                                                 
27 A study conducted by the Norwegian Geotechnical Institute (2005) defines tsunami risk as 
“the product of tsunami hazard times its consequence in terms of economic loss and/or loss of 
human life” (CCOP, 2006). 
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Table 10: Frequency of Earthquakes and Tsunamis 
Geophysical Events Involving Tsunamis in Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean Basins
  Indian Ocean Basin   
1881 Earthquake and tsunami Andaman Sea 
1883 Volcanic Eruption and tsunami Krakatoa, Indonesia 
Jan-41 Earthquake and tsunami Andaman Sea 
Nov-45 Earthquake and tsunami North Arabia Sea 
Aug-76 Earthquake and tsunami Philippines 
Aug-77 Earthquake and tsunami Indonesia 
Jul-98 Earthquake and tsunami Papua, New Guinea 
Dec-04 Earthquake and tsunami Indian Ocean 
  Pacific Ocean Basin   
Jun-1896 Earthquake and tsunami Honshu, Japan 
Apr-46 Earthquake and tsunami Aleutian Islands, Alaska 
Nov-52 Earthquake and tsunami Kamchatka 
Mar-57 Earthquake and tsunami Aleutian Islands 
Jul-58 Earthquake and tsunami Lituya Bay, Alaska 
May-60 Earthquake and tsunami Valdivia, Chile 
Mar-64 Earthquake and tsunami Prince Williams Sound, Alaska 
Nov-75 Earthquake and tsunami Hawaii 
Sep-92 Earthquake and tsunami Nicaragua 
Jun-01 Earthquake and tsunami Arequipa, Peru 
The tsunami has revealed that coastal communities in Thailand would benefit 
tremendously from additional disaster vulnerability reduction efforts, especially those which 
address all hazards facing coastal communities.  Both Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi need to address 
issues of environmental management and development as well as social issues of gender and 
ethnic equality.  Despite a relatively low risk of another such tsunami in the Andaman sea, 
coastal communities in Thailand and around the world are in a precarious position.  As the earth 
continues to warm, the frequency of flooding, hurricanes and tornadoes is increasing and coastal 
zones are increasingly vulnerable to disaster.  It would be irresponsible to for Southern Thailand 
to ignore these threats, and governments should seek to decrease future disaster vulnerability. 
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6.4.1 Recommendations for Aid donors 
 Throughout this study, travelers, family and friends have informally asked about the flow 
of aid to tsunami-stricken areas and have questioned whether donations from the West have been 
received by those who need it most.  In some instances I have hesitated to be candid in my 
response.  Corruption certainly exists, in Thailand, and elsewhere and often impairs disaster 
response and redevelopment.  In Thailand, some members of society gained wealth as a result of 
unequal aid distribution, officials especially.  This is a legitimate problem which means that 
charities and NGOs sometimes run the risk of acting as scapegoats for mismanaged governance.  
When governments mishandle relief aid, organizations are often there to fill in the ‘aid gaps.’  
Some believe that a reduction in ‘free’ aid would encourage responsible governance.  However, 
in doing so, we would be sacrificing those most vulnerable.  Thus, it is important that 
humanitarian organizations and those who donate to them continue to provide for the most 
vulnerable, and encourage the public to require more of their governments, but it is also 
necessary that these organizations make efforts to work with governments in order to increase 
accountability. 
6.4.2 Recommendations for Governments, Decision Makers and Stakeholders 
In this study, I believed it was important to seek the advice of those directly affected by 
the tsunami.  A list of recommendations was formulated, based on the input of participants.  The 
most common request made by participants was for a tsunami warning system.  Over 55% of 
participants from Koh Phi Phi and 70% of participants in Khao Lak mentioned the necessity of 
developing a tsunami warning system, including sirens.  Although some sirens had already been 
constructed, many felt these were not loud enough and were therefore inadequate.  Below is a list 
of recommendations organized by type.  Environmental, developmental, economic, cultural, and 
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disaster relief recommendations are provided here and are supported both by interviewee 
requests as well as by the opinions of other researchers of the tsunami in Thailand. 
 
Table 11: Recommendations 
Environmental Recommendations 
1 Create a waste management program on Koh Phi Phi Don in which garbage is collected 
regularly and is not solely the responsibility of individual households and restaurants. 
 *A waste clean up and disposal program (Interview 2e) 
2 Reclaim all national park land on Koh Phi Phi Don with aims for marine park 




Establish and enforce building codes with aims of reduced vulnerability 
 *Develop plans and policies in order that building is not crowded (Interview 2q,2s) 
 *Establish new building codes and new requirements for land-use planning to reduce tsunami 
impacts (CCOP & DMR, 2006) 
2 When appropriate, install protective barriers that will reduce tsunami impact in the 
future 
 *Build an artificial protective dam (Interview 1g, 1l) 
 *Construct artificial wall or dike to limit impact (CCOP & DMR, 2006) 
3 Adapt building design and materials to minimize damage and risk during a disaster (i.e. 
reinforce support beams) 
 *Halt building projects that involved metal roofs as these were a significant cause of injury 
and death in the tsunami (Interview 2k);  
Economic Recommendations 
1 Establish restrictions on the number of tourists for popular tourist areas 
2 Encourage economic diversification in Thailand’s coastal communities 
Cultural Recommendations 
1 Increased participation of the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, 
specifically the Office of Welfare Promotion, Protection and Empowerment of 
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Vulnerable Groups, with goals of equity for ethnic minority groups 
 “Thai people can get a lot of help from the government, but they don’t give anything to the 
Burmese” (Interviewee 1r). 
2 Establishment of a community group willing to collaborate with the National Statistics 
Office with goals of social mapping: disaster response coordinators need to know who 
will need special care, and where they are 
 “I want to talk with the Prime Minister and local leader about making a social map” 
(Interviewee 1g) 
 *Inform Burmese people about disaster plans, strategies, and protocol (Interview  
Disaster Relief Recommendations 
1 Develop a tsunami warning system 
 Tsunami warning systems will be important in the longer term perspective, but will 
contribute to awareness (CCOP & DMR, 2006) 
2 Set up emergency shelters 
 *Construct an emergency shelter (Interview 1f, 1g) 
 Create ‘safe areas’ (artificially elevated) within 500m reach (CCOP & DMR, 2006) 
3 Formulate community evacuation plans with annual emergency drills 
 *Establish evacuation plans (Interviews 2a) 
*Build wider roads that enable efficient evacuation (Interview1g) 
 Establish well marked escape routes (CCOP & DMR, 2006) 
4 Provide disaster counseling and assemble mental health facilities in communities 
impacted by the tsunami 
 *Increase post-disaster counseling (Interview 1g) 
These suggestions have been made based on identified gaps in existing disaster 
management initiatives and represent the genuine needs of community members in Koh Phi Phi 
and Khao Lak.  The recommendations provided above should act as a starting point for those 
responsible for developing disaster preparedness and response plans in these areas.  The practical 
implementation of these suggestions would not only decrease disaster vulnerability, but would 
increase community cohesion and demonstrate to the public that their opinions and concerns are 
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heard and valuable.  In order for these opinions to be heard and for vulnerability reduction to 
occur in Thailand, a number of political issues need to be addressed:  
• Increased communication and accountability systems between levels of government 
• Local governments, with assistance from the MONRE, must nurture relationships with 
civil society in order to convince locals of the benefits of environmental preservation and 
to dissuade development at any cost 
• The Ministry of Industry and specifically the Department of Industrial Promotion should 
invest in and promote business and industrial diversification in Southern Thailand in 
order to revive non-tourism bases occupations i.e. fishing, agricultural work 
• Commit to forcefully implementing building and national park laws 
• Local-level officials must face systems of accountability and transparency 
One of the biggest threats to meaningful vulnerability reduction in Thailand is one of 
economics and appropriate tourism development.  Currently, the tourism industry in Koh Phi Phi 
and Khao Lak provides low-cost travel opportunities for high volumes of tourists.  For any 
significant amount of vulnerability reduction to occur in Thailand, the Thai government must be 
willing to either: enforce restrictions on tourist numbers and accept a decrease in tourism 
revenue, or; must alter the type of tourism development.  For example, a switch to small-scale 
luxury resorts may have the potential to generate the same total revenues.  Still, the prospects of 
this are relatively small since global examples of restricting tourist numbers are few (Huahine 
and Tuamotu islands) (Brunet, 2001; Gossling, 2003).  In Thailand tourism is proving 
increasingly integral to the Thai economy: The World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) 
“estimates the proportion of tourism to Thailand’s GDP will increase from 11.7 percent in 2005 
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to 12.6 percent in 2014” (FPRI, 2005, 1), and this makes the prospect of controlled tourism even 
smaller.  
6.4.3 Theoretical Recommendations  
 Though most theorists mention the role of political, economic, social, cultural and 
environmental processes in influencing vulnerability to disaster, there should be greater attention 
paid to the fact that these factors are dynamic and relational.  Vulnerabilities are always in a state 
of flux as are the processes that shape them.  It is important to understand that the overlap in 
vulnerability factors increases overall vulnerability, but it is first important to recognize that 
vulnerability results from a combination of processes.  This combination could be understood as 
follows.  
 
The difference in the way academics have written about factors of vulnerability appears 
to be primarily semantic rather than conceptual.  In fact, most existing ‘factors’ could fit well 
within the above equation. For example, McEntire’s (2001) ‘physical’ variable, Pelling and 
Uitto’s (2002) ‘geographical process’ and Cannon’s (2000) ‘physical fragility’ could all be 
framed within ‘environmental risk.’  Some theorists have argued that ‘vulnerability’ has been 
used in so many contexts and has been so widely theorized that it is at risk of becoming useless 
(Cannon, 2000).  Vulnerabilities literature is dense with types and classifications of 
vulnerabilities, but the literature lacks consistent terminology and unanimity.  There needs to be 
consensus about the factors that contribute to vulnerability because these shape the more 
practical ‘vulnerability analyses.’  If vulnerabilities terminology was more universal in the 
literature it would increase the clarity of the theoretical discussions around disaster vulnerability 
Vulnerability= Political frailty x Economic Insecurity x Social Marginalization x Cultural 
Practice x Environmental risk x Hazard 
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and would be more accessible to disaster management professionals interested in developing 
vulnerabilities analyses.  In order to develop this consensus, vulnerability theorists should: place 
greater emphasis on including disaster victims in redevelopment initiatives and allowing victims 
of disaster to explain why they were particularly vulnerable and should develop vulnerability 
factors based on similar disasters and similar locations (Vatsa & Krimgold, 2000; Wisner, 
2005a).  Increasing public participation in disaster response would have a number of benefits: 
• Collective has the potential to improve local empowerment.28 Thus, the 
involvement of people in their own vulnerability reduction has the potential to 
increase community cohesiveness.  
• Participation in community decisions mobilizes people to act on their own behalf 
(Guijt & Shah, 1998).  
• Poor people have valuable capabilities that can positively change their situations 
(Guijt & Shah, 1998). 
 
                                                 
28 See Paulo Frire’s (1976) concept of ‘conscientization.’ 
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7 CONCLUSION 
 My research has been rooted in the vulnerability approach to disasters and has focused on 
understanding the primary causes of vulnerability for the communities of Koh Phi Phi Don and 
Khao Lak, Thailand.  As a starting point for this research, I identified that vulnerabilities are in a 
constant state of flux and combine with one another in ways that often multiply vulnerability.  
However, it was my intention to determine the influence of governance on vulnerability factors, 
in order to determine the ways that public policies and systems of governance enhance or reduce 
disaster vulnerability.   
 For disaster mitigation to occur (that is, the responsible combination of disaster 
preparedness and development), political and social systems that enable economic restructuring 
must be in place.  It is usually not a situation of whether these systems are in place, but to what 
degree they impede or enhance vulnerability.  Political and social institutions which have the 
ability to influence vulnerability exist on a ‘continuum of adequacy’, with some severely 
impeding vulnerability reduction, and some increasing disaster resilience. 
 In agreement with a number of disaster theorists (Cannon, 2000; Maskrey, 1989; Wisner, 
2001; Yodmani, 2001) my research has led to a general conclusion that capitalistic styles of 
development have the potential to enhance disaster vulnerability. However, I am unconvinced 
that these two are absolutely relational i.e. if capitalism then vulnerability.  Disaster vulnerability 
has also been high in socialist societies which embrace closed market economic strategies.  To 
answer one of my research questions: is vulnerability reduction possible in a capitalistic state? I 
suggest that it is possible, but meaningful vulnerability reduction depends significantly on 
governance.  McEntire (2001) is quite right when he calls for a disaster management scheme that 
addresses all agents (including the public) however, the most effective approach would start with 
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governance and would incorporate bi-lateral agencies, NGOs and civil society.  Any meaningful 
vulnerability reduction requires transparent, accountable political institutions which give as 
much attention to environmental management and social welfare as economic advancement.  
 Though numerous vulnerability reduction strategies exist, none explicitly attempt to 
incorporate vulnerability reduction and capitalism.  Arguably, one of the most promising 
approaches, ‘invulnerable development’, seeks to “promote social, political and economic 
advances and minimize the possibility that such progress may be nullified by disaster” (David A. 
McEntire, 2001, 194).  The reality is that, despite environmental or social insecurity, free market 
economics is the darling of governments, corporations and even small businesses.  On Phi Phi 
Island, it is the locals, not the corporations, who are protesting against land reform and 
environmental laws.  Even if the Thai government was committed to vulnerability reduction and 
environmental management they would receive little support from small communities unless 
they offered strategies that would combine vulnerability reduction with economic growth.   
7.1 Implications 
 The findings of this research are generally consistent with disaster literature of the past.  
In fact, many have argued for development that incorporates disaster preparedness; academic 
literature is full of examples of the negative impacts of tourism on coastal environments, 
including enhanced vulnerability to disasters (Gossling, 2003; Wilson, 1996); and many theorists 
contend that capitalistic styles of development have increased disaster vulnerability (Wisner, 
2003).  The case studies in Khao Lak and Thailand have demonstrated that although unregulated 
capitalism does enhance disaster vulnerability, many (including local citizens and higher 
echelons of government) are unwilling to modify development even following recent and 
devastating disasters which were in part enhanced by past development patterns.  Disaster 
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management strategies, with aims of environmental preservation and vulnerability reduction, will 
work best with the support of civil society, economists and politicians, and in many cases this 
will only happen if vulnerability reduction strategies go hand in hand with capitalism.   
 The practical implications of vulnerability reduction through capitalistic development 
would mean that disaster relief and reconstruction agencies should also aim to reduce 
vulnerabilities through economic re-development.  The time immediately following a disaster is 
critical: decisions are made that affect a community’s economy, vulnerability and relationship to 
the environment for years.  Redevelopment and economic planning during that time often 
determines whether communities follow old methods of development or reinvent their 
economies.  Post-disaster, one important need is the presence of economists with the ability to 
work with environmental coordinators, land-use planners, politicians and locals in order to 
reinvent economies by identifying (in the case of coastal Thailand): the demand for tourism; the 
labour market; and the capacities for all economically viable livelihoods.   
 Theoretically, there is a need to develop a post-disaster approach to redevelopment that 
would illustrate the steps community leaders should take, the people who should be sought for 
advice (i.e. economists, environmental planners, policy-makers), and the issues that should be 
addressed before redevelopment begins.  Though it seems clear that disaster-stricken 
communities should strive for vulnerability reduction with economic progress, it is difficult to 
know what this would look like.  Eco-tourism ventures are often thought a positive example, but 
the logistics of enforcing eco-tourism may be problematic.  As tourism continues as a primary 
industry for tropical coastal communities, there is a growing need to identify solutions to the 
impacts of tourism, on the environment and on disaster vulnerability.   
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 Explorations of gendered and ethnic differences of how people experience, understand 
and respond to disaster would be useful to identifying and formulating response plans.  
Practically this might involve vulnerability analyses focused specifically on ethnic minorities and 
women, and identification of disaster coping strategies and response plans that are helpful to 
each.   
7.2 Future Research 
 Finally, the relationship between governance and disaster vulnerability requires more 
research.  Specifically, future academics interested in taking a vulnerability perspective in regard 
to disaster management could increase the validity of a governance-based approach by pursuing 
vulnerability analyses from a political economy or political ecology perspective.  Needed are 
practical examples of the ways in which governance has influence vulnerability in both 
developed and non-developed nations. 
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8 Key Informant Reference List 
Interviewee 1a. 2006. Receptionist, Khao Lak town. September 26. 
Interviewee 1b. Cook, Ba Nam Kem. September 26 
Interviewee 1c. Dim Sum restaurant operator, Ba Nam Kem. September 26. 
Interviewee 1d. Restaurant operator, Bang Niang. September 27.  
Interviewee 1e. Launderer, Ba Nam Kem. September 27. 
Interviewee 1f. Restaurant owner, Ba Nam Kem. September 28. 
Interviewee 1g. Restaurant owner, Ba Nam Kem. September 28. 
Interviewee 1h. Bakery owner, Ba Nam Kem. September 28. 
Interviewee 1i. Architect, Khao Lak town. September 29. 
Interviewee 1j. Receptionist, Bang Niang. September 29. 
Interviewee 1k. Sales manager in a diving shop, Khao Lak town. September 30. 
Interviewee 1l. Tailor, Ba Nam Kem. October 4.  
Interviewee 1m. Restaurant owner, Bang Niang. October 5. 
Interviewee 1n. Bakery/restaurant owner, Bang Niang. October 5. 
Interviewee 1o. Fisher. Ba Nam Kem. October 6. 
Interviewee 1p. Labourer, Ba Nam Kem. October 10. 
Interviewee 1q. Hotel manager, Bang Niang. October 10. 
Interviewee 1r. Labourer in noodle factory, Ba Nam Kem. October 11. 
Interviewee 1s. Female head of household, Ba Nam Kem. October 11. 
Interviewee 1t. Shrimp farm laborer, Ba Nam Kem. October 6. 
Interviewee 2a. Guesthouse owner, Koh Phi Phi Don. October 16. 
Interviewee 2b. Masseuse, Koh Phi Phi Don. October 17. 
Interviewee 2d. Owner of: guesthouse; tourism office; accounting office; beauty parlor; 
restaurant and mini-mart, Koh Phi Phi Don. October 17.  
Interviewee 2e. Maid, Koh Phi Phi Don. October 18. 
Interviewee 2f. Bungalow and restaurant owner, Koh Phi Phi Don. October 18. 
Interviewee 2g. Tour shop employee, Koh Phi Phi Don. October 18. 
Interviewee 2h. Speed boat driver, Koh Phi Phi Don. October 19. 
Interviewee 2i. Restaurant maintenance, Koh Phi Phi Don. October 19. 
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Interviewee 2j. Restaurant worker, Koh Phi Phi Don. October 20. 
Interviewee 2k. Mountain climbing tour leader, Koh Phi Phi Don. October 20. 
Interviewee 2l. Coconut tree cutter, Koh Phi Phi Don. October 21. 
Interviewee 2m. Tourist information worker, Koh Phi Phi Don. October 21. 
Interviewee 2n. Diving Instructor, Koh Phi Phi Don. October 23. 
Interviewee 2o. Restaurant owner, Koh Phi Phi Don. October 24. 
Interviewee 2p. Guesthouse manager, Koh Phi Phi Don. October 25. 
Interviewee 2q. Launderer, Koh Phi Phi Don. October 25. 
Interviewee 2r. Retail worker, Koh Phi Phi Don. October 26. 
Key Informant Interview #1. Senior staff manager.  Interview at Habitat for Humanity, Khao 
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